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Abstract 
We use insurance claims data covering 28 percent of individuals with employer-sponsored health insurance in the 
US to study the variation in health spending on the privately insured, examine the structure of insurer-hospital 
contracts, and analyze the variation in hospital prices across the nation. Health spending per privately insured 
beneficiary differs by a factor of three across geographic areas and has a very low correlation with Medicare 
spending. For the privately insured, half of the spending variation is driven by price variation across regions and 
half is driven by quantity variation. Prices vary substantially across regions, across hospitals within regions, and 
even within hospitals. For example, even for a near homogenous service such as lower-limb MRIs, about a fifth of 
the total case-level price variation occurs within a hospital in the cross-section. Hospital market structure is 
strongly associated with price levels and contract structure. Prices at monopoly hospitals are 12 percent higher 
than those in markets with four or more rivals. Monopoly hospitals also have contracts that load more risk on 
insurers (e.g. they have more cases with prices set as a share of their charges). In concentrated insurer markets the 
opposite occurs – hospitals have lower prices and bear more financial risk. Examining the 366 merger and 
acquisitions that occurred between 2007 and 2011, we find that prices increased by over 6 percent when the 
merging hospitals were geographically close (e.g. 5 miles or less apart), but not when the hospitals were 
geographically distant (e.g. over 25 miles apart). 
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percent of the population.
1
 For the most part, Medicare pays hospitals using prospectively-set 
reimbursements that are formula-based. By contrast, hospital prices for the privately insured are 
set via negotiations between hospitals and insurers. Unfortunately, private health insurance 
claims data in general and the results of these hospital/insurer negotiations in particular – 
hospitals’ transaction prices – have been treated as commercially sensitive and have been largely 
unavailable to researchers.  
In this study, we use newly accessible claims data from three of the five largest private 
insurers in the US to study the variation in health spending on the privately insured. Notably, the 
data we use includes hospitals’ transaction prices. As a result, we are able to study the role that 
variation in hospitals’ prices plays in influencing health spending variation for the privately 
insured; to describe the variation in hospital prices across regions, within regions, and within 
hospitals; and to analyze the extent to which hospital and insurer market structures are associated 
with hospital price levels and the design of insurer-hospital payments (henceforth, “contracts”).  
The main data we use in this analysis are claims from Aetna, Humana, and UnitedHealth, 
which were provided by the Health Care Cost Institute (HCCI). Our data capture the claims from 
the health care services delivered to 27.6 percent of individuals in the US with employer-
sponsored coverage between 2007 and 2011. The data include more than 88 million unique 
individuals and capture over $125 billion in health spending per year. The paper proceeds in 
three stages. 
First, we present a national picture of the variation in health spending per privately 
insured beneficiary across all 306 hospital referral regions (HRRs) in the US.
2
 Risk-adjusted 
health spending per privately insured beneficiary age 18 to 64 varies by a factor of more than 
three across these regions. The HRR in the 90
th
 percentile of the spending distribution (Grand 
Junction, Colorado) spends 47 percent more than the HRR in the 10
th
 percentile of the spending 
distribution (Sarasota, Florida). Spending per privately insured beneficiary and spending per 
Medicare beneficiary have a correlation of only 0.044 across HRRs. For the Medicare program 
1 Our discussion of Medicare is focused on the traditional, publicly administered Medicare program. See Curtu et al. 
(2017) for a comparison of the traditional, public Medicare program and the privately administered Medicare 
Advantage program. The remainder of the population have coverage from the Medicaid program, other payers (e.g. 
the Veterans Administration), or are uninsured. 
2 Hospital referral regions are geographic regions created by researchers at the Dartmouth Institute for Health Care 
Policy to approximate markets for tertiary medical care in the US. Each HRR generally includes at least one major 
referral center and the US is divided into 306 HRRs. See 
www.dartmouthatlas.org/downloads/methods/geogappdx.pdf for more information. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over 55 percent of the US population has private health insurance. In 2017, the average 
insurance premium for employer-sponsored health coverage for a family of four was $18,764 
and between 2007 and 2017, premiums increased by about 55 percent (Kaiser Family 
Foundation, 2017). However, because of data availability, most of our understanding of health 
care spending comes from the analysis of the Medicare program, which covers less than 15 
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(where prices are set administratively), variation in hospital reimbursement rates account for 
only 13 percent of the variation in spending across regions, whereas the variation in the quantity 
of care delivered across regions accounts for 95 percent of the national variation in spending 
(these sum to more than 100 percent because a covariance term accounts for -8 percent). This 
fact has motivated research analyzing the factors that drive variation in the amount of care 
delivered across regions (e.g. Finkelstein, Gentzkow, and Williams [2016] and Cutler et al. 
[2017]). By contrast, for the privately insured, about half of the variation in spending is driven by 
price variation across regions and half is driven by quantity variation. This motivates us to focus 
on analyzing the drivers of hospital price variation.  
The second stage of our analysis looks at the variation in hospital prices and the structure 
of hospital payment contracts. Hospital care represents nearly 6 percent of GDP (Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, 2017) and is expensive – the average price of an inpatient case 
in 2011 is $14,240 in our data. Hospital prices vary significantly across the country and across 
hospitals within HRRs. For example, hospitals with risk-adjusted knee replacement prices in the 
90
th
 percentile of the national distribution of hospitals are 2.3 times as expensive as hospitals in 
the 10
th
 percentile. Likewise, in one representative HRR (Philadelphia, PA), the hospital in the 
90
th
 percentile of prices in the region is over twice as expensive as the hospital in the 10
th
 
percentile. This variation is also present for plausibly undifferentiated services, such as lower-
limb MRIs, which suggests that the dispersion we observe is not simply a function of differences 
in hospital quality or patient severity across providers.  
Our data allow us to extend beyond previous analysis and identify the variation in prices 
for health care services delivered within hospitals. We find that the variation in prices within 
hospitals for services ranging from joint replacements to lower-limb MRIs is substantial. We find 
that over a fifth of the total price variation across cases in the average month-year occurs within 
hospitals for the same procedure, after controlling for hospital fixed effects, insurance plan 
characteristics, and patient characteristics. That there is such substantial variation in prices for 
plausibly undifferentiated procedures such as lower limb MRIs within hospitals suggests that the 
relative bargaining power of insurers with hospitals can strongly influence price levels.  
We then analyze how hospitals are paid. While there has been recent work looking at 
how physicians set their negotiated prices with commercial insurers (Clemens, Gottlieb, and 
Molnar, 2017), much less is known about insurer-hospital contracts. We find that about 23 
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percent of hospitals’ inpatient cases have prices set as a share of hospitals’ charges - a “cost 
plus” contract that loads idiosyncratic patient risk onto the insurers.
3
 We estimate no more than 
57 percent of cases are on contracts where prices are prospectively set as a percentage of 
Medicare payment rates. This implies that hospital prices are less closely linked to the Medicare 
fee schedule than the 75 percent of cases that Clemens and Gottlieb (2017) observed for 
physicians’ prices. 
In the third stage of our analysis, we look at whether there is a link between market 
structure, hospital prices, and contractual form. Hospital prices and contract form are determined 
by bargaining between hospitals and insurers. Market structure is related to bargaining power – 
hospitals with fewer potential competitors are likely in a stronger negotiating position with 
insurers, and vice versa. Further motivating this analysis, as we illustrate in Appendix Figure I, 
there has been significant consolidation in the hospital sector between 2001 and 2011. During 
that period, based on data we collected, there were, on average, 66 merger and acquisition 
(M&A) transactions per year.
4
 This led the Herfindahl Hirschman index (HHI) in hospital 
markets where mergers occurred to increase by 19 percent over this period.
5
  
In our cross-sectional analysis, we find that hospitals in monopoly markets (relative to 
hospitals in quadropoly or greater markets) have 12.5 percent higher prices, 10.5 percentage 
points more cases paid as a share of charges (over a mean of 18.6 percent), and 11.3 percentage 
points fewer of their prospectively paid cases that have prices set as a share of Medicare payment 
rates (over a mean of 48.3 percent).
6
 By contrast, hospitals located in areas where the three 
insurers in our data had a high (collective) market share had significantly lower prices and 
participated in contracts that exposed insurers to less financial risk. A 10 percentage point 
increase in the insurers’ market share is associated with 7 percent lower prices, 4 percentage 
points less cases paid as a share of charges, and 6 percentage points more prospectively paid 
cases that have prices set as a percentage of Medicare payments.  
3 Hospital charges are the amount hospitals bill for care (i.e. their list prices). Individuals who self-fund their care 
are typically the only ones who pay hospitals their charges. 
4 We have made our roster of hospital mergers available at www.healthcarepricingproject.org. 
5 We measure a HHI for each hospital in our data within a circular area around each hospital defined by a 15-mile 
radius. We measure a hospital’s market share as its share of total hospital beds in those areas.  
6 We measure hospital market structure by counting competitors within a circular area around each hospital defined 
by a radius of 15 miles. In the results section we show that our results are robust to many alternative measures of 
hospital market structure and different market definitions.  
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To look at events that shifted market structure over time, we use our comprehensive 
database of hospital mergers combined with the HCCI panel data to examine how hospital prices 
evolve before and after merger events using difference-in-difference analysis. After mergers 
occurred, we find that prices increase by over 6 percent if the merging hospitals were close 
neighbors (less than or equal to five miles apart). The size of the post-merger price increases 
decline as the distance between merging parties increases, and there are no significant merger 
coefficients once merging hospitals are located over 25 miles apart. We find no pre-merger 
differences in trends in prices between merging and non-merging hospitals and show that our 
results are robust when we use various procedures to match treated and control hospitals.  
Our paper builds on a sizable literature that has used Medicare claims data to document 
large variations in health spending per beneficiary across HRRs (Fisher et al., 2003a,b; 
Finkelstein, Gentzkow, and Williams, 2016). A smaller literature has documented similar 
variation in spending on privately insured individuals using limited data samples. Both Chernew 
et al. (2010) and Newhouse et al. (2013) have documented that there is a low correlation between 
Medicare spending per beneficiary and private spending per beneficiary across HRRs. We add to 
this literature by using a much larger and more comprehensive national dataset to analyze health 
spending on the privately insured, by analyzing hospitals’ transaction prices, and by addressing 
the key question of why prices are so high in some regions, but not in others. Crucially, our data 
on hospitals’ transaction prices allow us to probe more deeply the claim in Chernew et al. (2010) 
and Philipson et al. (2010) that variation in health spending on the privately insured is driven by 
differences in hospital prices across regions.  
We also add to an existing literature that has used limited datasets to analyze variation in 
hospital transaction prices. Most of this literature has focused on describing differences in prices 
across regions (e.g. Government Accountability Office [2005], Ginsburg [2010], Coakley 
[2011], and White, Reschovsky, and Bond [2014]). We add to this literature by using data that 
cover the majority of hospitals nationally.
7
 This allows us to look at national variation in 
hospitals’ prices and compare hospital prices across and within geographic areas. Likewise, we 
risk-adjust prices, look at narrowly defined procedures (e.g. joint replacements without 
7 Our data contain transaction prices for 72 percent of non-critical access hospitals that are registered with the 
American Hospital Association (AHA). These 2,358 hospitals in our inpatient sample capture over 88 percent of 
total hospital admissions in the US (based on AHA data). Previous studies have generally relied on data from single 
states, a single employer, or a small set of urban areas. 
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complications), and focus on plausibly homogenous services (e.g. lower-limb MRIs). 
Collectively, this allows us to more effectively compare prices across hospitals by reducing the 
potential bias created from differences in quality and patient characteristics across hospitals. In 
addition, this is one of the first papers we are aware of that has described and quantified variation 
in prices within hospitals. Analyzing price variation within hospitals for broadly undifferentiated 
services allows us to hold quality constant. That we observe significant variation in prices across 
contracts within the same hospital provides evidence that the bargaining leverage of insurers 
influences hospital prices.  
Finally, we add to a large literature on hospital competition (see Gaynor, Ho, and Town, 
2015), which has generally found that hospital prices are higher in more concentrated markets. 
However, much of this literature has relied on estimates of transaction prices based on hospitals’ 
charges (rather than actual data on transaction prices) or has focused on data from limited areas 
or single states (often California). Our analysis shows that there is a positive but rather low 
correlation (0.314) between hospital charges and hospitals’ transaction prices. Moreover, we go 
beyond existing work by looking at the relationship between market structure and transaction 
prices using data from across the nation and by analyzing the relationship between market 
structure and the design of hospital-insurer contracts. Our findings are broadly consistent with 
models of insurer-hospital bargaining, such as Gowrisankaran, Nevo, and Town (2016) and Ho 
and Lee (2017). There is also an existing literature that has examined the effects of single 
mergers or small groups of mergers.
8
 We add to this literature by examining the post-merger 
price effects of all hospital mergers between 2007 and 2011.  
This paper is structured as follows. In Section II we outline our data, describe how we 
measure prices, and present descriptive statistics. In Section III we describe the variation in 
health spending across HRRs and determine the share of the variation that is a function of price 
differences across regions and the share that is a function of quantity differences. In Section IV, 
we describe the variation in hospital prices across HRRs, within HRRs, and within hospitals. In 
Section V, we describe insurer-hospital contracts. We then analyze the cross-sectional correlates 
of hospital price levels and contracts in Section VI, analyze mergers and hospital prices in 
Section VII, and make some concluding comments in Section VIII. Our online Appendices give 
8  See Gaynor, Ho, and Town (2015) for a summary of this literature. The exception is Dafny (2009), which 
examines the effect of 97 mergers that occurred between 1989 and 1996. 
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more details on data (A); how we construct risk-adjusted prices (B); our measures of market 
structure (C); how we identified mergers (D); econometric matching methods used in our merger 
analysis (E); and the robustness of our analysis in areas where Blue-Cross Blue Shield (BCBS) 
insurers had high and low market share (F). 
II. DATA AND VARIABLES
II.A. Health Care Cost Institute data 
The main data we use are from the Health Care Cost Institute (HCCI).
9
 We discuss the data in 
more detail in Appendix A, but outline some of the main features here. The HCCI database 
includes health insurance claims for individuals with coverage from three of the five largest 
insurance companies in the US: Aetna, Humana, and UnitedHealth. The data cover all health 
services paid for by the insurers from 2007 to 2011. We focus on individuals with employer-
sponsored coverage who are aged between 18 and 64 and for whom an HCCI payer is their 
primary insurer. The raw data covers 2.92 billion claims that were delivered to an insured 
population in our data of 88.7 million unique individuals (Appendix Table I).
10
  
Appendix Figure II shows the proportion of privately insured lives that the HCCI data 
cover by state.
11
 The HCCI database offers a significantly more comprehensive picture of private 
health spending across the US than other private health insurance claims databases. The most 
prominent alternative dataset of private health insurance claims is the MarketScan database. 
While MarketScan data includes individuals in 90 percent of HRRs in the US, some HRRs in the 
MarketScan data have very thin coverage and include fewer than 200 beneficiaries. By contrast, 
the HCCI data include individuals in all 306 HRRs and the smallest HRR in 2011 has 2,932 
beneficiaries. Appendix A1 gives a more detailed comparison between the datasets. 
Although we describe the most comprehensive picture to date of health spending on the 
privately insured, we do not have claims from every insurer and, in particular, from BCBS 
9 HCCI is a nonprofit organization dedicated to advancing knowledge about US health care costs and utilization. See 
http://www.healthcostinstitute.org for more information. 
10 The HCCI data are “de-identified” and do not include patient identifiers such as social security numbers, names, 
dates of birth, or addresses. Users of HCCI data are not allowed to publish results that identify patients, insurers, or 
hospitals by name. Because our data is de-identified, our project was exempted by the Yale Institutional Review 
Board. 
11 The data capture more than 30 percent of the privately insured population in Texas, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, 
Georgia, Kentucky, Ohio, Wisconsin, New Jersey, and Rhode Island. At the low end, the data capture between 1.9 





insurers. As a result, our analysis does not necessarily generalize to private health insurance 
spending in the US as a whole. BCBS plans covered 41 percent of covered lives across the small, 
medium, and large group markets in 2011.
12
To address possible concerns about the 
generalizability of our results, in Appendix F we reproduce all our main results using data from 
areas where BCBS plans have a high share of privately insured lives and areas where BCBS 
plans have a low share of privately insured lives.  
The HCCI data include a unique hospital identifier, a unique patient identifier, the date 
services were provided, hospitals’ charges (for 2010 and 2011), hospitals’ negotiated transaction 
prices (broken down by facility and physician fees), and payments to hospitals made by patients 
in the form of co-insurance payments, co-payments, and payments made before deductibles were 
met. As a result, we know the amounts paid to hospitals for all health care encounters recorded in 
our data.
13
 This allows us to analyze how prices vary within and across hospitals and study how 
insurers reimburse hospitals.  
We use an encrypted version of hospitals’ National Plan and Provider Identification 
System (NPI) code in the HCCI data to link to data on hospital characteristics from the American 
Hospital Association (AHA) annual survey, quality scores from Medicare’s Hospital Compare 
webpage, Medicare activity data from the 100 percent sample of Medicare claims (accessed via 
the American Hospital Directory (AHD)), Medicare reimbursement information from the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), and reputational quality scores from U.S. 
News & World Report. We use hospitals’ five-digit zip codes to link to local area characteristics 
from the Census. We use the system ID from the AHA data to identify multiple hospitals that are 
part of the same health system when we calculate our measures of hospital market structure.
14
 
The AHA annual survey sometimes consolidates hospital IDs when two hospitals merge, even 
when those two hospitals each remain open. We use various data sources to continue tracking the 
                                                        
12 Blue Cross Blue Shield is an association of 36 for-profit and not-for-profit health insurance companies in the 
United States. The BCBS insurance companies are licensees, the largest of which, Anthem, is a for-profit publicly 
traded firm that has beneficiaries in fourteen states. For more information on Blue Cross Blue Shield, see 
http://www.bcbs.com. We identify BCBS market share using data from HealthLeaders Interstudy, which is 
described in more detail in Appendix A. 
13  We present a sample hip replacement case constructed from claims data online at 
http://healthcarepricingproject.org/sites/default/files/papers/sample_hip_claims.xlsx.  
14  Hospitals that are part of the same health system are under common ownership (i.e. they are different 









II.B. Sample Definitions 
To support our analysis, we create three broad sub-samples from the raw HCCI data: the 
“spending samples”, the “inpatient price sample” and the “procedure samples”.  
The spending samples measure inpatient and overall spending per privately insured 
beneficiary. Our measure of total spending per beneficiary captures the sum of spending on 
inpatient, outpatient, and physician services, but excludes drug spending (we exclude 
prescription drug spending because it is not readily available for Medicare beneficiaries). Our 
measure of inpatient spending only captures inpatient hospital spending. We calculate spending 
per beneficiary by summing total or inpatient spending for each individual in our data in each 
HRR per year. To get the total number of private beneficiaries per HRR, we sum up the member 
months of coverage per HRR per year and divide by twelve. We use data from the Dartmouth 
Atlas for 2008 through 2011 to analyze variation in spending per Medicare beneficiary.
16
 
Following the approach taken by Dartmouth, we risk-adjust our HCCI spending samples for age 
and sex.
17 
In our decomposition of Medicare spending, we use data from the 100 percent sample 
of Medicare claims data that identifies how many cases in each diagnosis related group (DRG) 
case were provided by each hospital in the US in 2011. Our spending samples include claims for 
services that were delivered at all providers including, for example, care delivered at critical 
access hospitals.  
The inpatient price sample is derived from hospital claims for all inpatient care provided 
to our covered population (age 18 to 64) in AHA registered facilities.
18
 In total, there are 3,272 
                                                        
15 A complete list of data sources is contained in Appendix A1 and our process for identifying hospitals using their 
NPI code is outlined in Appendix A2. In Appendix A3, we detail our method for maintaining a consistent hospital-
level panel database in the face of merger activity. 
16  Data from the Dartmouth Atlas can be downloaded at: http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/tools/downloads.aspx. 
Information on how Medicare spending per beneficiary is calculated is available in their Research Methods 
document, accessible at: http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/downloads/methods/research_methods.pdf. 
17 Because we do not have data on race, we risk-adjust using age and sex as opposed to Dartmouth who risk-adjust 
using age, sex, and race. Like Dartmouth, we also risk-adjust spending using indirect standardization. For a detailed 
discussion of the risk-adjustment methods, see: 
http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/downloads/methods/indirect_adjustment.pdf. 
18 Our inpatient data in Appendix Table I includes some incomplete records. We exclude the 0.1 percent of cases 
that have missing or negative prices. A further 8 percent of cases are excluded because they are missing a provider 




non-critical access hospitals that are registered with the AHA during our sample period (see 
Appendix Table II) and we have all but 70 of them in the HCCI data. We focus our analysis on 
general medical and surgical hospitals and do not include specialist hospitals (e.g. orthopedic 
specialty hospitals). We exclude three hospitals for which we do not have Medicare payment 
information and also drop data from 2007 because of incomplete data (this leads to a loss of 10 
hospitals). We also limit our analysis to providers that delivered 50 or more cases per year, so 
that we had sufficient data to calculate our inpatient price index. Although this means losing a 
further 831 hospitals, these hospitals only account for 1.5 percent of our inpatient cases. We are 
left with 2,358 hospitals in our inpatient sample, which account for 88.4 percent of the total 
inpatient cases from the original 3,272 AHA hospitals that were eligible to be included in our 
analysis (Appendix A4 gives more detail on our sample restrictions).  
We also create seven procedure samples, which capture claims for hospital-based 
surgical or diagnostic inpatient and outpatient procedures. We create procedure samples for hip 
replacements, knee replacements, cesarean sections, vaginal deliveries, percutaneous 
transluminal coronary angioplasties (PTCAs), diagnostic colonoscopies, and magnetic resonance 
imaging (MRI) of lower-limb joints without contrast. These procedures occur with sufficient 
frequency to support empirical analysis and are relatively homogeneous, thereby facilitating 
comparison across facilities and areas (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2010). 
Each observation in the seven procedure samples includes all hospital claims from the 
time the patient entered the hospital until s/he exited the facility. We limit the observations 
included in our analysis to those without major medical complications and define the seven 
procedure samples narrowly using diagnosis and procedure codes to exclude atypical cases (see 
Appendix A4). We limit our observations to hospitals that deliver at least ten of a given 
procedure per year and applied the same cleaning rules we used to define our inpatient sample.
19
 
In total, from 2008 to 2011, we capture 470 hospitals performing hip replacements, 932 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
by DRG (these are cases with a length of stay of over six months in some cases). We then remove cases with prices 
in the top 1 percent and bottom 1 percent of the price distribution by DRG. Our results are robust to winsorizing 
these outliers instead of trimming them. 
19 For MRI we also require a separate physician claim for the reading of the MRI, which we do not include in our 
main analyses of price. We do this so that the facility portion we analyze only captures the taking the MRI as 
opposed to the reading of the MRI. We also restrict our lower-limb MRI cases to those for which the MRI itself was 
the only intervention occurring during the individual’s visit to the hospital. Focusing on MRIs performed during 
days where nothing else was done to the patient and outside of broader hospital admissions helps attenuate concerns 




performing knee replacements, 1,163 performing cesarean sections, 1,280 performing vaginal 
deliveries, 652 performing PTCAs, 1,237 performing colonoscopies, and 1,628 performing 
lower-limb MRIs who meet our sample restrictions.  
Table I reports summary statistics for our inpatient sample.
20
 Our sample of hospitals in 
the inpatient and procedure samples are generally similar to the universe of AHA-registered 
hospitals, but there are some differences (Appendix Table II). These differences are due in large 
part to our requirement that hospitals treat a minimum number of cases in our data annually, 
which means we are dropping some smaller hospitals. Relative to the universe of AHA-
registered hospitals, hospitals in our inpatient sample are larger (an average of 270 beds versus 
218 among all AHA hospitals), are located in less concentrated markets, and are more likely to 
be teaching facilities, non-profit facilities, and facilities ranked by the U.S. News & World 
Report as top performers.  
 
II.C. Measuring Hospital-level Prices 
Hospitals vary in the mix of services they offer and the patients they treat. As a result, a general 
concern when analyzing differences in prices across hospitals is that variation in prices could 
reflect observed and unobserved differences in the quality of care, mix of care, or the quantity of 
care provided per case at different facilities. For example, if patients with a given condition at a 
hospital were more severely ill, they would require more care, which could potentially show up 
in our data as higher prices. Likewise, providing higher quality care could raise costs, so a 
hospital that had a higher quality of care could show up in our data as having higher prices.  
We work to address these issues in a number of ways. First, we rely on risk-adjusted 
price measures, described in detail in Appendix B. Second, we show our results are stable when 
we control for hospital quality using a variety of measures. Third, we measure price variation 
across plausibly undifferentiated services (like lower-limb MRI) for which there is little variation 
in how these services are delivered across hospitals or across patients within a hospital. Since 
MRIs are plausibly homogeneous across patients, studying this procedure provides a reasonable 
benchmark for price variation that is uncontaminated by unobservable patient heterogeneity. 
Fourth, we define our procedures narrowly via our choice of clinical codes and exclude cases 
                                                        
20 The descriptive statistics for the sub-samples for each of the seven procedures look qualitatively similar and are 




with complications. Finally, we limit the age of patients we analyze by procedure to fairly 
narrow age groups (since older patients or atypically young patients may raise costs). For knee 
and hip replacements, we limit our analysis to cases involving patients between 45 and 64 years 
old. For cesarean and vaginal delivery, we limit our analysis to mothers who are between 25 and 
34 years old. 
Our hospital price measures are generated from data on the actual payments patients and 
insurers make to hospitals. We construct three different measures of hospital prices based on 
these allowed amounts (i.e. the sum of the patient and insurer payments to hospitals). The first is 
a private payer overall inpatient price index that is adjusted for the mix of care that a hospital 
delivers (via DRG fixed effects) and the mix of patients that hospitals treat (we risk-adjust for 
patient age and sex). This hospital-level, regression-based measure is similar to those used 
previously in the literature (e.g. Gaynor and Vogt [2003] and Gowrisankaran, Nevo, and Town 
[2015]). The second is a set of hospital-level and risk-adjusted price measures for each of our 
seven procedures.
21
 Third, we focus on contract-level prices within hospitals for the seven 
previously identified procedures. We also construct Medicare reimbursement rates for overall 
inpatient care and for the seven procedures in our analysis. More details on our price and 
Medicare reimbursement measures are in Appendix B.  
 
II.D. Descriptive Statistics on Prices 
Appendix Table 4 presents summary statistics for our main price measures and the within-
hospital correlations of the inpatient hospital price index, the procedure prices, and the Medicare 
inpatient base payment rates. There is high correlation in prices within hospitals within service 
lines like orthopedics (e.g., the correlation of hip with knee replacements is 0.923) and a weaker 
(but still substantial) correlation across service lines (e.g., the correlation of knee replacement 
with vaginal delivery prices is 0.510). By contrast, there is a low correlation within hospitals 
between the Medicare base payment rate and the inpatient price index (0.203) and between 
Medicare procedure-specific reimbursements and private payment rates for the procedures we 
                                                        
21 For inpatient procedures, the procedure price captures the combined price on all claims associated with services 
provided to the patient by hospitals from admission through discharge. For outpatient procedures (colonoscopies and 
MRIs), the price is the sum of all claims on the day the patient was in the hospital for the MRI or the colonoscopy. 
For colonoscopies and MRIs, we further limit our analysis to observations where no other medical care was 
provided to the patient on the day of the MRI or colonoscopy and exclude MRIs and colonoscopies that were 
performed within a wider hospital stay. As a robustness check, we also examine the sum of hospital and physician 




study (these range from -0.040 to 0.360). Medicare attempts to set administered prices to reflect 
hospitals’ exogenous costs (e.g. local labor costs) and therefore, the low correlation between 
Medicare and private prices suggests that private price variation is driven by more than simply 
differences in costs across hospitals.  
 The difference in the amounts that Medicare and private insurers pay for services is 
substantial. Figure I shows that in 2011, Medicare payments were 45 percent of private rates for 
inpatient care, 55 percent of private rates for hip and knee replacement, 62 percent for cesarean 
and vaginal delivery, 51 percent for PTCA, 37 percent for colonoscopy, and 25 percent for 
MRIs. As an illustration of the magnitude of this difference, we calculate that if private prices 
were set at 120 percent of Medicare rates rather than at their current levels, inpatient spending on 
the privately insured would drop by 19.7 percent.
22
  
There has also been significant recent interest in hospitals’ charges - the list prices for 
hospital services (e.g. Brill [2013], Bai and Anderson [2015]. and Hsia and Akosa Antwi 
[2014]). Indeed, in 2013, the Department of Health and Human Services began releasing hospital 
charge information for all inpatient claims billed to Medicare (Department of Health and Human 
Services, 2013). Figure I illustrates that charges are between 170 percent and 242 percent of the 
transaction prices. Appendix Figure III presents a scatterplot showing the relationship between 
hospital charges and transaction prices for the procedures in our analysis in 2011. The 
correlations are positive, but small in magnitude and range from 0.243 (lower-limb MRIs) to 
0.471 (vaginal deliveries).  
In the absence of available data on true transaction prices, a number of research papers 
have used transformations of hospital charges to produce proxies for hospitals’ transaction 
prices. Unsurprisingly, we observe that transformations of charges are not very highly correlated 
with transaction prices in our data. Using data kindly provided by Dafny, Ho, and Lee (2016), we 
find that the correlation between our main inpatient price index that is constructed using 
transaction prices and their price measure constructed using hospital charge data is 0.45. 
Although the Dafny, Ho, and Lee (2016) measure contains useful information (Garmon, 2017), 
the low correlation illustrates the advantage of using transaction prices if such data are available. 
                                                        
22 This thought experiment holds the quantities of care constant (i.e., it assumes no behavioral response). We also 
find that paying providers for inpatient care at 100 percent of Medicare rates, 110 percent of Medicare rates, 130 
percent of Medicare rates, and 140 percent of Medicare rates would lower spending by 33.1 percent, 26.4 percent, 





III. HEALTH CARE SPENDING VARIATION  
III.A. Geographic Variation in Spending Per Privately Insured Beneficiary 
In Panel A of Figure II, we map total risk-adjusted spending per privately insured beneficiary 
across HRRs. In 2011, mean spending per beneficiary was $4,197. Total spending per privately 
insured beneficiary in the highest spending HRR (Anchorage, Alaska) was $6,366, more than 
three times as much as spending per beneficiary in the lowest spending HRR (Honolulu, Hawaii 
spent $2,110 per person). Likewise, the HRR in the 90
th
 percentile of the spending distribution 
(Grand Junction, Colorado) spent 47.3 percent more than the HRR in the 10
th
 percentile of the 
spending distribution (Sarasota, Florida).
23
 
 Previous work has found that risk-adjusted Medicare spending per beneficiary also varies 
by a factor of more than three across HRRs (Fisher et al., 2003a,b). In Appendix Figure V, we 
present maps of total and inpatient spending per Medicare beneficiary across HRRs using data 
made accessible by the Dartmouth Institute. The correlation between HRR-level total spending 
per Medicare beneficiary and spending per privately insured beneficiary is only 0.044 and the 
equivalent correlation for inpatient spending is 0.172. The correlation between HRR-level 
inpatient spending per privately insured beneficiary age 55 to 64 (i.e. a group with a more similar 
demographic profile to the Medicare population) and spending per Medicare beneficiary across 




III.B. The Contributions of Price vs. Quantity to Spending Variation 
To what extent is the geographic variation in health spending generated by the variation in the 
price of care versus the quantity of care delivered across regions? Because the Medicare 
program’s administered hospital prices do not vary significantly across providers, it follows that 
most of the variation in Medicare spending is mainly driven by differences in the quantities of 
health care across HRRs.
25
 By contrast, variation in spending on the privately insured is likely to 
                                                        
23 We also present a map of inpatient spending per privately insured beneficiary in Appendix Figure IV. Inpatient 
spending per privately insured beneficiary has a correlation with total spending per beneficiary of 0.774. Total 
spending per privately insured beneficiary per HRR has a 0.468 correlation with spending per beneficiary on knee 
hip and knee replacements, 0.369 with cesarean sections, 0.335 with vaginal deliveries, and 0.393 with PTCA. 
24 Chernew et al. (2010) find a correlation between private spending per beneficiary measured using MarketScan 
data and Medicare spending per beneficiary in 2006 of -0.17.  
25  Finkelstein, Gentzkow, and Williams (2016) find that 47 percent of the geographic variation in Medicare 




be a function of both variation in the quantities of care delivered across regions and variation in 
the market-determined prices that providers and insurers negotiate. 
 To analyze the relative contributions of price and quantity to spending variation for the 
55 to 64 year old private patients from HCCI and Medicare, we decompose the variance of 




 (1)   Var(ln(prqr)) = Var(ln(pr)) + Var(ln(qr) + 2Cov(ln(pr),ln(qr)) 
  
where pr is the average price in HRR r and qr is the number of inpatient visits (quantity) divided 
by the number of beneficiaries in each HRR. The component 
Var(ln(pr))
Var(ln(prqr))
 represents the share of 
the variance in spending attributable to differences in price across HRRs; the component 
Var(ln(qr))
Var(ln(prqr))
 represents the share attributable to differences in quantity and 
2Cov( ln(pr), ln(qr))
Var(ln(prqr))
 is the 
share attributable to the covariance of price and quantity.
26
 We obtain each of these components 
per DRG. 
In Table II we report results for the top 10 DRGs in the data individually and the final 
row in Table II presents the decomposition results for both spending samples averaged across all 
DRGs (where each DRG-observation is weighted by spending on that DRG in the private 
population in the first three columns and the Medicare population in the last three columns).
27
 
The bottom row of Column (1) shows that averaged across DRGs, just under half of spending 
variation on the privately insured is due to price and almost the same is due to quantity in 
Column (2) with the covariance term accounting for essentially zero in Column (3).
28
 Columns 
(4) – (6) show that for Medicare spending, quantity differences across HRRs accounts for 95.3 
percent of the variation whereas only 12.7 percent is attributable to price variation (the residual is 
a -8.1 percent covariance term). These results suggest that variation in health spending on the 
privately insured is a function of variation in both the price and quantity of care delivered across 
                                                        
26 We focus on inpatient spending because we do not have reimbursement and quantity measures for Medicare 
outpatient services.  
27 Results for the top 25 DRGs are presented in Appendix Table V. 
28 Later, we focus on two outpatient procedures (colonoscopy and lower-limb MRI) and five inpatient procedures 
(hip replacement, knee replacement, vaginal baby delivery, cesarean baby delivery, and PTCA). Price explains 29 
percent of the variation in spending on hip and knee replacements, 42 percent for vaginal delivers, 40 percent on 
cesarean sections, and 34 percent on PTCAs. In contrast, price variation explains 12 percent and 10 percent variation 




HRRs, while variation in spending on the Medicare population is driven almost exclusively by 
differences in the quantity of care delivered across regions.
29
  
Overall, both populations have similar levels of quantity variation across HRRs where 
quantity is defined as spending with hospital prices fixed at the mean (we refer to this as “fixed-
price spending”, see Appendix Table VII).
30
 Further, although Medicare and private prices are 
only weakly correlated at the HRR level (recall that this correlation is only 0.203), the 
correlation is much stronger for quantities. The correlation of fixed-price spending (quantity) per 
private beneficiary and fixed-price spending (quantity) per Medicare beneficiary is 0.427 and 
rises to 0.536 when we restrict the private sample to 55 to 64 year olds. Similarly, we observe 
that the correlation in hip and knee replacements delivered per Medicare beneficiary and per 
privately insured beneficiary per HRR is correlated at 0.570 across HRRs. Finally, we observe 
that the correlation in hospitals’ case-mix indexes – a measure of the average DRG weights at 
hospitals – across Medicare and privately insured beneficiaries is 0.659. All this suggests, 
perhaps unsurprisingly, that the quantities of care delivered to Medicare and privately insured 
beneficiaries are much more correlated than the payment rates from the two sets of payers.  
 
IV. VARIATION IN HOSPITAL PRICES 
Given the importance of prices for the privately insured, we turn now to describing the overall 
variation in hospital prices and then decompose the amount of variation that occurs in the cross-
section (i) across HRRs, (ii) within HRRs across hospitals, and (iii) within hospitals.  
 
IV.A. Quantifying How Much Hospital Prices Vary  
Previous research has shown substantial geographic variation in hospital prices for sub-national 
geographies. For example, the United States Government Accountability Office (2005) analyzed 
health care claims data from the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program and found that 
hospital prices varied by 259 percent across metropolitan areas. Likewise, the Massachusetts 
Attorney General’s Office (Coakley, 2011) found that hospitals’ prices varied by over 300 
percent in the state. Ginsburg (2010) used insurance claims data to measure average hospital 
                                                        
29 The results are not driven by the particular weighting scheme used. For example, using the Medicare spending 
weights (by DRG) in the private spending decomposition generates an overall contribution of price of 52 percent 
instead of 50 percent in the final row of Column (1).  




prices in six cities. Similarly, White, Reschovsky, and Bond (2014) used claims data from 
autoworkers to examine hospital prices in thirteen Midwestern markets. They found that the 
highest priced hospitals in a market were typically paid 60 percent more for inpatient care than 
the lowest priced hospitals.
31
 These analyses, while extremely valuable, do not rely on national 
data, often do not risk-adjust prices for patient case mix, and do not analyze within hospital price 
variation.  
 In Figure III we present the variation in hospital-specific, risk-adjusted private-payer 
prices for knee replacements across all hospitals in our sample (Panel A). We also include the 
corresponding hospital-specific Medicare reimbursement rates. Hospitals were paid $24,059 on 
average for knee replacements in 2011 (Medicare reimbursed these same hospitals $12,986 on 
average). Across the nation, the ratio of the commercial price for a knee replacement at hospitals 
in the 90
th
 percentile of the price distribution relative to hospitals in the 10
th
 percentile is 2.29 
and the coefficient of variation across hospitals is 0.32.  
 It is possible that the variation in knee replacement prices across the US reflects 
differences in unobserved patient severity or quality across hospitals. Consequently we examine 
lower-limb MRIs as a plausibly homogeneous procedure free of any contamination due to 
unobserved heterogeneity. In Panel B of Figure III, we present a histogram of risk-adjusted 
hospital transaction prices for lower-limb MRIs and show variation that is on a similar scale to 
knee replacements - the coefficient of variation for knee replacements is 0.32 and for lower-limb 
MRIs is 0.40. The ratio of the price for a lower-limb MRI at the hospital in the 90
th
 percentile 
relative to the hospital in the 10
th
 percentile is 2.93 (similar figures for our other procedures are 
reported in Appendix Figure VI).  
 To determine whether the bulk of the price variation in the cross-section occurs across 
HRRs, within HRRs (across hospitals), or within hospitals, we use our case-level data for 2010 
and 2011, add various combinations of control variables into a regression, and observe the 




 In Table III the dependent variable is the price level, pi,p,h,r,t, for a 
case (e.g. a knee replacement) delivered to patient i with insurance characteristics p, at hospital 
                                                        
31 While notable, this sort of variation is not unique to health care. Many other industries exhibit price variation. 
Pratt, Wise, and Zeckhauser (1979) find large price variation for a range of services in the Boston area; Hortasçu and 
Syverson (2004) document extensive variation in mutual fund fees; Kaplan and Menzio (2015) significant variation 
for 36 oz. plastic bottles of Heinz ketchup in Minneapolis in 2007.  
32 We focus on these years as we do not have hospital charge information prior to 2010. Results are very similar for 




h, located in HRR r, in month-year t. In all columns we include month-year dummies, which 
account for only a trivial fraction of the variance (less than 0.001). Column (1) introduces patient 
characteristics (sex and age). We then sequentially add in fully interacted insurance plan 
characteristics, HRR fixed effects, hospital fixed effects, and controls for the hospital charges for 
each case.
33
 We allow HRR fixed effects and hospital fixed effects to vary by month-year pair.
 
 
Table III shows that a substantial amount of variation in hospital prices exists across 
HRRs, within HRRs, and even within hospitals. In Column (1) we find that controlling for 
patient characteristics explains very little of the variation in hospital prices – the R
2 
falls by less 
than 2 percent across all procedures. In Column (2), introducing insurance plan characteristics 
explains no more than an additional 3 percent. In Column (3), including HRR fixed effects 
substantially increases the R
2
 to between 0.331 (lower-limb MRI) and 0.502 (hip replacements). 
Column (4) includes hospital fixed effects, which increase the R
2
 to between 0.647 (vaginal 
delivery) and 0.774 (lower-limb MRIs). Although this is a large increase, it still leaves between 
22 percent and 34.3 percent of price variation unexplained. In Column (5) we include the total 
charge for each individual case. This is a further control for the patient-specific amount of care 
that was delivered within a case, since hospitals bill for each unit of service they deliver. Even in 
this demanding specification, between 18 to 30 percent of the cross-sectional variation still 
occurs within hospitals (Column (6)) implying that unobserved differences in the cost of 
providing care cannot account for the unexplained spread of within hospital prices in Column 
(5). 
The sizable variation in prices that we observe within hospitals seems likely to be due to 
differential insurer bargaining leverage, but potentially it could also be due to measurement error 
or contract re-negotiations that occur within a hospital-month.  To address these issues we focus 
on MRIs and identify specific hospital/insurer contracts (as described in more detail in Section 
IV.C). Limiting our analysis to identified contracts excludes cases that have unusually high or 
low prices due to pure measurement error. This lowers the unexplained variance only slightly 
                                                        
33  Insurance plan characteristics include the product type (health maintenance organization (HMO), preferred 
provider organization (PPO), point of service (POS), exclusive provider organization (EPO), indemnity plan, and 
other), the funding type (administrative services only (ASO) or fully-insured plan), and market segment (large 




(from 21.6 percent to 19.9 percent) which is unsurprising as this is administrative data.
34
 
Furthermore, since we observe contracts, we also can drop the hospital-month observations when 
a contract renegotiation occurred. Doing this reduces the unexplained variation to 15.3 percent. 
Thus we conclude that over 70 percent (=
15.3
21.6
) of the unexplained within hospital MRI price 
variation in Column (6) of Table III is due to cross-insurer price variation within hospitals, rather 
than measurement error or (within month) contract renegotiation. While the HCCI data do not 
identify the specific insurer that covers each beneficiary, these results are suggestive of the 
substantial degree to which differential insurer bargaining power affects hospital prices. 
 
IV.B. Hospital-level Price Variation Within and Across HRRs 
Panel B of Figure II presents a map of private-payer inpatient prices across HRRs. The map 
demonstrates that there is substantial variation in prices across geographic areas. Normalizing 
prices using the Medicare wage index, which captures local labor costs does not reduce this 
variation by much (Appendix Figure VII). To illustrate the extent of the price variation, Salinas, 
California has the highest average inpatient private-payer prices – more than four times as high 
as the least expensive HRR (Lake Charles, Louisiana). Likewise, the HRR with average hospital 
inpatient prices in the 90
th
 percentile of the national distribution of HRRs (Eugene, Oregon) is 
1.84 times as expensive as the average inpatient prices for the HRR in the 10
th
 percentile 
(Lafayette, Louisiana).  
Appendix Table IX presents the mean prices and coefficients of variation in private-payer 
prices for our inpatient price index and the seven procedures we analyze for the twenty-five 
HRRs with the greatest number of HCCI covered lives. The national averages of the within HRR 
coefficients of variation range from 0.162 (hip replacement) to 0.249 (MRI). To illustrate how 
large this variation is, consider the following thought experiment. If each patient paying above 
the median price in their HRR instead went to the hospital in their HRR with the median price, 
total inpatient spending for the privately insured would be reduced by 25.8 percent.
35
  
                                                        
34 We can classify 97 percent of the 113,914 MRI cases in Table III to contracts in this way (a higher fraction than 
for the other procedures). Note that this 1.7 percentage points is an upper bound for measurement error as it also 
excludes singleton observations for which we cannot find two matching prices (see Appendix B3).  
35 We calculated this number in the following way. Using data for 2011, we identified the median price for every 
DRG in the data across all HRRs. For any patient who paid a price above the median for that DRG, we substituted 
the median price for the actual price and then recalculated average spending per beneficiary. This counterfactual 




Figure IV illustrates the extent of the variation in hospital prices within a single HRR 
(Philadelphia, Pennsylvania) for the knee replacements and lower-limb MRIs. The coefficients 
of variation across hospital-level prices within Philadelphia for knee replacement and lower-limb 
MRI are 0.308 and 0.482, respectively. There is a substantial amount of variation in prices for all 
of these procedures, including lower-limb MRI (note that there is virtually no variation in 
Medicare’s administered payments across hospitals within HRRs). We find similar variation in 





IV.C. Within Hospital Variation in Prices 
Table III showed that the amount of within hospital price variation in the cross-section is 
substantial. Column (8) shows the within hospital coefficient of variation by procedure, averaged 
across every hospital- month which ranges from 0.157 (lower-limb MRIs) to 0.239 (PTCAs). For 
reference, the average within-HRR coefficient of variation in MRI prices across hospitals is 
0.249 (Appendix Table IX).  
As a result, to delve into the patterns of contracts within hospitals, we developed an 
algorithm to identify ongoing hospital/insurer contracts (see Appendix B3 for details). To do so, 
we find repeated prices at hospitals over time (for a given DRG or procedure) and then pair 
claims into larger contracts by grouping those that have similar combinations of insurance 
product characteristics (e.g. HMO versus PPO, large group products versus small group 
products). To illustrate these matches, in Figure V we present within-hospital contracted prices 
for lower-limb MRIs from 2008 to 2011 at the two highest volume hospitals in our data. Each 
point is an exact price paid for a case; the size of the dots is proportional to the number of patient 
cases at that price (exactly to the cent).
37
 We highlight the three highest volume contracts at each 
hospital (these capture 92 percent and 98 percent of all lower-limb MRI cases at these hospitals, 
respectively). The figure clearly demonstrates that there is significant variation in MRI prices 
within hospitals at single points in time. For example, in January 2011, the ratio of the price of 
the highest volume contract (circles) to the price of the second highest volume contract 
                                                        
36 Our data use agreement precludes us from publicly reporting information about HRRs with fewer than five 
providers in the data. Within market price variation graphs are available for all HRRs with five or more providers 
for all procedures at www.healthcarepricingproject.org.  
37 We present these amounts as dollars from the hospital mean to remain consistent with publishing rules in our data 




(triangles) is 1.39 at Hospital A and 1.65 at Hospital B. We also see that the main contract prices 
are stable for extended periods (usually one year) before being updated, although the updates 
occur at different times across contracts.  
  The analysis in this section provides the first national evidence that insurers pay 
substantially different prices for the same services at the same hospitals. This finding is 
consistent with insurer-hospital bargaining models of price determination where stronger insurers 




V. ANALYSIS OF INSURER-HOSPITAL CONTRACTS 
V.A. What are the types of insurer-hospital contracts? 
When a hospital joins an insurer’s network, the hospital signs a contract that stipulates how and 
what they will be paid. Unfortunately, because most of these contracts contain clauses that 
prohibit their terms from being released, little is known about precisely how insurers pay each 
hospital (Reinhardt, 2006; Gaynor and Town, 2011). However, in addition to analyzing price 
levels, the richness of the HCCI data also enables us to estimate the types of insurer-hospital 
contracts that are being struck.  
In general, there are two main ways hospitals are paid for inpatient services (Moody’s 
Investors Service, 2017). The first is using prospectively set prices that pay a fixed dollar amount 
based on the patient’s DRG (or sometimes a more disaggregated coding framework like ICD-9 
codes). The second method sets payments as a percent of hospital charges, which we call a 
“share of charges” contract. Note that there are also hybrid payments that blend elements of both 
payment types. These hybrid payments are prospective payment contracts that include “outlier 
adjustments” that allow hospitals to be paid more when costs for a particular case are 
significantly higher than average costs.
39
 Further, within the class of prospective payment 
contracts, some may have their payment levels set as a percentage of Medicare payments, while 
others will have payment levels independent of the Medicare fee schedule.  
                                                        
38 See for example Town and Vistnes (2001), Capps, Dranove, and Satterthwaite (2003), Sorensen (2003), Farrell et 
al. (2011), Gowrisankaran, Nevo, and Town (2015), and Ho and Lee (2017).  
39 There is another type of contract that has been used historically where some inpatient payments were made on a 
per diem basis. However, our data contributors report that virtually none of the cases in our data are paid on a per 




 There are two main reasons why hospitals are likely to prefer share of charges contracts 
to prospective payments.
40
 First, hospitals bear less risk with share of charges contracts. With 
this type of contract, a hospital gets paid for every service they provide to a patient. As a 
consequence, if a patient (in a particular DRG for example) requires more care and is therefore 
more expensive, the hospital gets paid more and the insurer bears this additional cost. Of course, 
if the patient requires fewer services and is thus cheaper, then the hospital receives less payment. 
By contrast, under a prospective payment the amount a hospital will receive is fixed ex ante. As 
a consequence, the hospital bears the risk associated with uncertainty over the cost of treatment 
(Burns and Pauly, 2018). With risk aversion, this uncertainty is unattractive (Ellis and McGuire, 
1988; Town, Feldman, and Kralewski, 2011). A second reason why hospitals prefer share of 
charge contracts is that it places them under less pressure to reduce costs, since they get paid for 
all the services provided (presuming that the prices at least cover hospitals’ marginal costs of 
providing services). As a result, prospective payments give stronger incentives for the hospital to 
contain costs (Shleifer, 1985).  
From our discussions with insurers, it seems that when prospective payment contracts 
exist, insurers will often offer a simple standardized “boilerplate” contract tied to the Medicare 
fee schedule (i.e. prospective payments at a fixed percentage of Medicare payments). This saves 
them the costs of negotiating with each hospital. The patient profile in a hospital may mean true 
costs depart significantly from Medicare reimbursement. However, it may be difficult for a 
hospital to credibly demonstrate this to an insurer due to asymmetric information, even if a 
deviation from the boilerplate contract were worthwhile for both parties (net of negotiating 
costs). Hence, whereas hospitals with high bargaining power may be able to move away from the 
insurer’s standard Medicare related prospective scheme, it will be harder for a weaker hospital to 
persuade an insurer to do this. 
 These considerations suggest that the differential bargaining power of hospitals and 
insurers will affect not only the hospital price level, but also the form of the contract. In 
particular, we expect that hospitals with greater bargaining power will have more share of charge 
contracts and, if they have prospective contracts, a lower share of them will be tied to Medicare 
                                                        
40 See Newhouse (1996) for a more general discussion of contract form and trade-offs. Basically, share of charge 




reimbursement. Before examining this hypothesis in the next section, we first turn to how we 
identify contract types and provide some basic descriptive statistics. 
 
V.B. Estimating the Percentage of Cases Paid as a Share of Hospital Charges 
Appendix B3 details exactly how we classify contracts, but we sketch the method here. The 
HCCI data do not specify whether cases are paid prospectively, as a share of charges, or using a 
hybrid payment. As a result, we developed a strategy to identify how cases were paid. To do this, 
we group separate claims within hospitals for a procedure (e.g. knee replacement) into single 
contracts if cases are paid at identical dollar amounts (down to the cent) or paid at identical 
percentages of hospital charges (down to the hundredth of a percent).
41
 We categorize hospital 
payments as either (i) share of charges (contracts where two or more cases are paid at an 
identical percentage of hospital charges), (ii) prospective payments (two or more cases are paid 
at identical dollar amounts), or (iii) unclassified cases. Unclassified cases are a mix between 
those using one of the hybrid contracts (e.g. those involving outlier payments) and others which 
do fall under one of the main two contract classes, but where the data is not rich enough to 
identify which one. The latter occurs, for example, when we only observe one case under a 
contract so we cannot “price match” it to another case. 
 We find evidence that even within a month a hospital can have prospective payments 
with one payer and share of charge contract with another for the same procedure. To illustrate 
this, consider Figure VI. Here we group cases into contracts for vaginal delivery at a large 
hospital using the methods described above. Two insurer contracts are clearly visible - Contract 
#1 is shown in circles and Contract #2 in triangles.
42
 In Panel A, we plot the contracted prices in 
dollars from the mean price at that hospital. As can be seen, there is one absolute dollar amount 
for Contract #2, but there is significant heterogeneity in the dollar amounts paid for Contract #1. 
Contract #2 is paid using a prospective payment set at a fixed payment amount, where the 
payment amounts for Contract #1 clearly vary. In Panel B, we plot all of these payments as a 
percent of the hospital’s charges. What is clear is that Contract #1 is paid at a constant percent of 
                                                        
41 Our approach to identifying contracts is similar to the bunching analysis that Clemens, Gottlieb, and Molnar 
(2017) use to study physician pricing. We identify cases that are paid as a repeated percentage of hospitals’ charges 
or as a repeated dollar amount. For more discussion of how we identify contracts, see Appendix B3.  




charges (60 percent). For Contract #2, the percent of charges varies in this graph because, while 
the absolute price is constant, the precise charges vary for each case.  
In Figure VII we show the breakdown of cases for the inpatient sample (first two bars) 
and procedure sample (other bars). Among inpatient cases, about a third are on prospective 
payments contracts and 17 percent are share of charge contracts. Almost half were unclassified, 
but when we restrict our sample to hospital-DRG pairs in higher volumes, we see a big reduction 
in unclassified cases. For example, in the second bar, we restrict to DRG-hospital pairs that have 
at least 20 admissions and observe that 22 percent of cases are unclassified. That is because the 
more cases a hospital treats, the higher the likelihood we correctly identify two cases paid at the 
same constant rate. As Appendix Figure VIII details, as we alter count restrictions, we maintain a 
robust estimate of about 23 percent of all cases being share of charge payments. There is a little 
more uncertainty about the exact proportion of cases on prospective payments, but we know the 




We also observe large variation in the fraction of share of charge contracts across 
hospitals and across procedures (see Appendix Figure IX). For vaginal deliveries (our highest 
volume service with the lowest fraction of unclassified cases), the hospital in the 90
th
 percentile 
has 91 percent of cases paid as a share of charges, whereas the 10
th
 percentile has zero. It may 
seem surprising that a single hospital has multiple forms of contracts given their patient mix. The 
fact that they do so is consistent with the idea that different insurers have different degrees of 
bargaining power within a single hospital.
44
 
There have been, to our knowledge, only two other attempts to identify hospital-insurer 
contracts, both trying to reverse engineer contracts from price (as we do here). Baker et al (2016) 
estimates that around three-quarters of inpatient payments were paid prospectively (see 
                                                        
43 The proportion of cases classified as prospective payments rises (and the proportion unclassified falls) almost 
monotonically with the minimum case threshold. For example, the proportion of cases classified as prospective rises 
from 55 percent at a threshold of 20 cases to 72 percent at a threshold of 200 cases. Note that for the procedures 
(with zero minimum case threshold restrictions), estimates range from 18 percent of cases on a share of charge 
contract for PTCA up to 30 percent for colonoscopies. Since nearly all lower-limb MRIs in our data have identical 
charges inside facilities, we cannot differentiate between cases paid prospectively and those paid as a share of 
hospital charges.  
44 In Appendix Figure X, we plot ln(prices) on the y-axis against ln(charges) on the x-axis for the same DRG for 
cases paid as a share of charges at a large hospital in our data. It shows that there tend to be a single share of charge 
per contract applied across all DRGs. In other words, an insurer will tend to negotiate the same level of discount off 





Appendix B3 for details). Gift, Arnould, and Debrock (2002) examined hospital contracts from a 
single insurer with hospitals in Washington State in financial year 1994/1995 and found only 41 
percent of the contracts had prospective payment contracts. We are able to extend beyond these 
papers by having the ability to differentiate between cases paid prospectively and those paid as a 
share of charges and show the existence of different contracts within the same hospital. As we 
describe in the next subsection, we are also able to analyze whether prospectively paid cases 
have payments set as a percentage of Medicare payments. This allows us to extend work by 
Clemens, Gottlieb, and Molnar (2017) and Clemens and Gottlieb (2017) on physicians and 
analyze the relationship between hospitals’ prices and Medicare payments.  
 
V.C. Prospective Payment Contracts and Their Link to Medicare Hospital Payments 
To estimate the share of prospective cases tied to Medicare, we calculate each prospective price 
as a percentage of the Medicare PPS payment rates. We then identify other private cases with 
different DRGs at the same hospital that are paid at the same percentage of Medicare PPS rates. 
These cases are then grouped into contracts. We then calculate the share of a hospital’s 
prospectively set inpatient cases that have another case of a different DRG that is paid at the 
same percentage of Medicare payment rates (down to the hundredth of a percent). We find that 
among all inpatient prospective payments, 74 percent are set as a share of Medicare rates. There 
is significant heterogeneity across hospitals - the unweighted mean is 48 percent with a standard 
deviation of 32.  
To illustrate this heterogeneity, in Figure VIII we plot ln(prospective payments) on the y-
axis against ln(Medicare payments) on the x-axis for the same DRG at two large hospitals in our 
data. Each circle is a unique case that we have classified as being under a prospective payment 
contract for a specific DRG. If hospitals were paid a fixed percentage of Medicare payment rates, 
the points on the graph would have a slope of one.
45
 Indeed, we observe that the private payment 
rates for the hospital in Panel A, for example, are predominantly set as a percentage of Medicare 
rates (they parallel the 45 degree line). By contrast, the payment rates at the hospital in Panel B 
are not highly correlated with Medicare rates.   
                                                        
45 To formalize this point, when the price P paid at hospital h, for DRG d, for an admission that occurs at time t, is 
set as a percentage of the DRG-specific Medicare rate M, assume it takes the form of a percentage markup Θh,t over 




When we look across all inpatient cases in our data, our results suggest the share of 
hospitals’ private prospective payments that are linked to Medicare is likely to be lower than the 
75 percent estimate Clemens, Gottlieb, and Molnar (2017) observed among physicians. First, 
about 23 percent of cases are share of charge payments, which are therefore directly not linked to 
Medicare. Second, since no more than 77 percent of cases are paid prospectively and 74 percent 
of prospective cases are linked to Medicare, this implies that the upper bound for total cases 
linked to Medicare payment levels is 57 percent (=77*0.74).  
 
VI. FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH HOSPITAL PRICES AND CONTRACT TYPES 
VI.A. Cross-Sectional Analysis of Hospital Prices and Contracting Type 
We have identified substantial differences across hospitals in their prices and contract structures 
and we now turn to identifying the factors associated with these differences. Prices and contract 
forms are determined by negotiations between hospitals and insurers and a number of factors 
may affect the outcomes of these negotiations. These include demand shifters (e.g. hospital 
quality), supply shifters (e.g. labor costs), and the respective bargaining leverage of insurers and 
hospitals.  
We begin by examining the cross-sectional relationship between hospital and insurer 
market structure and hospital prices and contracts. To do so, we use the following estimating 
equation: 





+ τt+ υh,t 
where Mh,t is a vector of measures of hospital and insurer market structure for hospital h in year 
t, xh,t is a vector of control variables (described below), τt are year dummies and υh,t is the error 
term. The y
h,t
 outcomes we consider are (i) the inpatient hospital price index ( p̂
h,t
) described 
above and in Appendix B1; (ii) our procedure-level prices described in Appendix B2; (iii) the 
percent of cases paid as a share of the hospital’s charges described in Section V.B; and (iv) the 
percent of prospective payments that are linked to the Medicare fee schedule described in 
Section V.C.  
We construct several measures of market structure. Our main measure of hospital market 
structure is made by drawing a circular area around each hospital with a radius of 15 miles. We 




hospitals as duopolies; and those in areas with three hospitals as triopolies. Our omitted base 
category is hospitals in areas with four or more hospitals (i.e. quadropolies or greater). We also 
show that our main results are robust to a large range of alternatively defined measures of 
hospital market structure, such as measures with alternative markets size definitions (e.g. fixed-
distance radii of various distances) and alternative measures of market structure (e.g. counts of 
hospitals and Herfindahl-Hirschman indexes (HHIs)). Our main measure of insurer market 
structure is the HCCI data contributors’ market share of privately insured lives at the county 
level. Further details of how our market structure measures are constructed are contained in 
Appendix C. We present correlates of our hospital concentration measures and key covariates in 
Appendix Figure XI. These concentration measures are not strongly associated with other 
covariates, such as hospital quality or average population characteristics, although we do find 
that rural areas have more concentrated hospital markets.  
We begin by examining the bivariate correlations between our hospital inpatient price 
index and other key variables in Figure IX. Relative to hospitals in markets with four or more 
competitors, hospitals in markets with fewer competitors have significantly higher prices. By 
contrast, prices are considerably lower at hospitals in counties where HCCI insurers have a 
higher market share. Apart from market structure, the other covariates are generally of the 
expected signs. Hospitals using more technologies, teaching hospitals, and larger hospitals have 
higher prices. Non-profit and government hospitals have slightly lower prices than for-profit 
hospitals. Hospitals with higher quality measured either by a mention in U.S. News & World 
Report or via process scores tend to have higher prices.
46
 Hospitals with higher Medicare base 
payment rates or those located in high-income counties have higher prices, consistent with these 





VI.B. Cross-Sectional Analysis of Hospital Prices and Contract Form 
                                                        
46 These are the percentage of AMI patients given aspirin at arrival, the percentage of patients given an antibiotic 
before surgery, and the percentage of patients treated to prevent blood clots. The sole exception is hospitals’ 30-day 
AMI survival rate, which is negatively correlated with hospital prices. 
47 By contrast, the higher the percentage of Medicaid patients a hospital treats, the higher its prices. However, this is 
the only coefficient which is significantly reversed in our multivariate regression estimates of Equation (2) - see 




In Table IV, we present estimates of Equation (2) and report the coefficients on the market 
structure variables where an observation is a hospital-year (full results with coefficients on the 
other covariates are reported in Appendix Tables X through XII). In Panel A the dependent 
variable is the inpatient price index, in Panel B it is the percent of each hospitals’ inpatient cases 
paid as a share of charges, and in Panel C it is the percent of prospective payments that are paid 
as a percentage of Medicare payments.  
Panel A of Table IV shows that there is a significant and positive association between 
hospital price and whether a hospital is located in a monopoly, duopoly, or triopoly market. 
Conversely, hospital prices fall as the HCCI insurers’ market share increases. Column (1) 
presents the simplest specification, Column (2) adds insurer market share, and Column (3) 
further adds HRR fixed effects, so the coefficients are identified from the variation in market 
structure within HRRs. Introducing HRR fixed effects reduces all the hospital concentration 
coefficients, but with the exception of the triopoly dummy, all coefficients remain significant at 
conventional levels. The coefficients in Column (3) indicate that monopoly hospitals are 
associated with prices that are 12.5 percent (= 𝑒0.118 − 1) higher than places where there are four 
or more hospitals. Duopolies are associated with 7.6 percent higher prices. Further, a ten-
percentage point increase in the market share of the HCCI insurers (i.e. a one standard deviation 
increase) is associated with a statistically significant 7 percent fall in hospital prices. Note that 
the hospital market structure indicators are quantitatively the most important variables in our 
cross-sectional price analysis. Our hospital market structure indicators capture 19.6 percent of 
the explained variance from estimates presented in Column (2) of Panel A in Table IV (when we 
exclude these measures, the R
2
 drops from 0.170 to 0.137). The market share of the HCCI 
insurers captures the second highest share of the explained variance, with an associated decrease 
in R
2
 of 16.1 percent (from 0.170 to 0.143). No other variables in the analysis capture more that 
10 percent of the explained price variance.  
The results in Panel A of Table IV are robust to measuring prices in a multitude of ways 
such as (i) risk-adjusting our inpatient price measure with patients’ Charlson score; (ii) risk-
adjusting our inpatient price using International Classification of Disease (ICD-9) diagnosis 




measuring price in levels instead of logarithms (see Appendix Table XIII).
48
 Our results are 
consistent with earlier, single state studies of hospital prices and market structure (mostly using 
data from California), which have found strong positive and statistically significant effects of 
hospital market concentration on prices (see Vogt and Town [2006], and Gaynor and Town, 
[2012]). 
Panel B of Table IV has the same specification as we used in Panel A, but changes the 
dependent variable to the percent of cases paid as a share of hospital charges.
49
 Since data on 
charges are only available in 2010 and 2011, the sample size roughly halves. Across the various 
specifications, we consistently find that the share of inpatient cases paid as a share of charges 
declines monotonically as the number of potential rival hospitals per market increases. Focusing 
on the estimates from Column (3), we find that a monopoly hospital has 10.5 percentage points 
more cases paid as a percent of charges than do hospitals in areas with four or more hospitals. 
Hospitals in counties where the HCCI insurers have a larger market share have significantly 
lower rates of cases paid as a share of charges (a 10 percentage point increase in the HCCI share 
is associated with a 4 percent lower share of cases on these contracts).  
One might be concerned that the coefficient on monopoly in the price regressions of 
Panel A of Table IV reflects some form of prospective contract where the hospital obtains a 
higher price because it is bearing more risk than the insurer. For example, perhaps there are more 
patients with unobservable idiosyncratic costs in places with concentrated hospital markets 
which (under a prospective pay contract) would leave hospitals bearing more financial risk. The 
fact that monopoly hospitals receive both higher prices and have disproportionately more share 
of price contracts (where insurers bear more of the risk) is inconsistent with this explanation.
50
 
Panel C of Table IV uses the share of prospective payments that are tied to Medicare 
payment levels as the dependent variable.
51
 The pattern is a familiar one: hospitals in markets 
                                                        
48  For example, when we use prices in levels as the dependent variable instead of logarithms in Table IV Panel A, 
we obtain a coefficient on the monopoly indicator of 1,605 in the equivalent of Column (3). Since the average 
inpatient case is $14,020, this estimate implies an effect of 12 percent, nearly identical to the baseline estimate. This 
is reported in Appendix Table XIII. 
49 The bivariate correlations are illustrated in Appendix Figure XI.  
50 If we control for contract type on the right-hand side of the price regressions the coefficient on monopoly falls by 
about a tenth which implies that monopolies have higher prices even on the same type of contract. To investigate 
this we ran a case-level price regression in 2010 and 2011 data (where we have charge data) analogously to Column 
(3) of Table IV Panel A where we include a dummy reflecting whether the case is paid as a share of charges or not. 
Without this control the coefficient on monopoly was 0.137, but with the control the coefficient falls to 0.125.  




with fewer potential competitors have significantly fewer cases paid as a percent of the Medicare 
payments. In Column (3), monopoly hospitals are associated with having 11.3 percentage points 
fewer cases on contracts of this type (over a baseline mean of 48 percent). We also find that 
hospitals in areas where the HCCI insurers have bigger market shares have a higher share of their 
cases paid based on the Medicare fee schedule (a ten percentage point increase in insurer share is 
associated with 6 percent more Medicare-linked contracts).  
The results in Table IV paint a consistent picture of bargaining power. At least 
descriptively, when hospital markets are concentrated (and/or insurer markets are fragmented), 
hospital prices are higher and hospitals are able to obtain contracts that shift more risk on to 
insurers. 
 
VI.C. Results for Individual Procedures 
A concern with the regressions in Table IV is that because we aggregate over many different 
procedures, we may fail to account for unobserved heterogeneity in hospitals’ care. For example, 
prices in monopoly hospitals may be higher because their procedures are more complex and 
costly, even after we risk-adjust. Consequently, in Appendix Table XIV we re-estimated the 
models of Table IV using our seven procedures.
52
 In Column (1) we reproduce the baseline 
inpatient estimates in the final column of Table IV. Looking across the different procedures, it is 
striking that despite the smaller sample sizes, the results are qualitatively very consistent with the 
overall inpatient results. For all procedures, we find that areas with a monopoly hospital have 
higher prices than those with four or more hospitals. This positive association is significant at the 
5 percent level for all procedures except hip replacements and PTCA (which have our smallest 
sample size) and colonoscopy (significant at the 10 percent level). The coefficients imply that a 
hospital located in a monopoly market has prices that are between 5.5 percent (hip replacements 
in Column (3)) and 23.4 percent (lower-limb MRIs in Column (9)) higher than hospitals in 
markets with four or more hospitals. The coefficient on the HCCI insurer market share is less 
precisely estimated, but it is negative for all procedures except cesarean sections and hip 
replacements. Column (2) summarizes the effects by pooling across all the procedures in 
                                                        
52 See Appendix B2 for construction of these prices. Note that we cannot perform an analysis of the share of 
prospective payments tied to Medicare at the procedure level, because the variable is constructed by linking payment 




Columns (3) through (9) and adding a dummy variable for each procedure. The pooled results 
confirm that hospitals facing fewer potential competitors have significantly higher prices.
53
  
In Panel B of Appendix Table XIV, we perform the same exercise for each procedure 
sample, but use the percent of cases paid as a share of charges as the dependent variable. We 
again find that hospitals with fewer potential competitors have a higher proportion of their cases 
paid as a share of charges. As with price, we find that hospital concentration is positively 
associated with the percentage of cases paid as a share of charges for all procedures and is 
significant for all procedures except hip replacements and PTCA (which have the smallest 
samples). The coefficient on HCCI insurer share is negative for five of the six procedures. There 
is almost no variation in hospital charges for MRIs within a facility, so we cannot estimate the 
structure of contracts for this procedure. When we pool our procedures into a single estimate 
(Column (2)), we confirm that there is a positive association between hospital market 
concentration and the fraction of cases paid as a share of charges. We also find that HCCI insurer 
market share is negatively and significantly associated with the fraction of cases paid as a share 
of charges.  
 
VI.D. Robustness of cross sectional analysis 
We conducted a large number of robustness tests on the results in Table IV, some of which we 
describe here. First, the main cross-sectional estimates are robust when we use alternatively 
constructed measures of hospital market structure, such as continuous or binned HHIs, allowing 
many alternatively sized radii to define markets, and/or allowing differential market definitions 
in rural and urban areas. Likewise, our results are also robust to different measures of insurance 
market structure.
54
 Second, our pricing analysis could be sensitive to omitted quality if, in 
particular, quality is correlated with market structure. Consequently, we include four additional 
measures of clinical quality to the price regression. Consistent with Figure IX, three of the four 
measures are correctly signed, but the coefficients on market structure were largely unchanged. 
We also included all 41 measures of quality published by Medicare Hospital Compare into cross-
                                                        
53 As hospitals increasingly purchase physician groups, there may be concerns that some portion of physician fees 
show up in facility prices. Consequently, we re-estimate our analysis using prices measured as the sum of hospital 
and physician prices in each claim (see Appendix Table XV). The results are qualitatively similar to what we 
observe in our main specifications.  
54 For example, the coefficients on our main hospital market structure measures are broadly unchanged when we 
include cubic polynomials of the market shares of the three HCCI contributors and/or individual shares of the top 




sectional regression, which again did not meaningfully shift the hospital market structure 
coefficients.  Third, we show that our results are not driven exclusively by extremes by dropping 
observations from monopolies or hospitals in markets with six or more providers. Fourth, we 
show that our results are not sensitive to the exact sample size cutoffs we use (e.g. hospitals must 
perform at least 50 cases per year to be in the inpatient sample) by showing results where we use 
many alternative cutoffs from between zero to 100 cases per year.
 55
  
Finally, as we discussed previously, we do not have data from Blue Cross Blue Shield 
(BCBS) plans. If hospital market structure is correlated with omitted BCBS presence, this could 
present a problem. Appendix F conducts an extensive analysis of this and does not find it to be a 
major issue. First, note that the correlation between hospital HHI and county-level BCBS market 
share is only 0.222. Second, we estimated all our models solely in areas with high (above 
median) and low (below median) BCBS market shares. While the exact magnitudes of some of 
our coefficients differ in areas where BCBS have high and low market share, our main finding 
that having fewer hospitals in a market is associated with higher prices, a higher proportion of 
cases paid as a share of hospital charges, and a lower fraction of prospectively paid cases paid as 




VII. HOSPITAL MERGERS 
VII.A. Introduction to merger analysis 
Our cross-sectional regressions in the previous section suggest that hospital market structure is 
strongly associated with hospital prices. In this section, we analyze mergers and hospital prices 
using the panel aspect of our data. Over the last few decades, there have been hundreds of 
mergers between hospitals across the US. Economic models of competition in the hospital sector 
predict that mergers between hospitals that are close geographic competitors will lead to price 
increases making mergers of direct interest (see the Gaynor, Ho, and Town [2015] review). 
Further, examining the impact of mergers on hospital prices provides us with another lens 
through which to view the relationship between market structure and prices, and complements 
our cross-sectional analysis.  
                                                        
55 The analysis of alternative market structure is in Appendix Tables XVI-XVIII; quality in Appendix Table XIX; 
extreme market structures in Appendix Table XX and alternative cut-offs in Appendix Table XXI. 
56 As we discuss in more detail in Appendix F, it becomes difficult to precisely estimate the impacts of the market 
structure variables in areas with high BCBS share when HRR fixed effects are included because very few of those 




A number of papers have estimated the impacts of specific mergers that were suspected 
to be anticompetitive. One strand of this literature uses estimates from structural (or semi-
structural) models and ex ante simulation methods to generate estimates of predicted price 
changes from a single or a small number of transactions.
57
 Although these models allow for a 
more sophisticated modeling approach to competition and bargaining between insurers and 
hospitals, they would be difficult to estimate for the hundreds of mergers we have in our data. 
Instead, we follow a second strand of the literature that uses ex post econometric methodologies 
to analyze the effects of consummated mergers.
58
 This kind of modeling is coarser, but does have 
the advantage of looking at what happens after mergers occur. Historically, this strand of the 
literature has also focused on analyzing individual mergers or small numbers of mergers. We 
extend the literature by examining the impact of hospital mergers that occurred in the US during 
the five years covered by our data (which is also a more recent time period than covered in 
previous studies).  
 
VII.B. Hospital Merger Data 
We created a database of nearly all US hospital mergers between 2007 and 2011 (see Appendix 
D for details) and found 366 transactions involving over 2,000 hospitals. For example, as 
Appendix Table XXII shows, there were 55 transactions involving 84 hospitals where the 
merging parties were less than 5 miles apart and 121 transactions involving 260 hospitals within 
15 miles of each other.  
 
VII.C. Modeling Hospital Mergers 
To estimate the effects of mergers on hospital prices, we employ the following specification: 






 +δt+ υh,t 
where p̂
h,t
 is the usual risk-adjusted hospital inpatient price for hospital h in year t. We include 
hospital fixed effects (η
h
) and year dummies (δt). The key variable of interest is the binary 
indicator, MERGEh,t
D
. In our baseline specification this indicator is zero until the year a hospital 
becomes involved in a merger, when it then takes a value of one and retains a value of one for 
                                                        
57  See Town and Vistnes (2001), Capps, Dranove, and Satterthwaite (2003), Gaynor and Vogt (2003), and 
Gowrisankaran, Nevo, and Town (2015). 
58 See Vita and Sacher (2001), Krishnan (2001), Capps and Dranove (2004), Dafny (2009), Kemp, Kersten, and 




the remainder of our sample period. We categorize mergers based on the physical distance 
(superscript D) between the merging entities (e.g. whether the merging parties were separated by 
five miles or less, ten miles or less, etc.). Since hospital location is a key factor determining 
demand (and hence potential patient substitutability between hospitals), we expect mergers 
between hospitals that are geographically closer to result in larger increases in prices than 
mergers between hospitals separated by large distances.
59
 We use a variety of different control 
groups, including all hospitals not involved in mergers and matched controls using a number of 
different matching methods. In some specifications we also include the same set of control 
variables included in our cross-sectional regressions in Table IV.
60
 
There are differences in the characteristics of the merging vs. non-merging hospitals (see 
Appendix Table XXIII). Merging hospitals tend to be located in less concentrated markets (this 
is unsurprising due to antitrust scrutiny and a mechanical limit to how concentrated a market can 
get), are more likely to be non-profit and teaching hospitals, are larger (more beds), and have 
higher reputational average quality (U.S. News & World Report quality rankings). However, 
merging and non-merging hospitals look broadly comparable in terms of their share of Medicare 
and Medicaid admissions, the technologies they possess, and their area characteristics (county 
uninsured and median income). Most of these characteristics vary little over time so the hospital 
fixed effects in Equation (3) will largely control for them. More importantly, as we demonstrate 
below, we do not find any evidence that merging hospitals have different pre-merger trends in 
prices relative to non-merging hospitals.  
 
VII.D. Results on Mergers and Hospital Prices 
Panel A of Table V contains the baseline specifications where we vary the distance between 
merging hospitals from 5 to 50 miles. There are positive coefficients on the merger dummies at 
every distance and these are almost all significant for mergers between hospitals up to 25 miles 
apart. The magnitude of the merger coefficient declines as the distance between the merging 
                                                        
59 We recognize that mergers between hospitals farther apart may have impacts on prices through more subtle forms 
of multi-market conduct behavior. Our specification flexibly allows for mergers to have impacts at any distance, 
although we are not testing specifically for cross-market merger effects like those analyzed by Dafny, Ho, and Lee 
(2016) and Lewis and Pflum (2017).  
60 Because DOJ and FTC occasionally allow failing or “flailing” firms to merge, we want to exclude these firms 
from our analysis. To do that, we exclude 53 hospitals that have the largest share of unused capacity defined as the 
average daily census divided by the total number of hospital beds (e.g. those in the 99th percentile of unused 




parties increases. Mergers within 5 miles are associated with price increases of 6 percent whereas 
the coefficients decline to 2 percent for mergers involving hospitals located up to 25 miles apart. 
In Appendix Figure XIV, we present the estimates of merger effects by one-mile bins for all 
mergers up to those 50 miles apart. The estimates are noisy for very close mergers (because there 
are few such events) but the coefficient on mergers is broadly monotonically decreasing as the 
distance between the merging parties increases.  
 In Panel B of Table V, we add the control variables we included in our cross-sectional 
analysis, which makes almost no difference to the results. It is also possible that non-merging 
neighboring hospitals may be affected by mergers (Dafny, 2009). We test for this by adding a 
dummy for neighboring hospitals, which switches on after a neighboring hospital is exposed to a 
nearby merger (in the relevant distance bin). As we illustrate in Panel C, although the 
coefficients on neighboring mergers are usually positive, they are generally statistically 
insignificant.  
It is possible that our estimates are capturing intertemporal factors other than the mergers 
themselves. Given the short time series in our panel, we examine price trends for two years 
before and after the merger event in Panel D of Table V and in Figure X. Reassuringly, there 
does not appear to be evidence of pre-trends prior to the merger, as prices in the year before the 
merger are not significantly different from two years before (or earlier) in any of the columns. 
By contrast there are significant post-merger price increases, with higher prices in all columns 
two years after mergers occurred. The coefficients seem to generally build up from the year of 
the merger, but given the size of the standard errors, it is hard to be certain. 
The merger coefficients we observe are economically significant.
61
 A horizontal merger 
price effect of five percent is often used as an indicator of (enhanced) market power (U.S. 
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, 2010). Further, this estimate represents 
the average effects of all mergers, not just those thought to be anticompetitive (as in previous ex 
ante studies). In addition, since we examine the impacts of consummated mergers, we are 
looking only at transactions that passed antitrust scrutiny. Since it is likely that the mergers with 
the largest potential effects on price are not attempted due to concerns over antitrust litigation or 
                                                        
61 We note that our estimates are of the same or similar order of magnitude to the bulk of studies of merger price 




are blocked by enforcement authorities, those that we observe should be expected to have a 
smaller impact on price.  
 
VII.E. Robustness of Merger Results 
We subject our merger analysis to a large number of other robustness tests, some of which we 
discuss here.
62
 First, instead of using the simple merger dummy, we estimate the cumulative 
merger effects by hospital for all mergers that hospitals were exposed to from 2007 to 2011.
63
  
Our post-merger price coefficients remain similarly scaled. Second, we used various matching 
procedures to identify alternative control groups for our analysis (see Appendix E), such as 
Mahalanobis distance matching between hospitals, the Dranove and Lindrooth (2003) procedure, 
and K-nearest neighbor matching. These tend to show slightly larger price effects for mergers 
within five miles than we observe in our baseline estimates. Third, we varied the 50 patients per 
year sample cutoff. This does not alter our main results. Fourth, it is possible that the price 
increases we observe following a merger could be due to improvements in management (e.g. 
hospitals doing a better job at price setting) rather than increased bargaining leverage. To test for 
this, we allow the merger coefficient to be different for targets and the acquirers and do not find 
statistically significant differences between the two. Finally, we also attempted to estimate 
merger effects for the seven procedures. Unfortunately, because those samples have fewer 
hospitals, there are fewer treated hospitals, so we cannot estimate merger effects with precision.  
 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
Using insurance claims from three of the five largest commercial insurers in the US, we find that 
health spending on the privately insured varies by a factor of three across the nation. 
Approximately half of the variation in private spending across HRRs is driven by differences in 
hospitals’ prices and half by quantity (Medicare spending variation is almost all accounted for by 
quantity variation). Since previous research has focused on understanding the drivers of 
differences in the quantity of health care delivered across regions (Cutler et al., 2017; 
                                                        
62 The tests discussed here are contained in Appendix Table XXIV where Panel A reproduces the baseline results 
from Table V. 
63 For example, of the 514 hospitals involved in at least one merger involving hospitals located less than 30 miles 




Finkelstein, Gentzkow, and Williams, 2016), we focus on analyzing the variance in hospital 
prices.  
 Historically, the prices hospitals negotiate with insurers have been treated as 
commercially sensitive and have been largely unavailable to researchers on a national basis. Our 
data includes hospitals’ transaction prices and we are able to observe substantial variation in 
prices across hospitals, even for plausibly undifferentiated services like lower-limb MRIs. 
Moreover, a significant amount of the national variation in prices occurs within hospitals. This 
suggests that insurers’ bargaining leverage influences the prices they negotiate with hospitals 
 We also use our data to characterize insurer-hospital contracts. When price is set as a 
share of charges (rather than prospectively paid), it offers hospitals weak incentives to lower 
costs and it transfers the financial risk from idiosyncratically expensive cases to insurers. We 
find that approximately 23 percent of inpatient cases are paid as a share of charges and estimate 
that no more than 57 percent of inpatient cases are set as a percentage of Medicare rates.  
 Market structure appears strongly associated with hospitals’ price levels and contract 
structure. Monopoly hospitals are associated with 12 percent higher prices, 10 percentage points 
more cases paid as a share of charges, and 11 percentage points less of their prospectively paid 
cases set as a percentage of Medicare payments compared to hospitals located in quadropoly or 
greater markets. In concentrated insurer markets we find the opposite correlations – hospitals 
have lower transaction prices and operate under contracts where they bear more risk. We also 
analyze the 366 hospital mergers that occurred between 2007 and 2011 and find that after 
mergers involving hospitals located less than five miles apart, prices at the merging parties 
increased by over 6 percent. As the distance between the merging parties’ increases, the size of 
the post-merger price increases is attenuated. This set of results around market structure suggests 
that bargaining leverage is an important component of the dispersion we see in transaction 
prices. 
 Collectively, our research highlights the importance of studying hospital pricing and 
contracts when analyzing health spending on the privately insured. Our findings suggest that 
policy-makers should continue to analyze whether potential hospital mergers could harm 
consumer welfare. Likewise, while we cannot draw strong normative conclusions, quantifying 
the scale of the variation in prices is nevertheless important. Given the variation in prices that we 




could save significant amounts of money if patients attended lower-priced providers. This 
suggests that policies aimed at steering patients towards low cost providers (e.g. reference 
pricing, incentivizing referring physicians, etc.) could lower spending. Finally, there is 
widespread agreement that payment reform (shifting to contracts where providers bear more risk) 
is crucial to increasing hospital productivity (McClellan et al., 2017). Our analysis suggests that 
providers who have fewer potential competitors will be more able to resist attempts at such 
payment reform.  
Further research should be focused on understanding the economic forces behind the 
patterns and correlations we have identified in the data. Given the growing availability of 
insurance claims data, there is scope for a rich and broad variety of research that takes on these 
important tasks.  
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TABLE I: HOSPITAL AND PATIENT CHARACTERISTICS 
           
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Mean SD Min Max 
Market Characteristics     
 Hospital in Monopoly Market, 15 Mile Radius 0.163 0.370 0 1 
 Hospital in Duopoly Market, 15 Mile Radius 0.194 0.395 0 1 
 Hospital in Triopoly Market, 15 Mile Radius 0.123 0.328 0 1 
 Hospital in Quadropoly+ 0.520 0.500 0 1 
 Hospital HHI Defined by Beds in a 15 Mile Radius 0.461 0.295 0.043 1 
 HCCI Market Share Measured at the County Level 0.178 0.101 0.017 0.571 
 Blue Cross Blue Shield Market Share Measured at the County Level 0.403 0.218 0.001 0.958 
Hospital Characteristics 
     Number of Technologies 59 30 0 138 
 Ranked in US News & World Reports 0.053 0.225 0 1 
 Beds 270 203 10 2,264 
 Teaching Hospital 0.380 0.485 0 1 
 Government Owned 0.122 0.327 0 1 
 Non-Profit 0.693 0.461 0 1 
 For-Profit 0.185 0.388 0 1 
Local Area Characteristics 
     Percent of County Uninsured 0.171 0.058 0.031 0.389 
 Median Income 51,516 13,153 22,255 119,525 
 Rural 0.162 0.369 0 1 
Other Payers 
     Medicare Payment Rate 6,437 1,288 4,590 14,292 
 Share Medicare 0.446 0.101 0 0.833 
 Share Medicaid 0.188 0.096 0 0.777 
Quality Scores 
     30-Day AMI Survival Rate 0.840 0.016 0.751 0.898 
 % of AMI Patients Given Aspirin at Arrival 0.975 0.049 0.330 1 
 % of Patients Given Antibiotics Pre Surgery 0.934 0.082 0.140 1 
 % of Surgery Patients Given Treatment to Prevent Blood Clots 0.881 0.106 0.030 1 
Patient Characteristics 
     Age 18-24 0.074 0.262 0 1 
 Age 25-35 0.248 0.432 0 1 
 Age 35-44 0.196 0.397 0 1 
 Age 45-54 0.219 0.414 0 1 
 Age 55-64 0.262 0.440 0 1 
 Female 0.672 0.470 0 1 
 Charlson Comorbidity Index 0.707 1.442 0 6 
           
Notes: These are descriptive statistics for the Inpatient Pricing sample from the HCCI database. There are 8,772 




TABLE II: PRICE/QUANTITY DECOMPOSITION OF MEDICARE AND PRIVATE HEALTH SPENDING, 2011 
                
        
 
  Private       Medicare   
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 














        Respiratory system diagnosis w ventilator support 96+ hours 0.650 0.415 -0.064 
 
0.102 0.771 0.127 
Perc cardiovasc proc w drug-eluting stent w/o MCC 0.465 0.681 -0.146 
 
0.153 1.113 -0.265 
Major small & large bowel proc w MCC 0.676 0.299 0.025 
 
0.213 0.888 -0.101 
Major small & large bowel proc w CC 0.474 0.453 0.073 
 
0.193 0.811 -0.005 
Esophagitis, gastroent & misc digest disorders w/o MCC 0.387 0.637 -0.024 
 
0.164 1.028 -0.192 
Spinal fusion except cervical w/o MCC 0.334 0.512 0.154 
 
0.085 1.067 -0.152 
Major joint replacement or reattachment of lower extremity w/o MCC 0.381 0.645 -0.026 
 
0.213 0.973 -0.186 
Infectious & parasitic diseases w O.R. proc w MCC 0.701 0.360 -0.061 
 
0.112 0.769 0.119 
Septicemia w/o MV 96+ hours w MCC 0.536 0.365 0.099 
 
0.120 0.815 0.064 
Rehabilitation w CC/MCC 0.460 0.430 0.109 
 
0.056 1.164 -0.219 
Average Shares (weighted by spending) 0.496 0.495 0.009 
 
0.127 0.953 -0.081 
Notes: The decomposition of ln(spending per beneficiary) is carried out on the 2011 Medicare and HCCI inpatient spending samples. The Medicare analysis is 
based on the 100% sample of Medicare claims accessed via the AHD. HCCI data includes all inpatient claims from our spending sample for those aged 55-64. 
“CC” is short for with “complication or comorbidity”; “MCC” is short for with “major complication or comorbidity”; “proc”=”procedure”; “cath” = “catheter”; 
“w”=With”; “w/o”=”without”. Because of space constraints, we show only the top 25 highest spending DRGs in the HCCI data; the “Average Shares” in the 
final row are the average decomposition results by DRG (weighted by spending, i.e. first three columns use spending weights for private and last three use 




 TABLE III: DECOMPOSITION OF HOSPITALS’ TRANSACTION PRICE VARIATION 
                  
         
 










Hip Replacement 0.006 0.017 0.502 0.763 0.776 22.4% 15,122 0.174 
Knee Replacement 0.006 0.016 0.416 0.728 0.756 24.4% 37,157 0.206 
Cesarean Section 0.011 0.029 0.432 0.726 0.755 24.5% 81,482 0.170 
Vaginal Delivery 0.012 0.030 0.381 0.647 0.701 29.9% 108,794 0.192 
PTCA 0.005 0.019 0.478 0.724 0.760 24.0% 16,636 0.239 
Colonoscopy 0.010 0.024 0.412 0.759 0.820 18.0% 66,017 0.165 
Lower Limb MRI 0.001 0.008 0.331 0.774 0.784 21.6% 113,914 0.157 
Mean 




         Patient Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
   Plan Characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
   HRR Fixed Effects No No Yes — — 
   Hospital Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes 
   Control for Charges No No No No Yes       
Notes: Columns (1)-(5) have transaction-level procedure prices (2010-2011) as the dependent variable and display the R2 of a regression that includes and the 
relevant right hand side variables indicated in the lower rows. All regressions use case-level data and control for month-year dummies. Patient characteristics 
include fixed effects for sex and five age bands (as in Table I). Plan characteristics include the full interaction of market segment (i.e. large vs. small group), and 
product (HMO, PPO, POS, EOP, indemnity plan and other) and funding type (fully insured or ASO). “Hospital fixed effects” indicates a full set of hospital 
dummies interacted with month-year dummies. “HRR fixed effects” indicates a full set of HRR dummies interacted with month-year dummies. Column (6) = 1 - 
Column (5) and the mean is the unweighted average across the 7 procedures. Column (8) reports the within-hospital-month coefficient of variation, averaged 




TABLE IV: HOSPITAL CONCENTRATION, PRICES AND CONTRACT FORM, 2008-2011  
        
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: ln(Hospital Price), Mean=9.42, Obs=8,772, Number of Hospitals=2,358   
Monopoly 0.234*** 0.190*** 0.118*** 
 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Duopoly 0.161*** 0.130*** 0.073*** 
 
(0.021) (0.020) (0.024) 
Triopoly 0.115*** 0.083*** 0.036 
 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Hospitals in quadropoly or greater markets are the omitted category 





Panel B: Percent of Cases Paid as Share of Charges; Mean=18.6%, Obs=4,344, Number of 
Hospitals=2,253 
Monopoly 17.335*** 15.241*** 10.455*** 
 
(1.828) (1.823) (1.778) 
Duopoly 9.979*** 8.424*** 5.702*** 
 
(1.760) (1.740) (1.596) 
Triopoly 7.804*** 6.235** 4.909** 
 
(1.909) (1.938) (1.608) 
Hospitals in quadropoly or greater markets are the omitted category 





Panel C: Percent of Cases of Prospective Payments Tied to Medicare; Mean=48.3%, Obs=3,669, Number 
of Hospitals=1,936 
Monopoly -16.849*** -11.275*** -11.293*** 
 
(2.882) (2.696) (3.160) 
Duopoly -8.791*** -4.272* -5.595** 
 
(2.441) (2.443) (2.316) 
Triopoly -7.111** -2.422 -5.747** 
 
(2.866) (2.727) (2.790) 
Hospitals in quadropoly or greater markets are the omitted category 





HRR Fixed Effects No No Yes 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. OLS estimates of Equation (2) with standard errors clustered at the HRR-
level in parentheses. Market structure variables described in Appendix C. The dependent variable in Panel A is 
ln(Hospital inpatient prices) that are regression risk-adjusted for DRG, age, and sex; in Panel B the dependent 
variable is the percent of cases paid as share of charges (i.e. non-prospective payments); in Panel C the dependent 
variable is the percent of cases tied to the Medicare reimbursement rate. An observation is a hospital-year. In Panel 
A, the data covers 2008 to 2011; Panels B and C it covers 2010 to 2011 because charge data is unavailable for 
earlier years. All regressions include controls for the number of technologies, dummy for being ranked in US News 
& World Reports, size (number of beds), hospital ownership (government, non-profit or for-profit), whether a 
teaching hospital, % of county uninsured, county median income, the Medicare payment rate, share of Medicare, 
share of Medicaid, and year dummies. Appendix Tables X - XII reports full set of results. 
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TABLE V: HOSPITAL PRICES AND MERGERS 
  
Dependent variable: ln(price) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Distance (merger within given number of miles): 5 10 15 20 25 30 50 
Panel A: Baseline 
       
 
Post-Merger 0.060** 0.039** 0.021 0.023* 0.024** 0.014 0.008 
  
(0.025) (0.019) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) 
Panel B: Add Controls 
    
 
 
Post-Merger 0.062** 0.040** 0.021 0.024* 0.024** 0.014 0.008 
  
(0.025) (0.019) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) 
Panel C: Separately Controlling for Neighbors      
 Post-Merger 0.062** 0.040** 0.021 0.022* 0.024** 0.013 0.008 
  (0.025) (0.019) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) 
 Merging Neighbor -0.016 0.024* 0.005 0.013 0.003 0.003 -0.005 
  (0.028) (0.014) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
Panel D: Merger Effects over time (t-2 and before omitted base) 
 
t-1 0.019 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.012 0.013 
  
(0.03) 0.018) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) 
 
t 0.074** 0.035 0.021 0.025 0.028* 0.017 0.011 
  
(0.034) (0.025) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) 
 
t+1 0.070** 0.064** 0.041** 0.044** 0.041** 0.028 0.024 
  
(0.035) (0.027) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.015) 
 
t+2 and after 0.056 0.088*** 0.068*** 0.063*** 0.059*** 0.041** 0.036* 
  
(0.040) (0.033) (0.026) (0.024) (0.022) (0.021) (0.019) 
  Observations 8,655 8,655 8,655 8,655 8,655 8,655 8,655 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. OLS estimates of Equation (3) with standard errors in parentheses (clustered by hospital and system). All regressions 
include hospital fixed effects and year dummies. The dependent variable is our risk-adjusted inpatient price index. Controls: share of the privately insured 
covered by the HCCI insurers, number of technologies, dummy for being ranked in US News & World Reports, size as measured by number of beds, hospital 
ownership (government, non-profit or for-profit), whether a teaching hospital, percent of county uninsured, county median income, the Medicare payment rate, 
share of Medicare, share of Medicaid, year dummies and HRR fixed-effects. Post-merger is dummy equal to 1 in the year a hospital merges and in all years 
afterwards and zero otherwise. “Neighbor” = 1 if a hospital was not involved in the merger, but within the distance indicated in the column head of a hospital 
where a merger took place (and zero otherwise).  
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FIGURE I: AVERAGE HOSPITAL FACILITIES CHARGES, NEGOTIATED PRICES, AND MEDICARE 
REIMBURSEMENTS, 2011 
 
Notes: Data drawn from the inpatient and procedures samples. The height of the pale grey bars (top) are the average 
hospital charges. The height of the darker shaded bars (middle) are the transaction prices. Both are risk-adjusted as 
described in Appendices B1 and B2. The intermediate shaded bars (bottom) are the Medicare reimbursements as 




FIGURE II: TOTAL PRIVATE SPENDING BY HRR, 2011 
 
Panel A: Spending per Beneficiary 
 
 
Panel B: Regression Adjusted Inpatient Hospital Prices 
 
Notes: Panel A captures risk-adjusted spending per beneficiary by HRR using data from 2011. Each bin captures a 
quintile of spending per beneficiary. The data are drawn from the spending sample. Spending per beneficiary is risk-
adjusted for age and sex. Panel B captures HRR-level average hospital regression-adjusted inpatient prices that are 
risk-adjusted for DRG, age, and sex, and weighted by hospital activity. In Appendix Figure VII, we present this map 
normalized using the Medicare wage-index in order to control for local wage costs across the US. Thatched regions 

































Notes: Each darkly shaded bar represents a single hospital’s regression-adjusted transaction price based on 2011 cases. The 
Medicare payment (lightly shaded bars) is based on the PPS fee schedule described in Appendix B4. The bars are ordered by 















    
Summary Statistics for Negotiated Prices 






$6,404 – $52,503 
 
Min - Max 
 
$270 – $3,251 
$15,115 – $34,554 
 
p10 - p90 
 
$719 – $2,104 
$18,260 – $28,698 
 
Inter Quartile Range (IQR) 
 


















Number of Hospitals 
 
1,304 
   
Panel A: Knee Replacement Prices Panel B: Lower Limb MRI Prices 
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Notes: These panels present average hospital-level regression-adjusted private-payer prices for knee replacements and lower limb MRIs using data from 2011. 
Each column captures a hospital in the Philadelphia, PA HRR. We include similar graphs for all procedures and HRRs that include five or more providers at 
www.hospitalpricingproject.org
  
Panel A: Knee Replacement Prices Panel B: Lower Limb MRI Prices 
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FIGURE V: WITHIN HOSPITAL PRICES FOR LOWER LIMB MRI AT TWO HIGH VOLUME HOSPITALS, 
2008-2011 
 
Panel A: Hospital 1 
 




Notes: These figures highlight the top three linked contracts (circles, crosses and triangles) within the two highest 
volume hospitals in our data in 2008-2011. Each point represents a unique price paid for lower limb MRI in a given 
hospital-month, where the size of the point corresponds to the volume of MRIs paid at that price. Repeated prices 
are linked across renegotiation events using information on the plan characteristics of the patients whose episodes 
were paid at that price. For more information on the methods used to link contracted prices see Appendix B3. 
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FIGURE VI: REPEATED PRICE AND SHARE OF CHARGE AGREEMENTS AT A HOSPITAL 
FOR VAGINAL DELIVERY, 2010-2011 
 
 
Notes: These figures highlight the top two linked contracts within a high volume hospital for 2010-2011. Circles 
represent Contract #1; triangles represent Contract #2. The size of the point corresponds to the volume of cases at 
that price. Repeated prices and price-to-charge ratios are linked across renegotiation events using information on the 
plan characteristics of the patients whose episodes were paid at that price or rate. For more information on the 




FIGURE VII: CONTRACT CLASSIFICATIONS OVERALL AND BY PROCEDURE, 2010-2011 
 
 
Notes: The bars present the share of the claims by procedure (or inpatient sample) classified into each type of 
contract using case-level data from 2010-2011. The bottom bars display the percent of cases classified as 
prospective payments. The middle bars display the percent of cases paid as a share of charges. And, the top bars 
display the percent of cases not classified. The numbers of hospitals (cases) underlying each bar are 2,253 
(2,288,907) for inpatient sample, 404 (15,122) for Hip Replacement, 809 (37,157) for Knee Replacement, 1,041 
(81,482) for Cesarean Section, 1,136 (108,794) for Vaginal Delivery, 501 (16,636) for PTCA, and 1,008 (66,018) 
for Colonoscopy. Inpatient* presents a restricted sub-sample of the inpatient cases for hospital-DRG pairs that 
represent at least 20 admissions from 2010-2011. This sample represents 1,841 hospitals and 1,078,697 admissions 










Notes: The panels represent two large hospitals in the data. Each circle is a unique, privately-paid prospective-payment amount for a DRG The x-axis is the 




FIGURE IX: BIVARIATE CORRELATIONS OF HOSPITAL PRICE WITH OBSERVABLE FACTORS, 2008-2011  
 
Notes: The x-axis reflects the level of the bivariate correlations between key variables featured in our regressions and hospitals’ regression-adjusted inpatient 
prices that are risk-adjusted for DRG, age, and sex. The bars show the 95% confidence intervals surrounding the correlations. Since these are bivariate 
correlations “Duopoly” is duopoly or monopoly and the implicit omitted category is triopoly or greater. “Triopoly” is triopoly, duopoly or monopoly. For 




FIGURE X: MERGER EVENT STUDIES, 2008-2011 
 






Within 20 miles 
 
Within 30 miles 
 
Within 50 miles 
 
Notes: These are the regression coefficients of price differences across merging and non-merging hospitals estimated separately by year. The dependent variable 
is log of our regression adjusted inpatient price that is risk-adjusted for DRG, age, and sex. All regressions include hospital and year fixed effects. 95 percent 
confidence intervals shown. The merger year (“0”) is shaded. The omitted category is 2 or more years before the merger.  
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APPENDIX A: Description of Data and Data Cleaning 
Appendix A1: Datasets and Sources  
Health Care Cost Institute (HCCI) Data: Our paper draws on data from the Health Care Cost 
Institute (HCCI). The HCCI data include claims from beneficiaries with employer-sponsored 
coverage from Aetna, Humana, and UnitedHealthcare. More details on HCCI can be found at 
www.healthcostinstitute.org.  
The data include claims for individuals with fully-insured and self-insured plans that receive 
employer-sponsored insurance.1 This includes insurance products in the national, large, and 
small group markets. The data cover 27.6 percent of individuals in the US with employer-
sponsored insurance. The data begin with sheets of membership data, inpatient facilities data, 
outpatient data, physician data, and pharmacy data. We use these to construct our inpatient and 
procedure samples. A sample hip replacement case constructed from these claims is posted 
online at http://healthcarepricingproject.org/sites/default/files/papers/sample_hip_claims.xlsx. 
This illustrates how we aggregate claims up to the case level and calculate a price. 
While the HCCI data include more than forty million covered lives per year (see Appendix Table 
I in the body of the paper), the data are from health insurance claims for individuals with health 
care coverage from Aetna, Humana, or UnitedHealthcare. While these are three of the largest 
five health insurers in the US, we do not have claims from Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS) 
health insurers. BCBS is an association of 38 for-profit and not-for-profit health insurers in the 
US who purchase a license to use the BCBS name. We use membership data from our database 
and compare it to coverage rates in the American Community Survey and the Census Bureau’s 
Small Area Health Insurance Estimates (SAHIE) to estimate the coverage of our three insurers at 
the state and county level. We also use data from the HealthLeaders Interstudy database to 
estimate the share of lives BCBS insurers cover by county. We use this information to show that 
our results are robust to areas with different levels of HCCI and BCBS coverage (See Appendix 
F). 
The most prominent alternative source of private health insurance claims data is the MarketScan 
database from Truven Health Analytics. MarketScan data include claims for individuals with 
health insurance from a number of large employers and also some smaller employers (although it 
seems that the MarketScan coverage for smaller employers is substantially lower than their 
coverage for larger employers). Most previous research using the MarketScan data to analyze 
health spending has relied on only the claims for individuals employed by large firms. We use 
the HCCI data to analyze claims for individuals employed in small, medium, and large firms. 
Using the HCCI data allows us to look at a substantially larger population than has been 
analyzed using the MarketScan data. Chernew et al. (2010) report that the MarketScan data 
contain between 16.9 million and 22.9 million covered lives per year between 1996 through 
2006. By contrast, the HCCI data contain between 42 and 46 million lives per year (see 
Appendix Table I).  
                                                             
1 With fully-insured plans, the insurer pools and bears risk. With self-insured plans, the firm pays all insurance 
claims themselves and relies on insurance companies for administrative services.  
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While the MarketScan database is useful for many research applications, it has drawbacks for the 
type of analysis we undertake in this project. First, the MarketScan database does not contain 
hospital IDs and sub-three digit geographic identifiers.  A unique hospital identifier is necessary 
so that we can merge in hospital characteristics and, more importantly, analyze price variation 
within and between providers. With HCCI, we can merge on hospital characteristics, identify 
individual hospitals, and merge in local characteristics at the zip code level. Second, MarketScan 
has very thin coverage in a number of markets. For example, while the smallest HRR in the 
HCCI data has 2,932 unique individuals, MarketScan includes HRRs with fewer than two 
hundred individuals.  
In addition to the core HCCI data, we merge on a number of other datasets listed below. 
American Hospital Association Annual Survey: We obtain data on hospital characteristics 
from the American Hospital Association (AHA) annual survey. More information on the AHA 
survey data can be obtained from: http://www.ahadataviewer.com/book-cd-products/AHA-
Survey/. The survey polls hospitals on characteristics, staffing, technology, finances, and other 
information and has been running since 1946. We use the AHA data to create our technology 
measures and measures of hospital market structure.  
American Community Survey Data: We use data on the percentage of working age (18-64) 
adults with employer-based health insurance coverage by county from the American Community 
Survey conducted by the US Census Bureau, https://usa.ipums.org/usa/acs_healthins.shtml.  
American Hospital Directory Data: We use data on hospitals’ Medicare activity that we 
obtained from the American Hospital Directory (AHD). The AHD is a for-profit data vendor that 
sells cleaned Medicare claims data derived from the Medicare Provider Analysis and Review 
limited access database. This includes claims records for 100% of Medicare fee-for-service 
inpatient claims. Details on the AHD data can be found at www.ahd.com. 
Census Data: Data on the number of uninsured lives by county, lives privately insured per 
county, and median household income come from the US census. See: 
http://www.census.gov/did/www/sahie/ and http://www.census.gov/did/www/saipe/index.html. 
Dartmouth Data: We use data on Medicare spending per HRR that we downloaded from the 
Dartmouth Atlas. Full details on the Dartmouth Atlas Medicare data can be obtained from: 
http://www.dartmouthatlas.org. 
FactSet Research Systems: These reports provide a roster of merger and acquisition (M&A) 
activity across industries and include the names of firms involved in transactions and the date of 
transactions. We used the database to find hospital mergers. The data are accessible with a 
subscription at: https://www.factset.com/data/company_data/mergers_acq  
HealthLeaders Interstudy Data: The HealthLeaders Interstudy database, available for purchase 
from the Decision Resources Group, includes the count of individuals enrolled, by county, by 
insurer in the small, medium, and large group markets. The data include coverage of the self-
insured and fully-insured market. See: decisionresourcesgroup.com. 
Irving Levin Associates’ Health Care Services Acquisition Reports: These reports provide a 
roster of M&A activity in hospitals, managed care companies, physician medical groups, 
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rehabilitation centers, labs, and behavioral health groups. We used reports for 2007 to 2011 to 
identify the hospital mergers that we include in this analysis. The reports can be purchased from: 
https://products.levinassociates.com/downloads/har-2017/ 
Medicare Quality Scores: We use data on hospital quality obtained from data.medicare.gov. 
The data include quality scores drawn from both Medicare and private claims data. The data can 
be downloaded from: https://data.medicare.gov/data/hospital-compare. The quality scores used 
were developed by the Agency for Health Care Research and Quality (AHRQ).  
Securities Data Company (SDC) Platinum: This database provides a historical transaction 
database including a roster of hospital mergers. The data are accessible with a subscription via: 
https://financial.thomsonreuters.com/en/products/data-analytics/market-data/sdc-platinum-
financial-securities.html. 
U.S. News & World Report Rankings: We obtained rankings of hospitals printed in the US 
News and World Report from 2007 – 2011. Some data were obtained from online rankings. For 
some years, we obtained the physical copy of the printed magazine issues.  
Appendix A2: Identifying Hospitals Using National Plan and Provider Enumeration System 
Identifiers 
Single hospitals can be assigned multiple National Plan and Provider Enumeration System 
Identifiers (NPI) because different wings of the hospitals and different units can each have their 
own NPI (e.g. a hospital’s radiology service could have a separate NPI to its Emergency Room). 
To address this issue, we made a crosswalk that consolidates providers’ multiple NPIs into a 
single, master NPI.  We use the master NPI to merge on data from the AHA and Medicare.  To 
consolidate NPIs, we undertake the following steps: 
1. Compile all variations of AHA ID/hospital name/address/city/state/ZIP Code in the 2000-
2011 AHA survey data, retaining the row for the latest year. 
2. Add NPI from the AHA survey files, beginning with the most recent year.   
3. Make sure there is only one NPI per AHA ID. If more than one AHA ID have the same 
NPI, look up in the CMS NPI Registry to resolve the discrepancy. 
4. Check all NPIs in the CMS NPI Registry to make sure they are valid and accurate. Remove 
invalid NPIs. 
5. Look up hospitals in the NPI Registry that do not have an NPI in AHA by name and 
address. Attach NPI to the AHA file when a match is found.  
6. Extract all organizational rows from the CMS NPI Registry where primary taxonomy code 
is for a hospital (287300000X, 281P00000X, 281PC2000X, 282N00000X, 282NC2000X, 
282NC0060X, 282NR1301X, 282NW0100X, 282E00000X, 286500000X, 2865C1500X, 
2865M2000X, 2865X1600X, 283Q00000X, 283X00000X, 283X00000X, 283XC2000X, 
282J00000X, 284300000X) or hospital unit (273100000X, 275N00000X, 273R00000X, 
273Y00000X, 276400000X). 
7. Match AHA compiled address file to the hospital NPI file on NPI. Add AHA number to the 
hospital NPI file and mark the NPI as ‘PRIMARY’ NPI for that hospital. 
8. Match remaining rows in the hospital NPI file according to the following hierarchy: 
1. Organization name, address1, city, state, ZIP Code 
2. Address1, city, state, ZIP Code, similar organization name 
5 
 
3. Other organization name, address1, city, state, ZIP Code 
4. Address1, city, state, ZIP Code, similar other organization name 
5. Address, city, state, ZIP Code, different name (validated name changes via web 
search)2 
6. Organization name, similar address1, city, state, ZIP Code3 
7. Other organization name, similar address1, city, state, ZIP Code 
8. Similar organization name, similar address1, city, state, ZIP Code 
9. Similar other organization name, similar address1, state, ZIP Code 
10. Medicare number, city, state, ZIP Code 
9. When a match is found, append AHA ID and ‘PRIMARY’ NPI. 
10. Some hospitals in the NPI Registry were not in the AHA survey data files.  For these 
hospitals, we pick one NPI as ‘PRIMARY’ and, using the match steps outlined above, 
add an ‘X’ to the AHA ID column and append the ‘PRIMARY’ NPI to all matched rows. 
11. We also consolidated NPIs to ZIP codes.  To do so, we:   
1. Sort file by ZIP Code, primary taxonomy code, address1 
2. Where more than one ‘PRIMARY’ NPI exists within a ZIP Code for the same 
organization name and primary taxonomy, change all rows to the ‘PRIMARY’ 
NPI associated with the AHA ID. 
3. Where more than one ‘PRIMARY’ NPI exists within a ZIP Code for the same 
organization name and primary taxonomy but none of the rows is associated with 
an AHA ID, double check against the AHA file. If no match is found, consolidate 
the rows to one single ‘PRIMARY’ NPI. 
 
Appendix A3: Constructing a consistent hospital-level panel from the AHA Data 
When hospitals merge, the AHA Survey will often consolidate two hospital IDs into a new single 
ID. While this does not affect our measure of hospital prices (since those are generated from the 
HCCI data), it does delete observations from the AHA data. This creates two issues. First, 
according to the AHA data, the count of AHA hospital sites (as opposed to systems) decreases 
over time. This is caused mechanically by mergers, which reduce the numbers of IDs. Second, 
because we measure prices for hospital sites, AHA characteristics that we use as control 
variables are only available at the more aggregated level of the consolidated sites. While most of 
our control variables are categorical (e.g. whether a hospital is a teaching facility), some are 
continuous measures (e.g. hospital beds, the count of Medicare discharges per year, and the 
count of Medicaid discharges per year).  
A good example of this issue is that after their merger, the IDs for New Britain General Hospital 
in New Britain, CT and Bradley Memorial Hospital in Southington, CT are consolidated into a 
new ID number for the Hospital of Central Connecticut in 2006. In the AHA Survey data the IDs 
for “New Britain General” and “Bradley Memorial” vanish from the survey in 2006 and a new 
hospital ID for “Hospital of Central CT” appears in the same year.  
                                                             
2 Because there can be hospitals within hospitals (e.g., specialty or children’s hospital on one floor of a general 
hospital), all of these occurrences were manually validated to ensure that the correct hospital was identified. 
3 Suburb names are occasionally used in addresses (e.g., Brentwood vs. Los Angeles). If the address1, state, and ZIP 
Code matched but the city name differed, this was still considered a valid match at each level. 
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This is a standard problem in firm-level analysis. A firm is composed of a number of 
establishments and often data are only available at the higher firm-level (e.g. Compustat). When 
two firms merge information is often only available at the aggregate consolidated level and not 
for the individual firms (even when they are still run as separate businesses). A standard 
approach to this problem is to freeze the organizational structure at a point of time, so the 
researcher can analyze a consistent set of firm sub-units (or at least until they exit). We perform 
an analogous exercise for hospital sites. 
In order to maintain the information at the more disaggregated level we “undo” the site-level 
consolidation in AHA after 2001 by (i) maintaining the original (vanished) ID at the site level in 
the year the consolidation occurs and for all years afterwards; (ii) remove the new consolidated 
ID from the data in all years after it occurs.4 We then construct a new master hospital system ID. 
The challenge that arises from “undoing” this consolidation of IDs is we do not know the correct 
bed count (and other observables) at the hospital site-level after consolidation.  
We address this by imputing the information at the consolidated level to the site level for all 
continuous variables for these hospitals in the following manner. Consider the following 
example of imputing hospital beds. Let two separate hospitals have distinct IDs A and B at time 
T-1. Assume that hospitals A and B merge at time T and become hospital C (hospital C may have 
already been in existence at T-1 or may be a new hospital created from the merger of A and B at 
time T). The merged hospital is given the ID C and the IDs for A and B cease to exist. Let bt
h be 







 . wh is hospital h’s share of the total number of beds between hospitals A and B at 










≤0.2, then we assume hospital h’s bed total is whbt
C for all t in which 
hospital C exists in the AHA Survey. Otherwise, we assume hospital h’s bed total is bT-1
h  for all t 
in which hospital C exists.  
In other words, if the percentage difference between the total number of beds at A and B in T-1 
and the number of beds of the consolidated hospital ID in time T is less than or equal to 20 
percent, then we impute hospital A’s bed count to be its share of the total beds at A and B at time 
T-1 (wA), multiplied by the consolidated hospital’s total number of beds (bt
C) for all years that 
hospital C exists in the AHA Survey. If this percentage difference is greater than 20 percent, then 
we assign hospital A the bed total it has at time T-1 to all the years in which hospital C exists 
(from time T forward).5  
We carry out this same imputation procedure for the share of Medicare and Medicaid discharges 
using the above methodology.  
                                                             
4 In some cases, the merger is recorded using the aggregation of an acquired hospital into an existing AHA ID. In 
these cases, the procedure is the same except we do not delete observations for the acquiring hospital.  
5 We choose a threshold because if the difference is large then it indicates that the merged hospital is undergoing a 
large restructuring, so this casts doubt on the assumption that the relative size of original entities is stable. 20 percent 
is an arbitrary threshold, of course, but the results are robust to other reasonable thresholds. 
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Appendix A4: Defining the Inpatient and Procedure Pricing Samples 
The inpatient sample in our data includes all inpatient claims aggregated to the level of a single 
hospital admission (which we call a case), each of which has a unique DRG. The procedures we 
use are defined using combinations of ICD9 codes and DRGs. In the case of MRIs, we identify 
cases using CPT-4 codes. The specific codes we use to define samples include:  
Coding Definitions for the Seven Procedure Samples 
Procedure ICD9 and  MS-DRG or CPT-4 
Hip Replacement 8151 470 
Knee Replacement 8154 470 
Cesarean Section 741 766 
Vaginal Delivery 7359 775 
PTCA 0066 247 
Colonoscopy V7651 (CM) 
MRI 73721 
 
For hip and knee replacements, we limit our analysis to individuals between forty-five and sixty-
four years of age. For vaginal deliveries and cesarean sections, we limit our analysis to 
delivering mothers who are between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-four.  In order to be 
included, an MRI case must be a single-line facility claim and we must observe a separate 
physician payment for the reading of the MRI. We do this to ensure that we are isolating the 
professional component (reading of the MRI) from the technical component (administering the 
scan). We also limit MRIs to those carried out on individuals who had no other hospital claims 
on the day that the MRI was provided and for whom the hospitalization was exclusively for the 
MRI. Similarly, for colonoscopies, we limit our analysis to individuals aged forty-five through 
sixty-four and only include hospital-based cases where nothing else was done to the patient that 
day and for which the colonoscopy was the reason for the trip to the hospital. We exclude 
colonoscopies where a biopsy was taken.  
In order to minimize the impact of unusually complicated cases or clerical billing errors, we 
exclude cases above the 99th percentile of length-of-stay as well as cases where the price is 
below the 1st percentile or above the 99th percentile. In the inpatient sample, these restrictions are 
implemented by DRG.  
Appendix Table III shows the impact on the number of hospitals and cases of the main selection 
criteria we use to derive our inpatient sample. After conditioning our data to cases delivered at 
hospitals that are registered with the AHA, we have 5,865,727 inpatient cases delivered at 4,326 
facilities between 2008 and 2011. Excluding critical access hospitals drops our number of 
providers by 1,124 (26 percent), but only lowers the number of cases we observe by 51,349 (less 
than one percent). We further exclude three hospitals where we do not have data on Medicare 
activity. We then exclude all cases from 2007. This lowers our cases by 769,104 (13 percent) and 
number of hospitals by 10 (less than one percent). In order to have sufficient data at each hospital 
to calculate an inpatient price index, we exclude providers that had fewer than 50 cases per year. 






Appendix A5: Construction of Price Fixed Spending and Quantity Fixed Spending Used in 
Section III.B. 
We calculate Medicare and private spending per beneficiary where we fix quantities nationally 
(and only allow price variation to drive variation in spending) and fix prices (and only allow 
quantity variation to drive spending variation).  
To do so, we first calculate inpatient spending per beneficiary for the privately insured and for 
Medicare recipients. Inpatient spending per beneficiary in HRR r (yr) is a function of the quantity 
(qr) of care provided and the price of care (pr): 




where the price of DRG d at hospital h in HRR r is represented by ph,d and quantity is qh,d (we 
suppress the subscript r for economy of notation), Br is the number of beneficiaries in HRR r, 
and ∑, indicates summing across all DRGs in a hospital and the all hospitals in an HRR.  
We compute counterfactuals to calculate the relative contributions of price and quantity to 
variation in inpatient spending. The first counterfactual we create is to fix all prices per DRG to 
be the same as the national average (̅) and then analyze spending variation. This allows us to 
identify the relative contribution that differences in the quantity of care provided across regions 
make to variation in spending per beneficiary. Spending per beneficiary calculated with national 
average prices is (where ~ indicates a counterfactual calculation):  
              
̅ = ∑ (̅,),

. 
The second counterfactual is to fix the quantity and mix of inpatient care delivered in each HRR 
to be the same as the national average mix and quantity of care () and then analyze spending 
variation.6 To do so, we calculate:  
      
 = ∑ (,),

. 
This allows us to identify the relative contribution that differences in price make to variation in 
spending per beneficiary across HRRs. These are, of course, purely accounting decompositions 
to gauge rough magnitudes, as quantity and price are both endogenously determined in the 
private sector. 
Appendix Tables VII and VIII contain the results of these counterfactual calculations for 
individuals age 55 to 64 (Appendix Table VII) and individuals age 18 to 64 (Appendix Table 
VIII).  
 
Appendix A6: Construction of Control Variables for Sections VI and VII 
                                                             
6 To do so, we identify the mix of DRGs at a national level and set every HRR to have that mix of DRGs.  
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In our estimates of the relationship between market structure, mergers, and hospital prices in 
Sections VI and VII, we also include a range of additional hospital and local area controls. 
Below are descriptions of these additional measures.   
Hospital Characteristics and Hospitals’ Local Area Characteristics: In our cross-sectional and 
merger analysis, we include controls for hospital characteristics drawn from the AHA annual 
survey. These include: the number of hospital beds, ownership type (not-for-profit, for-profit, 
government), teaching status, and indicators for the technologies available at a hospital in a 
specific year. In addition, we link hospitals’ zip codes to local area characteristics from the 
Census Bureau’s Small Area Health Insurance Estimates and Small Area Income and Poverty 
Estimates, including the proportions of the population who are uninsured and the median income 
in the county where the hospital is located.  
Technology Index: We follow Acemoglu and Finkelstein (2008) in using a count of hospital 
technologies offered by a hospital as recorded in the AHA survey data. The AHA data include 
binary indicators for whether a hospital has various technologies and services, such as computer-
tomography (CT) scanners, electron beam computed tomography, or proton beam therapy. We 
sum the number of these technologies available at each hospital in each year.  
Hospital Quality: To capture reputational quality, we include a yearly indicator for whether or 
not a hospital was ranked by the U.S. News & World Report as a top hospital. We indicate a 
hospital was ranked in the U.S. News and World Report if it was ranked as an overall top 
hospital or received a ranking as a top hospital for cancer care; gastrointestinal care; ear nose and 
throat; geriatric care; gynecology; cardiology; orthopedics; rheumatology; or urology. In total, 
from 2008 through 2011, the U.S. News & World Report ranked 192 hospitals in our sample in 
their annual ‘Best Hospital’ rankings across clinical specialties and the overall ranking.  
To measure clinical performance, we merge in data on hospital quality from 
https://data.medicare.gov/, which includes the hospital quality scores reported publicly on the 
CMS Hospital Compare webpage (https://medicare.gov/hospitalcompare). These include 
measures of patient safety, patient outcomes, and process measures of care captured from public 
and private claims data. We included quality scores for 2008 through 2011 for four measures: the 
percentage of heart attack patients given aspirin upon arrival to the hospital; the percentage of 
surgery patients given an antibiotic prior to surgery; the percentage of patients treated within 
twenty-four hours of surgery to prevent blood clots; and the 30-day risk adjusted mortality from 
heart attacks.7 These are widely acknowledged measures of the quality of care and they are all 
available for hospitals in our sample from 2008 through 2011 (Yale  Center for Outcomes 
Research and Evaluation 2013). We focus on these four clinical quality measures in the 
robustness analysis, but we also examine the effect of conditioning on all 41 quality measures. 
Note that we do not have CMS quality measures for 168 hospitals (7.5 percent) from our 
inpatient sample. As a result, we present analysis of these measures separately from our main 
analysis.  
Medicare and Medicaid Activity: We include the Medicare base payment rate for hospitals, since 
this may proxy for hospital costs. This comes from annual Medicare Impact Files. We also 
                                                             




include data from the AHA on the share of hospitals’ inpatient cases paid by Medicare and 
Medicaid each year. 
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APPENDIX B: Measures of Providers Private Prices and Medicare Reimbursements 
Appendix B1: Inpatient Private-Payer Hospital Price Index: Our private-payer inpatient price 
index captures the combined amount paid by patients and insurers for patient case i in DRG d 
delivered in hospital h, and provided in year t. Following Gaynor and Vogt (2003) and 
Gowrisankaran, Nevo, and Town (2015), we regress hospital payments (pi,h,d,t) on year-specific 
hospital fixed effects (αh,t), a vector of patient characteristics (Xi,h,d,t) comprised of indicators for 
patient age (measured in ten-year age bands), a dummy for the patient’s sex, and a vector of 
DRG fixed effects (γd ). The regression to produce our inpatient prices has the form: 
(4)        pi,h,d,t= αh,t	+ Χi,h,d,tβ	+	γd  + ui,h,d,t	 
where  ui,h,d,t is the stochastic error term. We recover the vector of hospital fixed effects αh,t and 
calculate a hospital price index for each year at the sample means of the patient characteristics 
(X) and the DRG indicators, d  (i.e., the sample mean basket of DRGs). 
(5)    ph,t= αh,t+	Xβ	+	dγd 
This yields the hospital’s price, adjusted for its mix of treatments and mix of patients (note the 
fixed effect αh,t  is the key output: Xβ	+	dγd is just a constant across all hospitals to match the 
mean in the data).   
For robustness, we also created alternate price indexes using many different functional forms. 
For example, in Appendix Table XIII we show robustness of the estimates reported in Table IV 
in the paper to alternative approaches. Panel A has the baseline results which are the same as 
Panel A of Table IV, i.e. using ln(ph,t) as the dependent variable. Panel B constructs the risk-
adjusted inpatient price by estimating Equation (4) but using ln(pi,h,d,t) instead of pi,h,d,t. We then 
implement the analog of Equation (5) to obtain an alternative ln(price) that we use as the 
dependent variable in Panel B. In Panel C of Appendix Table XIII, we use the level of price (ph,t) 
instead of the logarithm of price. In Panel D we include the Charlson Score of co-morbidities to 
the Χi,h,d,t vector in Equation (4). In Panel E we include a full set of ICD9 dummies instead of 
DRG dummies.  
In addition, we also looked at many other approaches. For example, we calculated regressions 
where DRG complexity was parameterized using CMS’s MS-DRG weights as right hand side 
control variables, rather than as fixed-effects for each DRG. We also calculated a price index 
where we regressed the DRG price divided by the DRG weight against patient characteristics and 
hospital fixed effects. These price measures are all highly correlated with each other (correlation 
coefficients greater than 0.95), and using alternative price measures does not materially affect 
our baseline results. 
Appendix B2: Procedure-Level Private-Payer Hospital Price Index: 
In addition to creating an inpatient price index, we also create risk-adjusted prices for the specific 
procedures we study. We adjust prices for differences in patient characteristics, just as we did in 
the inpatient price index. These regressions take the form:  
13 
 
(6)            pi,h,d,t
P = αh,d,tP 	+ Χi,h,d,tβd
P	+	ei,h,d,tP 	 
Superscript P indicates one of our seven procedures. We then recover our estimates of the 
hospital-year-procedure fixed effects as we did when we constructed our inpatient price index.  
Appendix B3: Constructing Hospital-Insurer Contracts 
Determining between Share of Charge and Prospective Payment contracts 
Unfortunately we do not directly observe the contracts struck between insurers and hospitals. In 
order to classify cases into contracts we “reverse engineer” our data using an ex post algorithmic 
method from observations of prices, charges, and case characteristics. We did this after extensive 
discussions with insurers on a sensible way to back out contracts.  
The first step is to search for repeated absolute prices and repeated price-to-charge ratios within a 
hospital for our narrowly defined procedures sample (or within DRGs in the inpatient sample). 
For each hospital and procedure, we look at all cases i over the two year period for which we 
observe hospital charge data (i.e. January 1st 2010 to December 31st 2011). Prices are considered 
repeated if for all cases i and i’ (i) their prices match to the cent ($0.01) or (ii) their price-to-
charge ratios match within 0.1 percent (0.001). Type (i) contracts are likely to be prospective 
(say tied to a DRG) whereas type (ii) will be share of charge contracts.  
If there is only ever one charge for a procedure, we cannot distinguish whether a case falls into 
one of these two categories. For example, if cases i and i’ have the same payment for a knee 
replacement (e.g. $1,000), then we will suspect them of being on prospectively paid contracts. 
But, if their charges are identical (e.g. $2,000), the price to charge is also at 50 percent for both. 
This is usually the case for lower limb MRIs, for example, which is why we cannot successfully 
implement our algorithm on this procedure. We can, however, identify the payment type if there 
exists a third hospital case i’’ which has the same price level but a different charge (or vice 
versa). For example if knee replacement case i’’ was also $1,000, but had a charge of $4,000 we 
would classify all three cases as falling under a prospective pay contract as although its price was 
always $1,000, its price-to-charge ratio differed (i.e. was 25 percent for contract i’’ and 50 
percent for i and i’). 
There are, of course, a number of cases that cannot be classified in this manner, since they are 
singleton prices or singleton price-to-charge ratios. This may be because they are on a “hybrid” 
contract, which is prospective but with outlier payments. Or it may be that they are on one of the 
two standard contracts (share of charge or prospective payments) but there has only been one 
case over our period so we cannot distinguish the contract. We denote these “unclassified cases.” 
Repeated contracts 
Repeated price-to-charges and repeated absolute prices define a “primitive contract,” which we 
can then use to construct a more persistent set of payment agreements over time by observing 
whether the classifications hold sequentially over time. We define primitive contracts not only by 
their price, but also by the first and last date at which that agreement is executed. We calculate 
characteristics of these contracts, measuring the average monthly volume of patients who are 
paid under those agreements and measuring the plan characteristics of those contracts (percent of 
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patients on ASO or fully insured plans; the percent of patients by market segment: large group or 
small group; and the percent of patients by product type: health maintenance organization 
(HMO), preferred provider organization (PPO), point of service plan, exclusive provider 
organization, indemnity, and other). We use all of this information to find contracts that precede 
or follow each other in order to match primitive contracts over time. Matching contracts are 
those which begin/end within 45 days of the end/beginning of the candidate contract, and 
minimize the Euclidean distance of characteristics (patient volume and plan characteristics): 






where x and y are vectors of contract characteristics, and si is the standard deviation of the ith 
characteristic across contracts. We recognize “valid” matches to be two contracts that mutually 
minimize this distance for each other.  
While we can determine the type of contract without this matching procedure, the fact that 
matches are well determined by plan characteristics gives us confidence that distinct contracts 
reflect distinct agreements across insurers at the same hospital. As we illustrate in Figure V in 
the paper, we are able to link primitive contracts over renegotiations. For example, we can link 
two primitive contracts if, before and after a price increase, both have 60 percent of cases where 
the beneficiary is on an ASO product and 80 percent are part of a PPO plan.   
Illustrative Examples and Descriptive Statistics 
To illustrate this, re-consider Figure VI in the paper for vaginal deliveries in one of the hospitals 
in our sample. This hospital had between 500 and 600 cases overall in 2010 and 2011.8 We were 
able to identify that 59.5 percent of these fall under a share of charge contract (the circles) and 
38.0 percent of these fall under a prospective pay contract (the triangles). The remaining 2.5 
percent were unclassified. In one month in 2011, for example, we had 24 cases of which 10 were 
the same absolute price of $1000 and 14 were all on a 60 percent price-to-charge ratio. This 
means that for this hospital-month, 41.7 percent of cases were prospective payment contracts, 
58.3 percent were price-to charge contracts and zero cases were unclassified. 
Figure VII shows how the contracts are split by the inpatient sample and for each procedure 
(these are all in terms of fractions of cases). The fraction unclassified is related to the sparsity of 
the data. As we noted above, the unclassifieds are a mixture of truly hybrid contracts and those 
we cannot classify, due to the fact we may only observe one case under a particular contract so 
do not have any other cases we can “match prices” with. This is particularly an issue for the 
inpatient sample where we are seeking to assign cases to contracts to every one of the 
approximately 750 DRGs for every hospital. Many hospitals (especially the smaller ones) will 
only have one case in a particular DRG over this time period. Recall that the only threshold the 
cases data have is that a hospital must have at least 50 inpatient cases over all DRGs in a year. 
Appendix Figure VIII illustrates this issue by showing what is the impact on contract 
classification (across cases in the inpatient sample) of introducing more stringent cut-offs over 
the minimum number of cases per DRG in the hospital. We start with our baseline of zero on the 
                                                             
8 To keep the figure anonymous, we are providing a range of the count of vaginal deliveries performed each year.   
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far left of the x-axis, i.e. we do not insist on any minimum number of cases per DRG in a 
hospital. At this point we reproduce the first bar chart in Figure VII for the inpatient sample: 33.6 
percent of cases are on prospective contracts; 17.3 percent are share of charges and 49.1 percent 
are unclassified. As we move to the right we see the fraction of unclassified cases shrink. This is 
because we are reducing the number of “singleton” prices by focusing on DRGs where we have 
more chance of identifying contracts. Importantly, the fraction of cases under share of charge 
contracts asymptotes after we condition on having only about 20 cases per DRG. This suggests, 
that the true fraction of cases which are on share of charge contracts are genuinely around 23 
percent in our sample.  
By contrast, the fraction on perspective payments contracts is still rising over the whole range of 
the x-axis.  By the time we restrict attention to DRGs with at least 100 cases in a hospital, we 
have shrunk the fraction of unclassifieds to under 10 percent and when we reach a 200 cases 
threshold, it is 4.2 percent.   
It is tempting to conclude from this that all the remaining unclassified cases are prospective, so 
the “true” breakdown of cases is 23 percent on share of charges and 77 percent on prospective 
contracts. An important caveat to this reading of Appendix Figure VIII is that the sample is 
changing as we move along the x-axis. We are effectively conditioning on larger and larger 
hospitals. Hence, the increasing incidence of prospective payment contracts may be due to 
selection if prospective contracts are more prevalent in the larger volume hospitals. One might 
have reason to doubt this selection-based explanation of the Figure however, as share of charge 
contracts are more commonly associated with larger hospitals in the cross-sectional regressions 
on the full inpatient sample. Appendix Table XI (the full results of Table IV Panel B) shows that 
there is a positive coefficient on hospital size (as measured by number of beds) in the regressions 
where the percentage of cases on share of charge is the dependent variable (and this is significant 
in our preferred Column (3)). Hence, our view is that Appendix Figure VIII shows that the 
unclassifieds are mainly prospective contracts (rather than hybrids) and this is simply disguised 
by the fact we only have finite samples of patients with many singleton observations. 
This selection effect is very unlikely to be an explanation for our estimate of the percent of cases 
under share of charge contracts, as the fraction does not change much after a threshold of 5 cases 
per DRG. Hence we feel confident that the true share of charge incidence is really around 23 
percent. The breakdown of the remaining 77 percent of cases between prospectives and hybrids 
has a bit more uncertainty. An upper bound for prospectives is 77 percent, but in principle a 
lower bound could be the 33.6 percent in the first column in Figure VII. As argued in the 
previous paragraph, however, our view is that the true incidence of prospective contracts is 
closer to 77 percent given the evidence in Appendix Figure VIII. 
Share of Prospective Payment contracts that are Medicare Related 
As discussed in the text, we divide the prospective payments contracts into those that appear to 
be linked to the Medicare fee schedule and those that are not. Figure VIII in the paper illustrates 
the methodology for two hospitals.  
In the inpatient sample as a whole, 74 percent of prospective payment contracts were linked to 
Medicare. This fraction was reasonably stable throughout the support of Appendix Figure VIII. 
At baseline, when we do not require a minimum DRG-hospital count restriction, we observed 
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that 72 percent of cases paid prospectively were linked to Medicare. This rose to 75 percent 
when we limited our analysis to DRG-hospital pairs with more than 100 cases. In order to 
estimate the overall fraction of cases that paid prospectively and linked to Medicare, we have to 
make an assumption about how the unclassifieds are split. Appendix Figure IX strongly suggests 
that the share of charge contracts are about 23 percent across all sample restrictions. If all of the 
remaining 77 percent of claims were under prospective contracts (which we have argued is not a 
bad assumption), the upper bound of the share of claims on Medicare related contracts would be 
57 percent (= 77*0.74). Even this upper bound is considerably below the share of physician 
cases under prospective payment contracts linked to Medicare, which is estimated by Clemens 
and Gottlieb (2017) to be around 75 percent.  
 
Appendix B4: Medicare Reimbursements 
We also construct hospital Medicare reimbursement rates for the services we observe from the 
HCCI data. Medicare reimburses providers for inpatient care on the basis of DRGs; these are set 
in an attempt to compensate hospitals slightly above their costs of treating Medicare patients. To 
calculate the payment for specific cases of care, Federal regulations stipulate that a hospital’s 
base payment is multiplied by a DRG weight that is set by CMS to capture the complexity of 
treating a particular type of case. Using data obtained from the CMS webpage, we follow the 
regulations and calculate the base payment rate for every hospital for every year from 2008 
through 2011, including adjustments for wage index reclassifications, indirect medical education 
payments, and disproportionate share payments. The base payment rate is the hospital’s 
Medicare price before any adjustment for its specific mix of DRGs. This is analogous to the risk-
adjusted private price. In addition, we also obtain DRG weights from CMS that allow us to know 
the rates CMS paid hospitals for every DRG per year from 2008 through 2011. We also create 
Medicare reimbursement rates for our outpatient services using the relevant ambulatory payment 




APPENDIX C: Measuring Hospital Market and Insurer Market Structure 
Appendix C1: Hospital Market Structure:  
We construct our measures of hospital market structure in a two-step process. The first step is to 
define a hospital’s market area.9 We define both fixed- and variable-radius markets. For our 
fixed-radius markets, we draw a radius around each hospital, which places hospitals in the center 
of circular markets of radius z. We construct hospital markets using five-mile, ten-mile, fifteen-
mile, and thirty-mile radii extending outwards from hospitals’ locations.10 Previous analysis of 
Medicare beneficiaries found that 80 percent of patients were admitted to hospitals within ten 
miles of their home (Tay 2003). We generally report statistics for markets with a radius z of 
fifteen-miles drawn around each hospital, so that we capture the travel distance of most patients. 
We illustrate our results are robust to using radii of longer and shorter distances.  
The second step is to measure market structure within our defined market areas. We do so in two 
ways. First, we identify whether the geographically defined markets are monopolies, duopolies, 
triopolies, or include four or more providers. Second, we calculate either counts of hospitals or 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Indexes (HHIs) within our various market definitions.  
The HHI for each hospital-centered market containing H hospitals is: 
(8)     Hospital HHIm,t= ∑ (sh,tm )
2H
h=1 , 
where Hospital HHIm,t is concentration in market m at time t, where sh,tm  is the market share of 
hospital h in market m at time t, calculated using hospital bed count.11  
There are well-known endogeneity concerns about the use of concentration measures in pricing 
equations (e.g., Bresnahan 1989). For example, higher quality hospitals may attract more patients 
and have higher market shares, resulting in a higher HHI for their market. Since they will likely 
also have higher prices, this can lead to an estimated positive relationship between price and 
concentration driven by omitted quality rather than by market power. It is also possible that 
hospitals with higher shares may be lower cost, which could create a negative association 
between price and concentration, again due to an omitted variable. This may be less of a problem 
in our paper, since we have a number of observable measures of quality and of cost. Nonetheless, 
the estimates should be interpreted as associations, not causal effects.12  
                                                             
9 These are approximations to hospitals’ geographic markets, not precise antitrust markets. Since these are not 
precise markets, we test the robustness of our results to various market delineations.   
10 We also calculate a variable radius market where the radius that defines a hospitals’ market is a function of the 
urban-rural classification defined by the US census. Hospitals located in ‘large urban’ areas are assigned a market 
defined by a ten-mile radius; hospitals located in ‘urban’ have a market defined around them using a fifteen-mile 
radius; and hospitals located in ‘rural’ areas have a market defined around them using a twenty-mile radius. For 
details on the Census definitions, see: https://www.census.gov/geo/reference/ua/uafaq.html. 
11 We also compute HHIs using hospital discharges and total days of care delivered. All measures have correlations 
of over 0.98.  
12 Kessler and McClellan (2000) propose one strategy to mitigate endogeneity by using a choice model to predict 
patient flows and then calculate market concentrations using predicted rather than actual patient flows. We cannot 
use this strategy because we do not see every patient treated at each hospital; we only see patients at a hospital who 




Appendix Figure XI shows the relationship between hospital HHI, measured with our 15 mile 
radius market boundary, and our set of observable covariates.  Unsurprisingly, rural areas have a 
higher hospital HHI. We also observe that higher hospital HHI is associated with hospitals 
having fewer technologies, lower rankings from the U.S. News and World reports, fewer beds, 
and lower quality scores. We also observe that hospitals with higher HHIs have lower Medicare 
payment levels and treat more Medicare patients.  
Appendix C2: Insurance Market Structure:  
There are few reliable sources of information on market structure in the health insurance industry 
(Dafny et al. 2011). We measure insurance market structure in the following way. We measure, 
by county, the share of privately insured lives per county that are covered in our data. To do so, 
we use data from the Census Bureau’s Small Area Health Insurance Estimates to identify total 
covered lives per county. We then use the count of covered lives per county from the HCCI data; 
the fraction of HCCI covered lives over total covered lives provides the share of county covered 
lives that received insurance coverage from the HCCI payers annually. Although this does not 
capture the market share across all private insurers, the measure is both county specific and is 
most relevant for the prices negotiated with the HCCI insurers (our dependent variable).  
  
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
measured using actual patient flows are correlated at over 0.90 with Kessler and McClellan (2000) style predicted 
flow HHIs. Instead, we measure hospital market size and hospital market share based on the total number of beds 
within a market and a facility, respectively. We also note that the number of hospital beds is a measure potentially 
less subject to endogeneity than patient flows because it is costly for hospitals to alter the number of beds.  
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APPENDIX D: Identifying Hospital Mergers 
The American Hospital Association Annual Survey contains data on respondent hospitals in the 
United States. While the AHA data are an invaluable source of information regarding hospital 
characteristics and geography, they provide an incomplete picture of hospital ownership 
transitions for multiple reasons. As a result, we have implemented several corrections in order to 
create more comprehensive and accurate roster of hospital mergers.  
First, the AHA reports data for a reference period preceding the year of the survey. As a result, 
system information in the AHA typically refers to the year following the reference year. In 
general, we deal with this issue by utilizing the lagged system information.  
Second, the AHA sometimes deals with mergers and acquisitions in a way that complicates our 
analysis. In a case where one hospital merges with another, the AHA contains a single 
observation for the merged entity. However, when a system acquires a hospital, it sometimes 
retains its unique AHA ID and experiences a change in its system ID. In order to obtain a 
complete picture of hospital geography and ownership, we generate imputed observations for 
those hospitals, which are deleted from the data as a result of a merger, while noting the change 
in ownership structure through the system information.  
We also incorporate several additional changes, which are motivated by validations with external 
data sources. We used data from the following databases to track mergers and acquisitions of 
hospitals: Irving-Levin Associates, Factset, and SDC Platinum. Each database contains detailed 
information (e.g. parties involved, announcement and closing dates) on both completed and 
failed M&A deals. To incorporate this merger information into the AHA survey, we aggregated 
the 2006 to 2011 AHA surveys to create a panel dataset of hospital IDs where the time unit is 
year. We then created a new health system ID for each hospital (called sysid2). If a hospital’s 
health system ID (sysid in the AHA survey) was non-missing, we assigned this health system ID 
to sysid2. For those hospitals where the value was missing, we “filled-down” sysid2 with the 
health system ID of the first non-missing year before it. That is, if hospital ℎ had health system 
ID  in 2007, but the sysid was blank in 2008 and 2009, we assigned health system  to ℎ in 
2008 and 2009.13 If a hospital had a missing sysid for all years, then we assigned the hospital’s 
unique hospital ID number to the sysid2 to denote that the hospital was an independent hospital 
in all years. 
Next, we reviewed each merger description in the three M&A databases and determined which 
AHA hospital IDs were parties to a merger, which health system IDs corresponded to the parties 
involved, and the date the merger closed. We then recorded the system ID of the acquiring party 
in a new variable called ilsysid for the target hospital in the year the merger closed.14 After 
completing this for every hospital merger in the three M&A databases, we then “filled-down” the 
blank values of the ilsysid variable in a similar manner to sysid2 (i.e. the years where a hospital 
did not experience a merger). If the hospital was not involved in any mergers (according to our 
                                                             
13 “Fill-down” in this context assumes the panel data are sorted by AHA hospital ID number and in ascending order 
by year. 
14 If the closing date was not populated in one of the M&A databases and we could not find a news article or report 




three databases), then we assigned the hospital’s unique ID number to the ilsysid variable to 
denote it was an independent hospital. 
We then flagged all instances where sysid2 did not equal ilsysid and reviewed each instance on a 
case-by-case basis to determine why there were discrepancies between the two health system 
IDs. We used resources such as Becker’s Hospital Review and local newspapers to determine if 
sysid2 or ilsysid (or neither) were the correct health system ID. We then created a consolidated 
health system ID variable (called msysid) to account for this new information; msysid is the 
variable we use to identify mergers. If the msysid of hospital ℎ switched from  to  between 
year  − 1 and year , then we say hospital ℎ experienced a merger in year . 
We measure the distance between merging parties using straight-line distance between hospitals. 
In classifying  mergers, we define a target (acquired) hospital as experiencing a merger within X 
miles if there is at least one hospital in the acquiring system located within X miles. 
Symmetrically, only the members of the acquiring system that are within X miles of the target 
are considered “X mile” mergers. 






Appendix E: Matching Estimators for our Merger Analysis 
In order to demonstrate the robustness of our result to choices of control hospitals, we implement 
several matching procedures. First, we follow Dranove and Lindrooth (2003) in generating 
propensity score matches using a probit regression including controls for the share of hospital 
admissions covered by Medicare and Medicaid, whether the hospital was located in an urban 
area, HMO penetration, number of hospitals in the market, miles to the closest hospital, teaching 
status, ownership type, and the number of beds in the hospital.  
We perform K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) matching to select the 20 closest matches for each 
hospital using the propensity score generated from a probit regression. Specifically, we predict 
the probability of merger using lagged controls for monopoly, duopoly, and triopoly indicators, 
combined county market share of HCCI insurers, county level insurer HHI, technologies, 
whether the hospital was ranked by US News and World Reports, number of beds, teaching 
status, ownership type, median income and un-insurance rate of the county, Medicare base 
payment rate, and share of hospital admissions paid by Medicare or Medicaid. We then use the 
predicted values from the probit to select the 20 closest matches for each hospital as control 
observations.  
We also match based on Mahalanobis distance nationally and within state using the same 
controls used in the KNN matching (which rely on the hospital controls we use in our main 





APPENDIX F: Robustness of Key Results in Markets Where Blue Cross and Blue Shield 
Insurance Plans Have High and Low Market Share 
Although we provide the most comprehensive picture of privately insured spending and prices to 
date, we do not have claims from every insurer and, in particular, from the Blue Cross Blue 
Shield (BCBS) insurers. In this Appendix, we analyze the robustness of our results to focusing 
on segments of the data with high and low BCBS market share. The areas where the BCBS plans 
have high market share correspond to areas where we have low HCCI insurer market share.  
We use data from HealthLeaders Interstudy to compute the BCBS market share by county (see 
Appendix Figure XV). The map in this figure shows the national distribution of BCBS market 
share. We estimate that BCBS plans account for approximately 41 percent of the privately 
insured market. The median county has BCBS market share of 51 percent. We use this measure 
directly in our hospital-level regression analyses, restricting attention to hospitals located in 
counties above and below the median.  
In order to analyze the impact BCBS has on our spending results, we need a measure of BCBS 
market share by HRR. While there is not a one-to-one mapping between counties and HRRs (or 
even counties and zip codes), we estimate HRR level market share in the following way:   
(1) We generate an estimate of zip code level market share using the counties which 
overlap it, weighting them by the share of residents in the zip code who live in each county;  
(2) We then aggregate these zip code level market shares to the HRR level using the 
Dartmouth Atlas zip code to HRR crosswalk, again weighting by the fraction of the HRR who 
live in each zip code. We estimate the median HRR to have a BCBS market share of 47 percent, 
and present our spending results separately for HRRs above and below the median.  
Appendix F1: Correlation of Private Health Spending Per Beneficiary and Medicare 
Spending Per Beneficiary 
BCBS market share is not strongly correlated with private health spending per beneficiary on the 
HCCI beneficiaries. There is a -0.064 correlation between total private spending per beneficiary 
in our HCCI data and BCBS county-level market share. There is a -0.026 correlation between 
private inpatient spending per beneficiary in our HCCI data and BCBS county-level market 
share. In Section III.A, we show that there is a 0.044 correlation across all HRRs in total 
spending per Medicare beneficiary per HRR and total spending per privately insured beneficiary 
per HRR. We also find a 0.172 correlation across all HRRs in inpatient spending per Medicare 
beneficiary per HRR and inpatient spending per privately insured beneficiary per HRR. In 
Appendix Table XXV, we segment our sample into HRRs in which we estimate BCBS to have 
market share above and below 47 percent. As can be seen, the correlations differ little between 
high and low BCBS areas.  
Appendix F2: Decomposing the Drivers of Spending Per Beneficiary into the Contributions of 
Price and Quantity 
In Section III.B, we decompose the drivers of inpatient spending variation on the privately 
insured into the relative contributions of price variation and quantity variation across HRRs in 
the US. We find that across the nation, variation in hospital prices drives 49.6 percent of the 
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variation in inpatient spending and variation in the quantity of each DRG provided across HRRs 
accounts for 49.5 percent of the variation (the remainder is captured by a covariance term). In 
Appendix Table XXVI we redo this analysis on the 153 HRRs with BCBS market share above 
47 percent and the half of HRRs with BCBS below 47 percent.  
As these results demonstrate, we see a similar role for prices and quantities to drive spending 
variation in HRRs where BCBS plans have above and below median market shares.  
Appendix F3: Variation in Hospital Prices  
We find significant variation in hospital prices across HRRs, within HRRs, and within hospitals. 
In Table III, we identify the share of the variation explained by a combination of HRR fixed 
effects, hospital fixed effects, and controls for plan characteristics. We found that including HRR 
fixed effects capture 33.5 percent of the national variation in hospitals’ MRI prices and 
introducing hospital fixed effects captures 78.0 percent of price variation, which implies that 
roughly 22 percent of the variation in MRI prices across the nation occurs within hospitals. In 
Appendix Table XXVII we recreate Table III for the half of counties with BCBS market share 
below 51 percent and the half of counties with BCBS market share above 51 percent.  
These results are nearly identical to our main results and the key findings do not differ as a 
function of the BCBS market share.  
In addition, we report the national coefficient of variation across our main procedures across 
HRRs, within HRRs, and within hospitals by month. For lower limb MRIs, the coefficient of 
variation across hospitals in the US is 0.40, the average within HRR coefficient of variation 
across hospitals is 0.31, and the average within hospital, within month coefficient of variation for 
lower-limb MRIs is 0.17. In Appendix Table XXVIII, we replicate those numbers for all our 
procedures using hospitals in counties where BCBS market share is above 51 percent and in 
counties where BCBS market share is below 51 percent.   
These results illustrate that we observe similar variation in procedure-level prices in counties 
with above and below average BCBS plan market share.  
Appendix F4: Cross-Sectional Analysis of Hospital Prices 
In our cross-sectional results in Section VI (Column (3) in Table IV), we show that monopoly 
hospitals have prices that are 12.5 percent higher than hospitals in markets with four or more 
competitors, have 10.5 percentage points more of their cases paid as a share of charges and have 
11.3 percent less of their prospectively set payment rates pegged to Medicare payment rates. In 
Appendix Table XXIX Panels A and B, we replicate these results for hospitals in counties where 
BCBS has market share above and below 51 percent. These specifications include HRR, year 
fixed effects, and the same controls we use in the above mentioned analysis.  
Our cross-sectional pricing results are similar in areas with high and low BCBS coverage when 
we do not include HRR fixed effects. When we include HRR fixed effects, we lose precision on 
our hospital market structure point estimates in HRRs with high BCBS market share. This is 
because while there are 70 low BCBS-share HRRs with both a monopoly hospital and a hospital 
facing three or more competitors, there are only 42 high BCBS-share HRRs with both a 
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monopoly hospital and a hospital facing three or more competitors. As a result, we lose the 
variation we need to estimate these cross-sectional results with precision.   
Another approach to testing the sensitivity of our results to insurer composition is to control for 
BCBS market share directly as a covariate in the regressions. We have also run specifications 
using a high order polynomial on HCCI insurers, as well as versions where we control for the top 
10 insurers in each market, allowing their effects to differ based on whether they are HCCI 
insurers or not. In all of these exercises, the results are qualitatively unchanged. Likewise, as we 
illustrate in Appendix Table XXIX, introducing the county-level BCBS insurer share as a control 
variable does not change our main monopoly/duopoly/triopoly point estimates (see Column (2) 
of Appendix Table XXIX).  
Appendix Table XXIX Panel C examines whether hospital market structure is associated with 
the share of cases at a hospital paid as a share of hospital charges is robust in areas with high and 
low BCBS coverage with and without the inclusion of hospital fixed effects. Panel D shows that 
in markets where BCBS insurers have high and low market share, hospitals in markets with 
fewer other hospitals have a lower share of prospective payments that are linked to the Medicare 
fee schedule.  
Appendix F5: Merger Analysis 
In our merger analysis in Section VII, we show that mergers of two hospitals that are located less 
than 5 miles apart raise prices by over 6 percent. In Appendix Table XXX we analyze mergers 
that occurred in counties with BCBS market shares above and below the median BCBS market 
share. As these results illustrate, while we observe that mergers raise prices in areas where the 
BCBS plans have low market share, we do not observe a price effect in areas where the BCBS 
plans have high market share. In part, this reflects that we observe considerably more mergers in 
areas where BCBS have low market share. For instance, we have 188 hospitals that are exposed 
to mergers where the merging parties are less than 15 miles apart. However, only 56 of them are 
in markets where BCBS payers have high market share. Likewise, for mergers involving 
hospitals located less than 5-miles apart, we have 34 hospitals within the support of our treatment 
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Appendix Table I: Annual Patients, Claims, and Spending From HCCI Data, 2007 – 2011 
        
   
 
Distinct Members Inpatient Spending ($) Total Spending ($) 
   
2007 44,869,397 28,703,216,810 126,439,637,925 
2008 45,064,977 29,796,787,559 131,711,103,920 
2009 44,780,736 32,288,419,203 141,932,049,143 
2010 43,642,097 31,829,518,213 140,894,344,384 
2011 42,976,359 31,829,841,920 141,110,226,944 
Total 88,680,441 154,447,783,705 682,087,362,316 
        
Notes: This table is based on claims from the entire HCCI database. All spending values have been inflation 




Appendix Table II: Comparison of AHA Hospitals, the Inpatient Sub-sample and the Procedure Sub-samples 
                      











Delivery PTCA Colonoscopy MRI 
Market Characteristics 
         
 
Monopoly 0.275 0.163 0.028 0.073 0.07 0.105 0.04 0.129 0.168 
 
Duopoly 0.194 0.194 0.087 0.153 0.153 0.161 0.125 0.185 0.198 
 
Triopoly 0.108 0.123 0.06 0.099 0.102 0.096 0.09 0.099 0.125 
 
Hospital HHI 0.541 0.461 0.314 0.38 0.374 0.402 0.338 0.425 0.472 
 
HCCI Market Share, County 15.3 17.8 25.3 23.6 21.1 20.5 24.1 20.6 19.3 
Hospital Characteristics 
         
 
Number of Technologies 51.1 59.3 74.3 68.3 67.7 66.2 71.8 65.1 62.7 
 
Ranked in US News & World Reports 0.037 0.053 0.137 0.08 0.076 0.072 0.124 0.081 0.063 
 
Beds 218.4 269.7 420.5 345.6 342.1 327.1 417.3 290.3 267.8 
 
Teaching Hospital 0.306 0.38 0.622 0.503 0.478 0.455 0.555 0.428 0.389 
 
Government Owned 0.167 0.122 0.068 0.074 0.088 0.101 0.074 0.108 0.117 
 
Non-Profit 0.64 0.693 0.83 0.785 0.754 0.744 0.75 0.75 0.735 
Local Area Characteristics 
         
 
Percent of County Uninsured 17.5 17.1 16.3 16.8 16.9 17.1 17.3 16.3 16.5 
 
Median Income 49,019 51,516 55,663 53,892 55,116 54,566 52,968 53,691 51,745 
 
Rural 0.292 0.162 0.01 0.042 0.048 0.068 0.029 0.124 0.164 
Other Payers 
         
 
Medicare Payment Rate 6,295 6,437 6,339 6,207 6,464 6,482 6,400 6,381 6,208 
 
Share Medicare 46.2 44.6 42.8 43.9 41.9 42 43.6 44.3 45.2 
 
Share Medicaid 18.7 18.8 15.2 16.2 17.9 18.3 16.7 17.4 17.7 
Quality Scores 
         
 
30-Day AMI Survival Rate 16.1 16 15.5 15.8 15.8 15.9 15.6 15.9 16 
 
% of AMI Patients Given Aspirin at 
Arrival 95.7 97.3 98.5 98.1 98.2 98.1 98.5 97.6 97.4 
 
% of Patients Given Antibiotics Pre 
Surgery 91.5 93.3 94.4 94.4 94.1 94.1 94 94 93.9 
 
% of Surgery Patients Given Treatment 
to Prevent Blood Clots 85.9 88 89.8 89.3 88.8 88.7 88.7 88.8 88.9 
Number of Observations 12,847 8,772 1,259 2,660 3,794 4,096 1,764 3,512 5,082 
  Number of Hospitals 3,272 2,358 470 932 1,163 1,280 652 1,237 1,628 
 % of Inpatient Cases Represented 100 88.4 23.4 38.4 54.3 55.1 31.1 40.9 52.4 
Notes: The inpatient data is derived from the inpatient sample. The procedure files are drawn from the procedure samples. MRIs include only lower-limb scans.  
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Appendix Table III: Effect of Sample Restrictions on Number of Cases and Hospitals 
      
   
 
Cases Facilities 
   1. Condition on match to AHA 5,865,727 4,326 
2. Exclude critical access hospitals 5,814,378 3,202 
3. Condition on match to Medicare payment data 5,808,583 3,199 
4. Exclude 2007 data 5,039,479 3,189 
5. Exclude hospitals with fewer than 50 cases per year 4,964,774 2,358 
      
Notes: This table tracks the impact of each of our successive cleaning rules on the inpatient data used in our main analyses. The data contains cases drawn from 




Appendix Table IV: Private Prices and Medicare Base Payment Rate at the Hospital Level, 2011  
                            
              
 
Summary Statistics   Correlation 
 
Mean Standard Deviation 
# 




























Inpatient 14,020 4,782 2,139 
 
1 
        Hip Replacement 24,565 7,209 341 
 
0.724 1 
       Knee Replacement 24,059 7,677 664 
 
0.761 0.923 1 
      Cesarean Section 8,258 2,758 926 
 
0.794 0.535 0.574 1 
     Vaginal Delivery 5,465 1,727 1,022 
 
0.693 0.544 0.510 0.879 1 
    PTCA 25,395 8,577 375 
 
0.678 0.580 0.573 0.440 0.349 1 
   Colonoscopy 1,834 685 844 
 
0.342 0.285 0.273 0.303 0.322 0.156 1 
  Lower Limb MRI 1,343 533 1,304 
 
0.350 0.224 0.264 0.276 0.232 0.255 0.252 1 
 Medicare Base 6,494 1,291 2,139 
 
0.203 0.283 0.203 0.258 0.360 0.093 0.087 -0.040 1 
                            
Notes: The private-payer hospital 2011 prices are the risk-adjusted transaction prices as discussed in Appendix B1 and Appendix B2. The inpatient Medicare 
payment rate is the Medicare base payment with a DRG weight of 1. Correlation coefficients are pairwise correlations between multiple procedures at the same 
hospital. The data are drawn from our pricing samples. All correlations are significant at p<0.01 except for Medicare and PTCA (p<0.1), Medicare and 
Colonoscopy (p<0.05), and Medicare and Lower Limb MRI (not significant).  
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Appendix Table V: Price/Quantity Decomposition of Medicare and Private Health Spending, 2011, Ages 55-64 
                
        
 
  Private       Medicare   
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 














        Intracranial hemorrhage or cerebral infarction w CC 0.484 0.466 0.050 
 
0.256 0.662 0.082 
Pulmonary edema & respiratory failure 0.594 0.402 0.004 
 
0.213 0.770 0.017 
Simple pneumonia & pleurisy w CC 0.475 0.514 0.011 
 
0.221 0.989 -0.210 
Respiratory system diagnosis w ventilator support 96+ hours 0.650 0.415 -0.064 
 
0.102 0.771 0.127 
Respiratory system diagnosis w ventilator support <96 hours 0.655 0.321 0.024 
 
0.155 0.987 -0.143 
Cardiac valve & oth maj cardiothoracic proc w/o card cath w MCC 0.468 0.410 0.122 
 
0.086 0.840 0.074 
Cardiac valve & oth maj cardiothoracic proc w/o card cath w CC 0.389 0.498 0.113 
 
0.069 0.846 0.085 
Cardiac defibrillator implant w/o cardiac cath w/o MCC 0.713 0.377 -0.090 
 
0.061 0.956 -0.017 
Coronary bypass w cardiac cath w/o MCC 0.277 0.746 -0.023 
 
0.074 1.168 -0.242 
Coronary bypass w/o cardiac cath w/o MCC 0.381 0.699 -0.079 
 
0.108 1.058 -0.166 
Major cardiovasc proc w MCC or thoracic aortic aneurysm repair 0.555 0.308 0.138 
 
0.166 0.871 -0.037 
Major cardiovascular proc w/o MCC 0.518 0.547 -0.065 
 
0.163 1.059 -0.222 
Perc cardiovasc proc w drug-eluting stent w MCC or 4+ vessels/stents 0.371 0.564 0.065 
 
0.089 1.004 -0.094 
Perc cardiovasc proc w drug-eluting stent w/o MCC 0.465 0.681 -0.146 
 
0.153 1.113 -0.265 
Circulatory disorders except AMI, w card cath w/o MCC 0.435 0.756 -0.191 
 
0.112 1.110 -0.222 
Major small & large bowel proc w MCC 0.676 0.299 0.025 
 
0.213 0.888 -0.101 
Major small & large bowel proc w CC 0.474 0.453 0.073 
 
0.193 0.811 -0.005 
Esophagitis, gastroent & misc digest disorders w/o MCC 0.387 0.637 -0.024 
 
0.164 1.028 -0.192 
Spinal fusion except cervical w/o MCC 0.334 0.512 0.154 
 
0.085 1.067 -0.152 
Major joint replacement or reattachment of lower extremity w/o MCC 0.381 0.645 -0.026 
 
0.213 0.973 -0.186 
Cellulitis w/o MCC 0.425 0.583 -0.008 
 
0.128 0.923 -0.051 
Infectious & parasitic diseases w O.R. proc w MCC 0.701 0.360 -0.061 
 
0.112 0.769 0.119 
Septicemia w MV 96+ hours 0.759 0.305 -0.065 
 
0.072 0.860 0.067 
Septicemia w/o MV 96+ hours w MCC 0.536 0.365 0.099 
 
0.120 0.815 0.064 
Rehabilitation w CC/MCC 0.460 0.430 0.109 
 
0.056 1.164 -0.219 
Average Shares (weighted by spending) 0.496 0.495 0.009 
 
0.127 0.953 -0.081 
Notes: The decomposition of ln(spending per beneficiary) is carried out on the 2011 Medicare and HCCI inpatient spending samples. The Medicare analysis is 
based on the 100% sample of Medicare claims accessed via the AHD. HCCI data includes all inpatient claims from our spending sample for those aged 55-64. 
“CC” is short for with “complication or comorbidity”; “MCC” is short for with “major complication or comorbidity”; “proc”=”procedure”; “cath” = “catheter”; 
“w”=With”; “w/o”=”without”. Because of space constraints, we show only the top 25 highest spending DRGs in the HCCI data; the “Average Shares” in the 
final row are the average decomposition results by DRG (weighted by spending, i.e. first three columns use spending weights for private and last three use 
weights based on Medicare) across the 735 DRGs (HCCI) 562 DRGs (Medicare). 
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Appendix Table VI: Price/Quantity Decomposition of Medicare and Private Health Spending, 2011, Ages 18-64 
                
        
 
  Private     Medicare   
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 














        Craniotomy & endovascular intracranial procedures w MCC 0.386 0.535 0.079 
 
0.120 0.860 0.020 
Pulmonary edema & respiratory failure 0.488 0.437 0.075 
 
0.213 0.770 0.017 
Simple pneumonia & pleurisy w MCC 0.546 0.482 -0.028 
 
0.160 1.073 -0.233 
Simple pneumonia & pleurisy w CC 0.493 0.747 -0.240 
 
0.221 0.989 -0.210 
Respiratory system diagnosis w ventilator support 96+ hours 0.609 0.540 -0.150 
 
0.102 0.771 0.127 
Respiratory system diagnosis w ventilator support <96 hours 0.571 0.484 -0.055 
 
0.155 0.987 -0.143 
Cardiac valve & oth maj cardiothoracic proc w/o card cath w MCC 0.396 0.617 -0.013 
 
0.086 0.840 0.074 
Cardiac valve & oth maj cardiothoracic proc w/o card cath w CC 0.312 0.618 0.071 
 
0.069 0.846 0.085 
Coronary bypass w cardiac cath w/o MCC 0.238 0.852 -0.090 
 
0.074 1.168 -0.242 
Major cardiovasc procedures w MCC or thoracic aortic anuerysm repair 0.478 0.447 0.075 
 
0.166 0.871 -0.037 
Major cardiovascular procedures w/o MCC 0.360 0.760 -0.120 
 
0.163 1.059 -0.222 
Perc cardiovasc proc w drug-eluting stent w MCC or 4+ vessels/stents 0.329 0.722 -0.052 
 
0.089 1.004 -0.094 
Perc cardiovasc proc w drug-eluting stent w/o MCC 0.463 0.889 -0.352 
 
0.153 1.113 -0.265 
Circulatory disorders except AMI, w card cath w/o MCC 0.339 0.877 -0.216 
 
0.112 1.110 -0.222 
Major small & large bowel procedures w MCC 0.584 0.421 -0.005 
 
0.213 0.888 -0.101 
Major small & large bowel procedures w CC 0.387 0.564 0.049 
 
0.193 0.811 -0.005 
Esophagitis, gastroent & misc digest disorders w/o MCC 0.372 0.835 -0.208 
 
0.164 1.028 -0.192 
Spinal fusion except cervical w/o MCC 0.280 0.571 0.149 
 
0.085 1.067 -0.152 
Major joint replacement or reattachment of lower extremity w/o MCC 0.331 0.724 -0.055 
 
0.213 0.973 -0.186 
Cellulitis w/o MCC 0.406 0.995 -0.401 
 
0.128 0.923 -0.051 
Kidney & urinary tract infections w/o MCC 0.372 0.750 -0.122 
 
0.151 1.062 -0.212 
Infectious & parasitic diseases w O.R. procedure w MCC 0.590 0.306 0.104 
 
0.112 0.769 0.119 
Septicemia w MV 96+ hours 0.768 0.269 -0.038 
 
0.072 0.860 0.067 
Septicemia w/o MV 96+ hours w MCC 0.508 0.457 0.035 
 
0.120 0.815 0.064 
Rehabilitation w CC/MCC 0.420 0.507 0.074 
 
0.056 1.164 -0.219 
Average Shares (weighted by spending) 0.438 0.567 -0.005 0.127 0.953 -0.081 
                
Notes: The decomposition of ln(spending per beneficiary) is carried out on the 2011 Medicare and HCCI inpatient spending samples. The Medicare analysis is 
based on data drawn from the 100% sample of Medicare claims that we accessed via the AHD. The HCCI data includes all inpatient claims and is drawn from 
our spending sample. “CC” is short for with “complication or comorbidity”; “MCC” is short for with “major complication or comorbidity”; “proc”=”procedure”; 
“cath” = “catheter”; “w”=With”; “w/o”=”without”. Because of space constraints, we show the top 25 highest spending DRGs in the HCCI data; the “Average 
Shares” in the final row are the average decomposition results by DRG (weighted by spending) across the 735 DRGs (HCCI) 562 DRGs (Medicare). 
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Appendix Table VII: Counterfactual Spending Holding Price or Quantity Fixed, 2011 
All Medicare vs Private Ages 55-64 
                        





















































 Coefficient of 
Variation 0.44 0.33 -0.11 0.37 -0.07 
 
0.35 0.30 -0.04 0.18 -0.16 
Gini 0.21 0.15 -0.05 0.21 -0.0004 
 
0.18 0.17 -0.01 0.10 -0.08 
p90/p10 2.39 1.85 -0.53 2.71 0.32 
 
2.23 2.20 -0.03 1.53 -0.70 
Number of 







                         
Notes: Counterfactual spending measures are calculated at the HRR level using 2011 spending data. Columns (1) and (6) present raw inpatient spending per 
beneficiary for the privately insured and Medicare populations, respectively. Columns (2) and (7) present the spending per privately insured and Medicare 
beneficiary when DRG-level prices are fixed to be the national average in all regions. Columns (3) and (8) report the reduction in measures of spending variation 
that result from fixing price. Columns (4) and (9) present spending per privately insured and Medicare beneficiary when the quantity of care (i.e. mix of DRGs as 
well as the rate at which beneficiaries are admitted across DRGs) is fixed to the national average. Columns (5) and (10) report the reductions in measures of 




Appendix Table VIII: Counterfactual Spending for Holding Price and Quantity Fixed, 2011  
All Medicare vs Private, Ages 18-64 
                        





















































 Coefficient of 
Variation 0.46 0.35 -0.11 0.32 -0.15 
 
0.35 0.30 -0.04 0.18 -0.16 
Gini 0.21 0.15 -0.05 0.17 -0.03 
 
0.18 0.17 -0.01 0.10 -0.08 
p90/p10 2.34 1.87 -0.47 2.14 -0.20 
 
2.23 2.20 -0.03 1.53 -0.70 
Number of 







                         
Notes: Counterfactual spending measures are calculated at the HRR level using 2011 spending data. Columns (1) and (6) present raw inpatient spending per 
beneficiary for the privately insured and Medicare populations, respectively. Columns (2) and (7) present the spending per privately insured and Medicare 
beneficiary when DRG-level prices are fixed to be the national average in all regions. Columns (3) and (8) report the reduction in measures of spending variation 
that result from fixing price. Columns (4) and (9) present spending per privately insured and Medicare beneficiary when the quantity of care (i.e. mix of DRGs as 
well as the rate at which beneficiaries are admitted across DRGs) is fixed to the national average. Columns (5) and (10) report the reductions in measures of 





Appendix Table IX: Hospital Procedure Prices (Mean and Coefficient of Variation) for the 25 Most Populated HRRs, 2011 
                                  














Mean CoV Mean CoV Mean CoV Mean CoV Mean CoV Mean CoV Mean CoV Mean CoV 
                 Phoenix, AZ 15,710 0.427 16,350 0.195 20,376 0.471 7,378 0.262 4,982 0.297 15,236 0.298 1,724 0.522 1,326 0.6 
Los Angeles, CA 14,836 0.355 25,658 0.387 22,447 0.465 9,205 0.342 5,998 0.317 20,773 0.52 2,459 0.325 1,453 0.281 
Denver, CO 15,876 0.291 20,475 0.287 22,849 0.38 8,471 0.229 4,912 0.237 25,423 0.22 2,127 0.356 1,306 0.335 
Washington, DC 10,830 0.204 19,669 0.183 18,521 0.302 7,532 0.216 5,603 0.143 21,855 0.297 1,302 0.394 1,010 0.378 
Ft Lauderdale, FL 12,329 0.288 21,230 0.278 22,008 0.365 6,349 0.247 4,471 0.205 23,574 0.287 1,639 0.309 753 0.405 
Miami, FL 12,983 0.257 22,418 0.34 25,454 0.287 6,439 0.165 4,827 0.189 23,942 0.41 1,855 0.422 1,213 0.654 
Orlando, FL 13,902 0.28 24,987 0.3 23,137 0.288 7,800 0.21 4,685 0.276 23,779 0.336 2,142 0.287 1,219 0.309 
Atlanta, GA 11,368 0.253 20,617 0.266 20,105 0.319 5,905 0.281 4,303 0.261 19,038 0.28 1,653 0.408 1,040 0.377 
Louisville, KY 9,509 0.241 18,508 0.207 15,628 0.173 5,611 0.278 4,138 0.341 14,680 0.193 1,343 0.273 1,206 0.386 
Minneapolis, MN 14,225 0.177 23,613 0.192 22,542 0.167 8,488 0.19 4,953 0.137 24,412 0.179 1,499 0.165 1,299 0.395 
Kansas City, MO 11,240 0.222 19,441 0.252 18,499 0.239 5,935 0.251 4,012 0.206 20,567 0.297 1,448 0.181 1,182 0.295 
St. Louis, MO 10,091 0.317 15,225 0.117 14,415 0.155 5,070 0.236 3,922 0.317 18,401 0.2 1,227 0.238 1,188 0.298 
Camden, NJ 13,131 0.487 20,351 0.237 20,142 0.262 9,144 0.295 6,542 0.249 21,064 0.39 1,548 0.362 1,006 0.265 
E Long Island, NY 13,664 0.216 40,049 0.135 31,567 0.201 8,905 0.136 6,279 0.142 32,862 0.174 2,154 0.232 1,294 0.4 
Manhattan, NY 13,529 0.229 30,464 0.082 28,323 0.214 8,337 0.26 5,715 0.201 28,654 0.292 1,745 0.287 1,050 0.241 
Cincinnati, OH 11,749 0.156 25,085 0.091 23,153 0.12 6,381 0.079 4,465 0.134 21,641 0.125 1,794 0.154 1,259 0.455 
Columbus, OH 13,638 0.171 30,246 0.198 27,439 0.288 7,783 0.304 5,265 0.224 25,401 0.287 1,506 0.402 1,446 0.307 
Philadelphia, PA 12,236 0.257 27,697 0.231 26,173 0.287 9,464 0.274 6,402 0.247 29,369 0.302 1,945 0.387 1,512 0.515 
Austin, TX 11,957 0.216 24,713 0.183 23,964 0.172 6,435 0.099 4,523 0.087 27,261 0.21 1,349 0.211 1,069 0.296 
Dallas, TX 13,691 0.244 32,427 0.186 31,826 0.209 6,992 0.207 5,070 0.164 29,935 0.2 1,627 0.169 1,277 0.312 
Fort Worth, TX 13,632 0.248 39,709 0.115 34,626 0.24 7,001 0.185 5,220 0.173 29,917 0.232 1,617 0.222 1,191 0.375 
Houston, TX 12,643 0.434 26,855 0.341 22,642 0.31 6,319 0.218 4,308 0.302 29,663 0.299 1,409 0.338 1,178 0.402 
San Antonio, TX 12,770 0.288 24,733 0.138 22,621 0.205 6,247 0.291 3,608 0.34 26,139 0.125 1,179 0.289 1,082 0.319 
Arlington, VA 12,987 0.126 24,672 0.137 24,428 0.136 7,868 0.129 5,420 0.135 22,984 0.201 1,707 0.155 1,460 0.177 
Milwaukee, WI 14,084 0.159 25,284 0.167 24,491 0.169 8,585 0.165 5,103 0.126 26,266 0.251 2,450 0.213 1,561 0.248 
                 National Average 13,815 0.218 24,658 0.162 23,567 0.182 7,825 0.184 4,957 0.183 25,992 0.196 1,719 0.228 1,373 0.249 
Medicare Average 6,461 0.087 13,389 0.064 13,039 0.068 4,954 0.067 3,175 0.096 12,907 0.072 656 0.073 354 0.033 
                                  
Notes: Prices are regression adjusted transaction prices for 2011.  CoV = coefficient of variation. The national averages present the mean within HRR Coefficient 
of Variation (CoV) and the average within HRR price. The data are drawn from the pricing samples and include prices that are risk-adjusted for age and sex. The 
inpatient analysis uses our risk-adjusted inpatient price index.  
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Appendix Table X: Inpatient Cross-Sectional Price Regressions with All Controls, 2008-
2011; Full Results 
          
 
Dependent Variable: ln(Facilities Price) 
Market Characteristics 
   
 
Monopoly 0.234*** 0.190*** 0.118*** 
  
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
 
Duopoly 0.161*** 0.130*** 0.073*** 
  
(0.021) (0.020) (0.024) 
 
Triopoly 0.115*** 0.083*** 0.036 
  
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Share HCCI  -0.006*** -0.007*** 
   (0.002) (0.002) 
Hospital Characteristics    
 
ln(Technologies) 0.012** 0.011** 0.010** 
  
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
 Ranked by US News and World Reports 
0.118*** 0.138*** 0.134*** 
 
(0.031) (0.031) (0.033) 
 
ln(Number of Beds) 0.046*** 0.040*** 0.067*** 
  
(0.012) (0.011) (0.010) 
 
Teaching Hospital -0.006 0.001 0.020 
  
(0.018) (0.018) (0.014) 
 
Government Owned -0.129*** -0.133*** -0.148*** 
  
(0.031) (0.031) (0.030) 
 
Non-Profit -0.049** -0.053** -0.074*** 
  
(0.022) (0.022) (0.023) 
County Characteristics 
   
 
Percent Uninsured 0.006** 0.009*** -0.002 
  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
 
ln(Median Income) 0.137*** 0.236*** 0.048 
  
(0.047) (0.050) (0.056) 
Other Payers    
 
ln(Medicare Base Payment Rate) 0.430*** 0.299*** 0.088 
 
(0.083) (0.085) (0.078) 
 
Share Medicare -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.002*** 
  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
Share Medicaid -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.002** 
  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
R-square 0.143 0.170 0.453 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
 
HRR Fixed Effects No Yes Yes 
 
Observations 8,772 8,772 8,772 
         
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. OLS estimates with standard errors clustered at the HRR-level in 
parentheses. We use hospital price data from 2008 to 2011. Facilities prices are regression adjusted transaction 
prices that are risk-adjusted for DRG, age, and sex. All regressions include yearly fixed effects. The omitted hospital 
market structure is quadropoly or greater and the omitted ownership category is private hospitals. 
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Appendix Table XI: Inpatient Regressions for Percent of Cases Paid as Share of Charges, 
2010-2011; Full Results 
          
     
 
Dependent Variable: Percent of Cases Paid as Share of Charges 
Market Characteristics 
   
 
Monopoly 17.335*** 15.241*** 10.455*** 
  
(1.828) (1.823) (1.778) 
 
Duopoly 9.979*** 8.424*** 5.702*** 
  
(1.760) (1.740) (1.596) 
 
Triopoly 7.804*** 6.235** 4.909** 
  
(1.909) (1.938) (1.608) 
Share HCCI  -0.288*** -0.403*** 
   (0.077) (0.120) 
Hospital Characteristics    
 
ln(Technologies) 0.733** 0.750** 0.462 
  
(0.271) (0.270) (0.249) 
 Ranked by US News and World Reports 
3.860 4.807* 1.728 
 
(2.299) (2.284) (1.501) 
 
ln(Number of Beds) 1.099 0.809 2.905*** 
  
(0.791) (0.776) (0.601) 
 
Teaching Hospital 1.343 1.615 0.528 
  
(0.934) (0.949) (0.784) 
 
Government Owned 3.265 3.048 4.407* 
  
(1.847) (1.842) (1.828) 
 
Non-Profit 6.651*** 6.514*** 4.532*** 
  
(1.188) (1.219) (1.103) 
County Characteristics 
   
 
Percent Uninsured -0.338* -0.215 0.248 
  
(0.136) (0.141) (0.347) 
 
ln(Median Income) -2.637 1.934 3.761 
  
(3.961) (4.205) (5.049) 
Other Payers    
 
ln(Medicare Base Payment Rate) -18.993*** -25.057*** -16.714*** 
 
(4.833) (5.367) (4.679) 
 
Share Medicare -0.377*** -0.388*** -0.206*** 
  
(0.079) (0.077) (0.050) 
 
Share Medicaid -0.032 -0.015 -0.086 
  
(0.068) (0.069) (0.045) 
 
R-square 0.166 0.179 0.557 
Yearly FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
HRR FE No Yes Yes 
 
Observations 4,344 4,344 4,344 
         
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. OLS estimates of Equation (2) with standard errors clustered at the HRR-
level in parentheses. We measure percent of inpatient cases paid as share of charges for 2010-2011. The omitted 
hospital market structure is quadropoly or greater and the omitted ownership category is private hospitals. 
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Appendix Table XII: Inpatient Regressions for Share of Linked to Medicare, 2010-2011; 
Full Results 
          
     
 
Dependent Variable: Share of Prospective Payments Linked to Medicare 
Market Characteristics 
   
 
Monopoly -16.849*** -11.275*** -11.293*** 
  
(2.882) (2.696) (3.160) 
 
Duopoly -8.791*** -4.272* -5.595** 
  
(2.441) (2.443) (2.316) 
 
Triopoly -7.111** -2.422 -5.747** 
  
(2.866) (2.727) (2.790) 
 
HCCI Market Share 
 
0.890*** 0.616*** 
   
(0.091) (0.174) 
Hospital Characteristics 
   
 
ln(Technologies) 0.465 0.453 0.809* 
  
(0.511) (0.461) (0.459) 
 
Ranked in US News & World Reports 7.662** 4.591 5.339* 
 
(3.390) (3.266) (2.722) 
 
ln(Beds) 7.998*** 9.138*** 9.320*** 
  
(1.317) (1.209) (1.239) 
 
Teaching 4.402*** 3.405** 2.504* 
  
(1.511) (1.429) (1.472) 
 
Government -0.859 -0.481 -3.377 
  
(2.588) (2.535) (2.638) 
 
Non-Profit 2.781 3.031 1.485 
  
(2.022) (1.881) (2.084) 
County Characteristics 
   
 
Percent Uninsured -0.024 -0.394** -0.118 
  
(0.264) (0.186) (0.483) 
 
ln(Median Income) -0.747 -14.915*** -3.349 
  
(5.510) (4.781) (7.177) 
Other Payers 
   
 
ln(Medicare Base Payment Rate) -34.805*** -14.562* -18.145** 
 
(8.942) (7.824) (8.960) 
 
Share Medicare -0.210** -0.140* -0.231*** 
  
(0.087) (0.081) (0.080) 
 
Share Medicaid -0.071 -0.126 -0.185** 
  
(0.091) (0.086) (0.086) 
 
R-Squared 0.115 0.172 0.380 
 
Yearly-FE Yes Yes Yes 
 
HRR-FE No Yes Yes 
 
Observations 3,669 3,669 3,669 
         
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. OLS estimates of Equation (2) with standard errors clustered at the HRR-
level in parentheses. We measure share of inpatient cases linked to Medicare from 2010 to 2011. All regressions 
include yearly fixed effects. The omitted hospital market structure is quadropoly or greater and the omitted 




Appendix Table XIII: Cross-sectional Pricing Regressions Using Alternative Price 
Measures 
    Panel A: Baseline Result, Observations = 8,772 
Monopoly 0.234*** 0.190*** 0.118*** 
 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Duopoly 0.161*** 0.130*** 0.073*** 
 
(0.021) (0.020) (0.024) 
Triopoly 0.115*** 0.083*** 0.036 
 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 





Panel B: ln(Price) Before Risk-Adjustment, Observations = 8,772 
Monopoly 0.222*** 0.182*** 0.096*** 
 
(0.027) (0.028) (0.026) 
Duopoly 0.148*** 0.119*** 0.047* 
 
(0.023) (0.022) (0.024) 
Triopoly 0.095*** 0.066*** 0.002 
 
(0.025) (0.025) (0.023) 





Panel C: Levels of Price, Observations = 8,772 
Monopoly 3080.604*** 2402.447*** 1604.775*** 
 
(350.922) (343.335) (339.422) 
Duopoly 2168.105*** 1685.231*** 1006.571*** 
 
(290.420) (266.204) (319.430) 
Triopoly 1545.485*** 1055.851*** 470.042 
 
(303.488) (300.250) (314.683) 





Panel D: Adding Charlson Score to Risk Adjustment, Observations = 8,491 
Monopoly 0.230*** 0.188*** 0.115*** 
 
(0.024) (0.025) (0.024) 
Duopoly 0.159*** 0.129*** 0.070*** 
 
(0.021) (0.020) (0.024) 
Triopoly 0.119*** 0.088*** 0.038* 
 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 





Panel E: Risk-Adjustment Using ICD9 Codes, Observations = 8,772 
Monopoly 0.205*** 0.158*** 0.076*** 
 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.026) 
Duopoly 0.156*** 0.123*** 0.055** 
 
(0.024) (0.022) (0.026) 
Triopoly 0.107*** 0.073*** 0.012 
 
(0.024) (0.025) (0.024) 





HRR FE No No Yes 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. OLS estimates with standard errors clustered at the HRR-level in 
parentheses. All regressions include controls in Table IV notes. In Panel B ln(prices) rather than levels are used in 
Equation (A1). Panel C uses level instead of logs of prices. In Panels A, B, and C, prices are risk-adjusted for DRG, 
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age, and sex. In Panel D, they are risk-adjusted for DRG, Charlson Score, age, and sex. In Panel E, we risk-adjust 
using ICD-9 codes, age, and sex.  
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Table XIV: Prices and Contractual Form at the Procedure level  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 














Panel A: ln(Hospital Price)                 
Monopoly 0.118*** 0.139*** 0.054 0.152*** 0.140** 0.100** 0.150 0.080* 0.210*** 
(0.024) (0.026) (0.102) (0.057) (0.059) (0.040) (0.100) (0.043) (0.036) 
Duopoly 0.073*** 0.095*** 0.016 0.019 0.092*** 0.072*** 0.153** 0.064 0.141*** 
(0.024) (0.018) (0.069) (0.046) (0.030) (0.024) (0.071) (0.039) (0.031) 
Triopoly 0.036 0.055** 0.068 -0.011 0.040 -0.001 0.086 0.037 0.126*** 
(0.023) (0.021) (0.084) (0.048) (0.038) (0.031) (0.052) (0.041) (0.035) 
HCCI Market Share -0.007*** -0.003 0.001 -0.002 <0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) 
Observations 8,772 22,167 1,259 2,660 3,794 4,096 1,764 3,512 5,082 
Panel B: (Percent of Cases Paid As a Share of Charges)*100 
Monopoly 10.455*** 22.264*** 6.655 19.596*** 22.228*** 24.937*** 10.504 22.628*** 
(1.778) (3.226) (6.425) (4.832) (5.540) (4.488) (8.583) (4.299) 
Duopoly 5.702*** 12.678*** -2.558 13.366** 14.932*** 18.528*** 13.160 8.166* 
(1.596) (2.908) (7.533) (4.824) (4.087) (3.683) (6.797) (3.868) 
Triopoly 4.909** 7.942** 16.634* 9.208 5.471 10.256** 0.049 9.607* 
(1.608) (2.604) (7.943) (5.447) (3.980) (3.576) (3.949) (3.869) 
HCCI Market Share -0.403*** -0.579** 0.500 -0.434 -0.510 -0.510 -0.259 -0.801** 
(0.120) (0.218) (0.331) (0.327) (0.331) (0.272) (0.314) (0.252) 
Observations 4,344 8,463 661 1,362 1,870 2,056 807 1,707   
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. OLS estimates of Equation (2) with standard errors clustered at the HRR-level in parentheses. Column (1) reproduces 
the results in Column (3) of Table IV. The dependent variables in Panel A are the ln(Inpatient hospital prices), risk-adjusted for age and sex. In Panel B, they are 
the Percent of cases paid as a share of hospital charges. In both panels these are for the specific procedures noted at the head of the column. Charges for MRIs do 
not generally vary across cases within hospitals so it is not possible to split into contract type. All regressions include controls for the number of technologies, 
dummy for being ranked in US News & World Reports, size as measured by number of beds, hospital ownership (government, non-profit or for-profit), whether 
a teaching hospital, percent of county uninsured, county median income, the Medicare payment rate, share of Medicare, share of Medicaid, year dummies and 




Appendix Table XV: Procedure-Level Regressions Measured as the Sum of Facility and Physician Prices, 2008-2011 
                      
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 










Delivery PTCA Colonoscopy MRI 
Dependent Variable: ln(Facilities Price + Physician Price)  
Market Characteristics 
         
 
Monopoly 0.093*** 0.110*** 0.026 0.120** 0.084** 0.053** 0.135 0.077** 0.189*** 
  
(0.019) (0.022) (0.089) (0.048) (0.038) (0.027) (0.091) (0.037) (0.032) 
 
Duopoly 0.058*** 0.078*** 0.004 0.012 0.053** 0.044*** 0.137** 0.083** 0.125*** 
  
(0.018) (0.016) (0.061) (0.038) (0.022) (0.017) (0.064) (0.035) (0.028) 
 
Triopoly 0.028 0.046*** 0.070 -0.006 0.026 0.002 0.071 0.043 0.115*** 
  
(0.018) (0.017) (0.071) (0.039) (0.027) (0.021) (0.047) (0.034) (0.031) 
 
HCCI Market Share -0.006*** -0.003** 0.000 -0.003 -0.000 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004* 
  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Hospital Characteristics 
         
 
ln(Technologies) 0.008** 0.006** -0.003 -0.004 0.004 0.001 0.014* 0.013** 0.009 
  
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) 
 
Ranked in US News 
& World Reports 
0.107*** 0.063*** 0.032 0.073** 0.072*** 0.067*** 0.052 0.081** 0.053 
 
(0.027) (0.021) (0.033) (0.031) (0.022) (0.020) (0.040) (0.032) (0.034) 
 
ln(Beds) 0.052*** 0.010 -0.005 -0.002 0.024** 0.025*** 0.079*** -0.021 0.006 
  
(0.008) (0.006) (0.025) (0.017) (0.010) (0.007) (0.028) (0.014) (0.012) 
 
Teaching 0.017 0.006 0.030 0.010 0.010 0.008 -0.036 0.019 -0.001 
  
(0.011) (0.010) (0.027) (0.019) (0.012) (0.013) (0.029) (0.025) (0.017) 
 
Government -0.113*** -0.049* -0.107 -0.086 -0.069** -0.077*** -0.177*** -0.141*** 0.059 
  
(0.023) (0.026) (0.072) (0.056) (0.031) (0.027) (0.061) (0.041) (0.049) 
 
Non-Profit -0.058*** -0.009 -0.006 0.022 -0.001 0.004 -0.078 -0.104*** 0.046 
  
(0.018) (0.016) (0.037) (0.036) (0.018) (0.016) (0.048) (0.026) (0.044) 
County Characteristics 
         
 
Percent Uninsured -0.002 -0.003 -0.011* -0.003 -0.009*** -0.006* -0.004 0.000 -0.002 
  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) 
 
ln(Median Income) 0.039 -0.067 -0.315*** -0.097 -0.171*** -0.051 -0.179 0.080 -0.033 
  
(0.044) (0.045) (0.094) (0.106) (0.065) (0.056) (0.160) (0.096) (0.097) 
Other Payers 




0.088 -0.043 0.185 0.143 -0.089 -0.043 -0.075 -0.038 0.003 
 
(0.063) (0.051) (0.136) (0.108) (0.075) (0.070) (0.125) (0.104) (0.105) 
 
ln(Share Medicare) -0.002*** -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.001 0.000 0.000 
  




ln(Share Medicaid) -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.004** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
Yearly-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
HRR-FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
R-Squared 0.456 0.955 0.627 0.548 0.613 0.614 0.582 0.513 0.398 
 
Observations 8,772 22,167 1,259 2,660 3,794 4,096 1,764 3,512 5,082 
                     
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. OLS estimates of Equation (2) with standard errors clustered at the HRR-level in parentheses. We rely on data from 
2008-2011. Procedure prices are regression-adjusted transaction prices where we risk-adjust for age and sex (plus DRGs for the inpatient index). All regressions 




Appendix Table XVI: Inpatient Cross-Sectional Price Results Using Different Measures of Hospital Market Concentration 
                  
         
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  
Dependent Variable: ln(Facilities Price) 
Market Characteristics 
       
 
ln(HHI) 0.053*** 0.076*** 0.100*** 0.047*** 
   
 
(0.015) (0.014) (0.021) (0.014) 
   
 
Hospital Count 
    
-0.005*** 
  





     
0.117*** 0.077*** 























Market Radius 5 Miles 15 Miles 30 Miles Variable 15 Miles 15 Miles 15 Miles 
         
 
HCCI Market Share -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.008*** 
  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
       
 
Observations 8,772 8,772 8,772 8,772 8,772 8,772 8,772 
                 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. OLS estimates with standard errors clustered at the HRR-level in parentheses. 8,772 observations. The dependent 
variable is our regression-based inpatient price index that is risk-adjusted for DRG, age and sex. All regressions have the same set of controls in the notes to 
Table IV Panel A Column (3). We use multiple measures of hospital market concentration. Column (1) includes hospital HHIs where the market is defined using 
a five-mile fixed radius drawn around each hospital. Column (2) includes hospital HHIs where the market is defined using a fifteen-mile fixed radius drawn 
around each hospital. Column (3) includes hospital HHIs where the market is defined using a thirty-mile fixed radius drawn around each hospital. In Column (4), 
we measure hospital HHIs in variable radii markets.  Hospitals located in ‘large urban’ areas are assigned a market defined by a 10-mile radius; hospitals located 
in ‘urban’ have a market defined around them using a 15-mile radius; and hospitals located in ‘rural’ areas have a market defined around them using a 20-mile 
radius. In Column (5), we measure market concentration using counts of hospitals within a fifteen-mile radius drawn around each hospital. In Column (6), we use 
dummy variables to capture the quartiles of our hospital HHIs measured within hospital markets defined using fixed radii extending fifteen-miles around each 
hospital. The omitted category, quartile 1, is the least concentrated quartile. In Column (7), we measure the effect of being in the most concentrated quartile of 
hospital HHI within a market defined by a fifteen-mile fixed radius market drawn around each hospital. The reference categories are the other three quartiles of 
hospital HHI. Facilities prices are regression-adjusted transaction prices. All regressions include yearly fixed effects and controls for number of beds, teaching 
status, government ownership, non-profit status, county insurance rate and median income, Medicare payment rate, and share of hospital activity covered by 




Appendix Table XVII: Determinants of Share of Cases Paid Percentage of Hospital Charges, Alternative Concentration 
Measures 
                  
         
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  
Dependent Variable: Share of Contracts Paid Share of Charges 
Market Characteristics 
       
 
ln(HHI) 4.339*** 7.569*** 6.278*** 5.202*** 
   
 
(1.122) (1.272) (1.617) (1.300) 
   
 
Hospital Count 
    
-5.123*** 
  





     
11.951*** 6.584*** 























Market Radius 5 Miles 15 Miles 30 Miles Variable 15 Miles 15 Miles 15 Miles 
         
 
HCCI Market Share -0.557*** -0.401*** -0.498*** -0.511*** -0.376*** -0.402*** -0.491*** 
  
(0.122) (0.121) (0.125) (0.121) (0.122) (0.120) (0.119) 
 
       
 
Observations 4,344 4,344 4,344 4,344 4,344 4,344 4,344 
                  
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. OLS estimates of Equation (2) with standard errors clustered at the HRR-level in parentheses. All regressions have the 
same set of controls in the notes to Table IV Panel B Column (3). All regressions are based on the inpatient sample of data. 
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Appendix Table XVIII: Determinates of the Linkage between Private and Medicare Payments Estimated with Alternative 
Measures of Concentration, 2010-2011 
                  
         
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  
Dependent Variable: Percent of Cases Tied to Medicare*100 
Market Characteristics 
       
 
ln(HHI) -1.285 -8.121*** -10.076*** -3.804** 
   
 
(1.723) (1.703) (2.582) (1.668) 
   
 
Hospital Count 
    
0.447*** 
  





     
-11.778*** -4.863** 























Market Radius 5 Miles 15 Miles 30 Miles Variable 15 Miles 15 Miles 15 Miles 
         
 
HCCI Market Share 0.808*** 0.614*** 0.680*** 0.755*** 0.722*** 0.663*** 0.733*** 
  
(0.170) (0.172) (0.167) (0.168) (0.170) (0.170) (0.172) 
 
       
 
Observations 3,669 3,669 3,669 3,669 3,669 3,669 3,669 
                  
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. OLS estimates of with standard errors clustered at the HRR-level in parentheses. The dependent variable is the percent 






Appendix Table XIX: Inpatient Cross-Sectional Price Results with Multiple Measures of Quality 
                  
         
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Dependent Variable: ln(Facilities Price) 
A standard deviation increase in quality by: 
       
 
% AMI pats. given aspirin at arrival 
 
0.022** 









% of surgery pats. given antibiotic 1 hour 











% of surgery pats. given treatment to 











30-day death rate for heart attack patients 
    
0.005* 0.005 
 
     
(0.003) (0.003) 
 Full set of 41 quality controls? No No No No No No Yes 
Other Characteristics 
       
 
 
Monopoly 0.118*** 0.119*** 0.117*** 0.118*** 0.117*** 0.119*** 0.117*** 
  
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
 
Duopoly 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.073*** 0.072*** 0.071*** 
  
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) 
 
Triopoly 0.036 0.036 0.036 0.037 0.035 0.036 0.034 
  
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Share HCCI -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 
   Observations 8,772 8,772 8,772 8,772 8,772 8,772 8,772 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. OLS estimates of Table IV with the addition of alternative quality measures. The dependent variable is our regression-
based inpatient price index that is risk-adjusted for DRG, age, and sex. Standard errors are clustered at the HRR-level and are in parentheses. Facilities prices are 
regression adjusted transaction prices for 2008-2011. All regressions include HRR and year fixed effects. All regressions also include same controls as Column 




Appendix Table XX: Cross-Sectional Relationships and Robustness to Sample Restrictions 







Dependent Variable ln(Price) 
 
Percent Paid Share of 
Charges 
 






Hospitals in  
Markets with 






Hospitals in  
Markets with 






Hospitals in  
Markets with 
≥ 6 Hospitals 
Market Characteristics 



















































          
 





                   
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. “Excluding monopolies” drops all monopoly hospitals and “Excluding Hospitals in  Markets with ≥ 6 Hospitals”  drops 
all hospitals in markets with 6 or more hospitals. OLS estimates of Table IV Panel A Column (3) with different sample restrictions. The dependent variable in 
Columns (1) and (2) is the log of our regression-based inpatient price index that is risk-adjusted for DRG, age, and sex. The dependent variable in Columns (3) 
and (4) is the share of cases paid as a percentage of hospital charges. The dependent variable in Columns (5) and (6) is the percent of prospective cases with 
prices set as a percentage of Medicare payments. Standard errors are clustered at the HRR-level and are in parentheses. Facilities prices are regression adjusted 
transaction prices for 2008-2011. All regressions include HRR and yearly fixed effects. All regressions also include insurance market controls, controls for beds, 
teaching status, government ownership, non-profit status, percent county uninsured and median income, Medicare payment rates, and share of hospitals’ admits 
covered by Medicare and Medicaid.  
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Appendix Table XXI: Inpatient Cross-Sectional Price Results with Alternative Sample Restrictions 
                      
           
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dependent 
Variable ln(Price) 
           Monopoly 0.107*** 0.109*** 0.115*** 0.115*** 0.118*** 0.119*** 0.120*** 0.123*** 0.122*** 0.127*** 
 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.027) (0.028) (0.029) 
Duopoly 0.069*** 0.073*** 0.076*** 0.075*** 0.073*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.074*** 0.074*** 0.075*** 
 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Triopoly 0.029 0.027 0.033 0.036 0.036 0.037* 0.040* 0.041* 0.041* 0.042* 
 
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) 
HCCI Market 
Share 
-0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
           Minimum 
Inpatient Case 
Count 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
           
Number of 
Hospitals 3,013 2,793 2,622 2,497 2,358 2,270 2,176 2,089 2,013 1,945 
Observations 11,374 10,488 9,789 9,269 8,772 8,380 8,000 7,689 7,389 7,133 
                      
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. OLS estimates with standard errors clustered at the HRR-level in parentheses. Market structure variables described in 
text and Appendix C. The dependent variable is ln(Hospital inpatient prices) that are regression risk-adjusted for DRG, age, and sex. Data runs 2008 to 2011. All 
regressions include number of technologies, dummy for being ranked in US News and World Reports, size as measured by number of beds, hospital ownership 
(government, non-profit or for-profit), whether a teaching hospital, percent of county uninsured, county median income, the Medicare payment rate, share of 
Medicare, share of Medicaid, as well as HRR and year dummies. Minimum inpatient case count indicates the minimum number of unique cases per hospital-year 





Appendix Table XXII: Transactions and Targets by Distance 
                  
         Distance: 
 
5 Miles 10 Miles 15 Miles 20 Miles 30 Miles 50 Miles All 
         2007 Transactions 6 14 18 25 31 37 69 
 
Target Hospitals 7 17 21 29 38 51 119 
 
Acquirer Hospitals 7 20 25 39 64 92 493 
         2008 Transactions 9 15 23 28 39 46 69 
 
Target Hospitals 11 19 28 33 45 54 86 
 
Acquirer Hospitals 13 30 43 58 89 136 693 
         2009 Transactions 9 15 17 21 32 44 70 
 
Target Hospitals 9 15 17 22 33 48 85 
 
Acquirer Hospitals 5 12 19 30 60 113 578 
         2010 Transactions 6 13 17 24 39 50 76 
 
Target Hospitals 7 15 19 27 42 59 90 
 
Acquirer Hospitals 7 19 33 45 68 120 753 
         2011 Transactions 11 21 32 38 49 64 82 
 
Target Hospitals 11 21 33 40 55 75 106 
 
Acquirer Hospitals 7 17 33 46 67 114 753 
         All Transactions 42 77 108 138 189 243 366 
 
Target Hospitals 45 87 118 151 212 285 464 
 
Acquirer Hospitals 39 97 146 204 320 494 1563 
                 
Notes: This is based on data from the AHA, Irving-Levin Associates, Factset, and SDC Platinum databases. Data on hospital beds came from the AHA annual 
survey.   
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Appendix Table XXIII: Characteristics of Merging/Non-Merging Hospitals 
              
   












Static Static Differenced Differenced 








9.2 9.4** 0.056 0.052 
Market Structure 
















0.419 0.719*** -0.023 -0.191 
 
Insurer Market Share 
 
13.6 17.8*** -0.001 <0.001 
Hospital Characteristics 




64.5 59.6 3.4 1.5 
 
Ranked in US News 
 
















70.1 69.7 0.0 -0.1 
Local Area Characteristics 








50841.7 51537.3 -757.1 -533.2 
Other Payers 
     
 
PPS Payment Rate 
 








18.3 18.8 1.0 0.4 




77 8,415 70 7,944 
 
Number of Hospitals 
 
37 2,241 35 2,153 
             
Notes: These are descriptive statistics for the inpatient sample used in estimating post-merger price differences. This table uses pre-merger data for each hospital. 
There are 8,492 hospital-year observations representing 2,278 unique hospitals. Hospital prices are hospital prices that are risk-adjusted for DRG, age, and sex. 
The static columns – (1) and (2) – display the average value of each covariate during our sample period across hospital years pre-merger. The differenced 
columns – (3) and (4) – capture the average first difference of each covariate pre-merger.  
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Appendix Table XXIV: Robustness of Hospital Prices and Mergers 
                  
         
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  
      ln(price)       
         Distance (miles): 5 10 15 20 25 30 50 
         Panel A: Baseline 
       
 
Post-Merger 0.060** 0.039** 0.021 0.023* 0.024** 0.014 0.008 
  
(0.025) (0.019) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) 
 
Observations 8655 8655 8655 8655 8655 8655 8655 
Panel B: Treatment Counts Estimated Log-Linearly 
       
 
Post-Merger 0.087** 0.059** 0.033* 0.036** 0.036** 0.023 0.014 
  
(0.036) (0.027) (0.019) (0.018) (0.016) (0.015) (0.013) 
 
Observations 8655 8655 8655 8655 8655 8655 8655 
Panel C: Matching (Within State Mahalanobis Distance) 
       
 
Post-Merger 0.100*** 0.024 0.009 0.011 0.009 0.003 -0.001 
  
(0.028) (0.023) (0.016) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009) 
 
Observations 1286 2295 2993 3417 3954 4215 5120 
Panel D: Matched using Mahalanobis Distance 
       
 
Post-Merger 0.070*** 0.023 0.007 0.014 0.014 0.004 -0.000 
  
(0.026) (0.021) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009) 
 
Observations 1921 3124 4058 4745 5216 5509 6265 
Panel E: Matching (Dranove/Lindrooth Model) 
       
 
Post-Merger 0.075*** 0.032 0.013 0.017 0.016 0.004 0.001 
  
(0.026) (0.021) (0.015) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) 
 
Observations 1918 3506 4522 5154 5636 5972 6786 
Panel F: Matched using K-Nearest Neighbor Method 
       
 
Post-Merger 0.075*** 0.024 0.010 0.016 0.018 0.006 0.001 
  




Observations 1912 3311 4239 4827 5496 5700 6544 
Panel G: Robustness to Minimum Count Restrictions 
       
 
Post-Merger (Minimum 40 Cases) 0.060** 0.040** 0.023* 0.023* 0.025** 0.013 0.007 
  
(0.025) (0.018) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) 
 
Observations 9086 9086 9086 9086 9086 9086 9086 
 
Post-Merger (Minimum 10 Cases) 0.076*** 0.044** 0.028** 0.027** 0.029*** 0.021** 0.014 
  
(0.024) (0.018) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) 
 
Observations 11157 11157 11157 11157 11157 11157 11157 
Panel H: Estimated Separately for Targets/Acquirers 
       
 
Post-Merger X Target 0.080** 0.055* 0.034 0.033 0.031 0.019 0.010 
  
(0.040) (0.031) (0.026) (0.023) (0.020) (0.019) (0.017) 
 
Post-Merger X Acquirer 0.039* 0.025 0.012 0.018 0.020* 0.011 0.007 
  
(0.023) (0.018) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) 
 
Observations 8655 8655 8655 8655 8655 8655 8655 
                  
Notes: ***significant at 1 percent level; **5 percent level; *10 percent level. Coefficients estimated by OLS with standard errors in parentheses (clustered by 
hospital). All regressions include hospital fixed effects and time dummies. The dependent variable is the log of our risk-adjusted inpatient price measure. 
Controls: Insurer HHI, percent privately insured covered by the HCCI insurers, quality scores from News & World Report, technology index, hospital size, 
whether the hospital is a teaching facility, government-owned facility, or a not-for-profit; country median income and percent uninsured; the Medicare base 
payment rate, the share of hospitals’ discharges that are Medicare and Medicaid patients. Unless otherwise specified, post-merger equals 1 in the year a hospital 




Appendix Table XXV: Correlation between Private and Medicare Spending Per 
Beneficiaries 
        
    
  
Total Inpatient 
    Overall 
 
0.044 0.172 
High BCBS Share 0.011 0.156 
Low BCBS Share 0.063 0.201 
        
Notes: Each cell presents the correlation between spending per beneficiary for private and Medicare patients across 
HRRs in 2011. High and low BCBS share are defined by HRRs which are above or below the median BCBS market 





Appendix Table XXVI: Price/Quantity Decomposition for Cases in High/Low BCBS Market Share, 2011 
                        
 
Private   Medicare 
 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
 
Share Price Share Quantity Share Covariance   Share Price Share Quantity 
Share 
Covariance 
        Overall 0.496 0.495 0.009 
 
0.127 0.953 -0.081 
Low BCBS 0.541 0.495 -0.036 
 
0.107 0.975 -0.081 
High BCBS 0.496 0.488 0.016 
 
0.149 0.921 -0.070 
                
Notes: This table presents results of the price quantity decomposition as described in Section III.B using data from 2011. Shares are averaged across DRGs 
(weighted by total spending). High and low BCBS share are defined by HRRs which are above or below the median BCBS market share across HRRs (47 




Appendix Table XXVII: Price Decomposition for Cases in High/Low BCBS Market Share 
Panel A: Price Decomposition for High BCBS Market Share 
                  









Hip Replacement 0.014 0.034 0.461 0.713 0.743 25.7% 3,573 0.164 
Knee Replacement 0.010 0.028 0.464 0.702 0.747 25.3% 8,344 0.190 
Cesarean Section 0.013 0.052 0.487 0.757 0.792 20.8% 14,367 0.165 
Vaginal Delivery 0.014 0.036 0.380 0.612 0.670 33.0% 22,834 0.187 
PTCA 0.006 0.037 0.585 0.739 0.768 23.2% 3,455 0.223 
Colonoscopy 0.013 0.018 0.404 0.794 0.856 14.4% 13,170 0.145 
Lower Limb MRI 0.003 0.016 0.370 0.775 0.789 21.1% 29,018 0.139 
Mean 23.4% 0.173 
Patient Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Plan Characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control for Charges No No No No Yes 
HRR Fixed Effects No No Yes — — 
Hospital Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes 
  
Notes: Data include cases treated at hospitals in counties with more than 51 percent market share. Each cell contains the R2 value for the relevant specification 
and data pair in January, 2011. All regressions rely on case-level data. Patient characteristics include fixed effects for sex, and 10-year age bands. Plan 
characteristics include the full interaction of market segment (i.e. large vs. small group), and product and funding type. Column (8) reports the within-hospital-




Appendix Table XXVII Panel B: Price Decomposition for Low BCBS Market Share 
                  









Hip Replacement 0.006 0.016 0.518 0.773 0.782 21.8% 11,549 0.177 
Knee Replacement 0.006 0.017 0.418 0.734 0.758 24.2% 28,813 0.211 
Cesarean Section 0.011 0.024 0.433 0.717 0.745 25.5% 67,113 0.171 
Vaginal Delivery 0.011 0.028 0.395 0.653 0.707 29.3% 85,956 0.194 
PTCA 0.006 0.021 0.460 0.718 0.756 24.4% 13,181 0.244 
Colonoscopy 0.010 0.028 0.435 0.752 0.813 18.7% 52,847 0.171 
Lower Limb MRI 0.001 0.008 0.365 0.773 0.782 21.8% 84,896 0.164 
Mean 23.7% 0.190 
Patient Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Plan Characteristics No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control for Charges No No No No Yes 
HRR Fixed Effects No No Yes — — 
Hospital Fixed Effects No No No Yes Yes 
        
Notes: Data include cases treated at hospitals in counties with less than 51 percent market share. Each cell contains the R2 value for the relevant specification and 
data pair in January, 2011. All regressions rely on case-level data. Patient characteristics include fixed effects for sex and10-year age bands. Plan characteristics 
include the full interaction of market segment (i.e. large vs. small group), and product and funding type. Column (8) reports the within-hospital-month coefficient 




Appendix Table XXVIII: Levels of Variation in High/Low BCBS Facilities 
Panel A: Overall 
          
     
  
Coefficient of Variation 
  
(1) (2) (3) 
  
Across HRR Within HRR Within Hospital 
     Inpatient 
 
0.349 0.429 1.000 
Hip Replacement 
 
0.348 0.218 0.189 
Knee Replacement 
 
0.362 0.306 0.219 
Cesarean Section 
 
0.350 0.245 0.178 
Vaginal Delivery 
 
0.351 0.254 0.189 
PTCA 
 
0.445 0.288 0.242 
Colonoscopy 
 
0.383 0.311 0.170 
Lower Limb MRI 
 
0.325 0.312 0.173 
          
Notes: Data for each clinical cohort drawn from January, 2011. Each cell presents a coefficient variation. Column 
(1) presents the CoV of HRR-level average prices across HRRs. Column (2) presents the within-HRR CoV in 
hospital-level average prices then averaged across HRRs. Column (3) presents within-hospital CoV averaged across 




Appendix Table XXVIII, continued 
Panel B: High BCBS (counties with over 51 percent market share) 
          
     
  
Coefficient of Variation 
  
(1) (2) (3) 
  
Across HRR Within HRR Within Hospital 
     Inpatient 
 
0.414 0.422 0.907 
Hip Replacement 
 
0.340 0.174 0.148 
Knee Replacement 
 
0.375 0.237 0.189 
Cesarean Section 
 
0.337 0.210 0.175 
Vaginal Delivery 
 
0.393 0.243 0.190 
PTCA 
 
0.475 0.188 0.183 
Colonoscopy 
 
0.377 0.276 0.163 
Lower Limb MRI 
 
0.317 0.299 0.157 
          
Notes: Data for each clinical cohort drawn from January, 2011. Each cell presents a coefficient variation. Column 
(1) presents the CoV of HRR-level average prices across HRRs. Column (2) presents the within-HRR CoV in 
hospital-level average prices then averaged across HRRs. Column (3) presents within-hospital CoV averaged across 





Appendix Table XXVIII, continued 
Panel C: Low BCBS (counties with under 51 percent market share) 
          
     
  
Coefficient of Variation 
  
(1) (2) (3) 
  
Across HRR Within HRR Within Hospital 
     Inpatient 
 
0.385 0.429 1.042 
Hip Replacement 
 
0.353 0.220 0.203 
Knee Replacement 
 
0.351 0.324 0.229 
Cesarean Section 
 
0.358 0.251 0.179 
Vaginal Delivery 
 
0.324 0.258 0.189 
PTCA 
 
0.461 0.283 0.256 
Colonoscopy 
 
0.393 0.313 0.172 
Lower Limb MRI 
 
0.348 0.312 0.179 
          
Notes: Data for each clinical cohort drawn from January, 2011. Each cell presents a coefficient variation. Column 
(1) presents the CoV of HRR-level average prices across HRRs. Column (2) presents the within-HRR CoV in 
hospital-level average prices then averaged across HRRs. Column (3) presents within-hospital CoV averaged across 
hospitals.   
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Appendix Table XXIX: Cross Sectional Analysis of Hospital Payments in High/Low BCBS Counties, 2008-2011 
Panel A: Prices without HRR Fixed Effects, 2008-2011 
          
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable:  ln(Facilities Price) 
Monopoly 0.190*** 0.190*** 0.155*** 0.225*** 
 
(0.024) (0.025) (0.031) (0.039) 
Duopoly 0.130*** 0.130*** 0.108*** 0.153*** 
 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.024) (0.038) 
Triopoly 0.083*** 0.083*** 0.056** 0.113*** 
 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.028) (0.041) 
HCCI Market Share -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.004* 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 







     Sample Overall Overall Low BCBS High BCBS 
HRR FE No No No No 
Observations 8,772 8,772 6,084 2,688 
          
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. OLS estimates of Equation (2) with standard errors clustered at the HRR-level in parentheses. Facilities prices are 
regression adjusted transaction prices. All regressions include yearly fixed effects. The omitted ownership category is private hospitals. High and low BCBS 





Appendix Table XXIX, continued 
Panel B: Prices with HRR Fixed Effects, 2008-2011 
          
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable:  ln(Facilities Price) 
Monopoly 0.118*** 0.112*** 0.126*** 0.036 
 
(0.024) (0.023) (0.029) (0.039) 
Duopoly 0.073*** 0.069*** 0.073*** 0.023 
 
(0.024) (0.023) (0.025) (0.050) 
Triopoly 0.036 0.036 0.042 -0.001 
 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.046) 
HCCI Market Share -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.008*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 







     Sample Overall Overall Low BCBS High BCBS 
HRR FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,772 8,772 6,084 2,688 
          
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. OLS estimates of Equation (2) with standard errors clustered at the HRR-level in parentheses. Facilities prices are 
regression adjusted transaction prices. All regressions include yearly fixed effects. The omitted ownership category is private hospitals. High and low BCBS 




Appendix Table XXIX, continued 
Panel C: Share of Chargemaster, 2010-2011 
          
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable:  Percent of Cases Paid Share of Charges 
Monopoly 10.455*** 10.215*** 7.917*** 11.924*** 
 
(1.778) (1.813) (2.064) (2.872) 
Duopoly 5.702*** 5.567*** 4.080* 6.604* 
 
(1.596) (1.624) (1.755) (2.788) 
Triopoly 4.909** 4.951** 2.886 4.909 
 
(1.608) (1.601) (1.859) (2.692) 
HCCI Market Share -0.403*** -0.367** -0.320* -0.702** 
 
(0.120) (0.125) (0.128) (0.254) 







     Sample Overall Overall Low BCBS High BCBS 
HRR FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,344 4,344 2,980 1,364 
          
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. OLS estimates of Equation (2) with standard errors clustered at the HRR-level in parentheses. All regressions include 
controls for the number of technologies, an indicator for whether the hospital was ranked in US News and World Reports, bed count, hospital ownership type, 
local area characteristics, and public payer characteristics, as well as yearly fixed effects and HRR fixed-effects. The dependent variable is hospital-level measure 




Appendix Table XXIX, continued 
Panel D: Share Linked to Medicare, 2010-2011 
          
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable:  Percent of Cases Tied to Medicare 
Monopoly -11.293*** -11.342*** -14.721*** -2.779 
 
(3.160) (3.175) (3.666) (5.520) 
Duopoly -5.595** -5.634** -6.271** -7.414 
 
(2.316) (2.319) (2.770) (4.790) 
Triopoly -5.747** -5.744** -6.760** -1.960 
 
(2.790) (2.792) (3.361) (4.842) 
HCCI Market Share 0.616*** 0.626*** 0.470** 1.590*** 
 
(0.174) (0.166) (0.188) (0.328) 







     Sample Overall Overall Low BCBS High BCBS 
HRR FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,669 3,669 2,620 1,049 
          
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. OLS estimates of Equation (2) with standard errors clustered at the HRR-level in parentheses. The dependent variable is 
the percent of cases paid as a percent of Medicare, conditional on being paid on a prospective payment schedule. All regressions include controls for the number 
of technologies, an indicator for whether the hospital was ranked in US News and World Reports, bed count, hospital ownership type, local area characteristics, 
and public payer characteristics, as well as yearly fixed effects and HRR fixed-effects. High and low BCBS share defined as above or below 51 percent. 
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Appendix Table XXX: Post-Merger Price Effects in High/Low BCBS Markets 
                  
         
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  
      ln(price)       
         Distance (miles): 5 10 15 20 25 30 50 
         Panel A: Full Sample 
       
 
Post-Merger 0.060** 0.039** 0.021 0.023* 0.024** 0.014 0.008 
  
(0.025) (0.019) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) 
 
Observations 8,655 8,655 8,655 8,655 8,655 8,655 8,655 
         Panel B: Low BCBS Share 
      
 
Post-Merger 0.074*** 0.053** 0.040** 0.038** 0.035*** 0.027** 0.022** 
  
(0.028) (0.021) (0.016) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) 
 
Observations 5,831 5,831 5,831 5,831 5,831 5,831 5,831 
Panel C: High BCBS Share 
      
 
Post-Merger 0.021 0.015 -0.003 0.013 0.016 0.014 0.007 
  
(0.050) (0.033) (0.021) (0.018) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) 
 
Observations 2,847 2,847 2,847 2,847 2,847 2,847 2,847 
                  
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. OLS estimates with standard errors clustered at the hospital-level in 
parentheses. Facilities prices are regression adjusted transaction prices. All regressions include hospital fixed effects 
and yearly fixed effects.  
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Appendix Figure I: Hospital Mergers and Acquisitions by Year
 
Notes: This figure shows the number of unique hospital merger and acquisition transactions by year. Authors’ 
calculations based on data from the AHA, Irving-Levin Associates, Factset, and SDC Platinum databases. See 
Appendices A and D for details.  
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Appendix Figure II: HCCI Data Coverage Rates by State 
 
 
Notes: Coverage rates = number of HCCI lives enrolled divided by total number of beneficiaries. Coverage rates 
were calculated using 2011 HCCI enrollment data. Statewide insurance coverage totals were derived from the 
American Community Survey for 2011. All numbers in percentages. 
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Lower Limb MRI 
 
Notes: These are scatter plots of hospital charges for our main procedures and regression-adjusted transaction prices 
(“negotiated prices”).  We include providers who deliver 10 or more of the specific procedure per year (50 for 
inpatient). We include prices from 2011. The figures contain the correlation between charges and transaction prices. 
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Appendix Figure IV: Map of Inpatient Spending per Privately Insured Beneficiary, 2011  
 
        
Mean SD Min Max 
$1,059 $258 $453 $2,485 
 
Notes: This figure captures risk-adjusted inpatient spending per beneficiary by HRR using data from 2011. Each bin 











Appendix Figure V: Map of Total and Inpatient Spending per Medicare Beneficiary, 2011 
Panel A: Total Medicare Spending per Beneficiary, 2011 
 
        
Mean SD Min Max 
$9,316 $1,315 $6,843 $14,487 
 
Panel B: Medicare Inpatient Spending Per Beneficiary, 2011 
 
        
Mean SD Min Max 
$4,430 $759 $3,076 $8,394 
 
Notes: Medicare data are drawn from the Dartmouth Atlas (dartmouthatlas.org). Private data are risk-adjusted for 
age and sex using indirect standardization. Spending data do not include prescription drug spending. 
70 
  




































    
     
$24,565  Mean  $8,258 
$10,894 – $50,476  Min - Max  $2,424 – $18,679 
$15,501 – $33,933  p10 - p90  $5,154 – $12,109 
$19,231 – $29,319  IQR  $6,317 – $9,815 
2.19  p90/10 ratio  2.35 
0.29  Coefficient of Variation  0.33 
0.16  Gini Coefficient  0.18 
341  Number of Hospitals  926 
     
Panel A: Hip Replacement Prices Panel B: Cesarean Section Prices 
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$5,465  Mean  $25,395 
$1,944 – $13,039  Min - Max  $9,293 – $58,433 
$3,486 – $7,814  p10 - p90  $15,965 – $37,097 
$4,218 – $6,387  IQR  $19,034 – $30,528 
2.24  p90/10 ratio  2.32 
0.32  Coefficient of Variation  0.34 
0.17  Gini Coefficient  0.19 
1,022 Number of Hospitals 375 
     
Panel C: Vaginal Delivery Prices Panel D: PTCA Prices 
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Notes: Each bar represents a single hospital’s regression-adjusted transaction price based on hospital cases from 2011. The Medicare payment 















   
    
$1,834  Mean  
$520 – $4,878  Min - Max  
$1,056 – $2,747  p10 - p90  
$1,357 – $2,197  IQR  
2.6  p90/10 ratio  
0.37  Coefficient of Variation  
0.2  Gini Coefficient  
844 Number of Hospitals  
    





Appendix Figure VII: Regression Adjusted HRR-Level Inpatient Hospital Prices Normalized 
Using the Medicare Wage Index 
 
Notes: This figure presents coverage hospital regression adjusted inpatient prices per HRR, weighted by hospital 
activity, using data from 2011 and normalized prices using the Medicare 2011 wage index. This therefore captures 









Appendix Figure VIII: Contract Classification Rates by Minimum Case Count 
 
 
Notes: This figure presents fraction of cases classified as either prospective payment or paid as a percent markup 
over Medicare. Data is at the case level in the Inpatient sample in 2010 and 2011. The data include all hospital-DRG 




















Notes: These are bar graphs of the percent of a hospital’s cases paid as a share of charges for our main procedures. 
We include providers who deliver ten or more of the specific procedure per year (50 for inpatient). We include prices 
from 2011. The figures contain bars for each unique hospital, where the height indicates the percent of that hospital’s 
cases that were paid as share of charges. For more detail on how we identify method of payment, see Appendix B3. 
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Appendix Figure X: Correlation between Prices Paid as Share of Charges and Charges across 
DRGs at a High Volume Hospital, 2011 
 
Notes: The y-axis presents logged, DRG-level prices and the x-axis presents logged, DRG-level charges within a 
high volume hospital for inpatient cases which occurred in 2011. 
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Appendix Figure XI: Bivariate Correlations of Hospital HHI with Observable Factors, 2008-2011 
 
Notes: The x-axis captures the bivariate correlations between key variables featured in our regressions and our HHI.  The bars capture the 95 percent confidence 




Appendix Figure XII: Bivariate Correlations of Hospital Percent Paid as Share of Charges with Observable Factors, 2010-2011  
 
Notes: The x-axis captures the bivariate correlations between key variables featured in our regressions and our hospitals’ share of cases at a hospital paid as a 
fraction of a hospitals’ charges.  The bars capture the 95 percent confidence intervals surrounding the correlations. Since these are bivariate correlations 
“Duopoly” is duopoly or monopoly and the implicit omitted category is triopoly or greater. “Triopoly” is triopoly, duopoly or monopoly. For government and 
non-profit, the omitted category is private for-profit hospital.  
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Appendix Figure XIII: Bivariate Correlations of Percent of Prospective Payment Paid as a Share of Medicare with Observable Factors, 
2010-2011 
 
Notes: The x-axis captures the bivariate correlations between key variables featured in our regressions and our hospitals’ share of fixed-price cases linked to the 
Medicare payment rate.  The bars capture the 95 percent confidence intervals surrounding the correlations. Since these are bivariate correlations “Duopoly” is 
duopoly or monopoly and the implicit omitted category is triopoly or greater. “Triopoly” is triopoly, duopoly or monopoly. For government and non-profit, the 
omitted category is private for-profit hospital. 
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Appendix Figure XIV: How merger coefficient changes for mergers between hospitals of different geographical proximity 
 
 
Notes: These are the regression coefficients from Equation (3) of post-merger effects on the log of regression-adjusted price for the sample of inpatient 
admission. These prices are risk-adjusted for DRG, age, and sex. We estimate the model separately for 50 specifications identical to that of Panel A in Table V. 
We allow the merger definition to vary in including merging hospitals within the distances shown on the x-axis. So a value of 10 corresponds to a merger of 





Appendix Figure XV: BCBS Market Share 
 
Notes: These are estimates of the share of covered lives by county covered by BCBS using HealthLeaders Interstudy coupled with Census data. 
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